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Introduction
Common sense suggests that a certain strategic ambiguity can be useful in conflicts.1
“Many different strategies are used to orient toward conflicting interactional goals; some
examples include avoiding interaction altogether, remaining silent, or changing the topic”,
says Eric Eisenberg in his famous article “Ambiguity as strategy in organizational commu-
nication” (Eisenberg (1984)), and he points out that applying one’s resources of ambiguity
is key in successful communication when conflicts of interest are present.
My doctoral thesis introduces such strategic use of ambiguity into games. Although
game theory was invented to model conflicts of interest, so far the theory does not allow
players to intentionally choose ambiguity as a strategy. To this end, I am going back
to the beginnings of game theory. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) introduced
mixed strategies as random devices that are used to conceal one’s behavior. I take up this
interpretation and propose a generalization. In short, I allow players to use Ellsberg urns
in addition to probabilistic devices like a roulette wheel or a die. For example, a player
can base his action on the draw from an urn that contains hundred red and blue balls and
it is only known that the number of red balls is between thirty and fifty. Such urns are
objectively ambiguous, by design; players can thus create ambiguity. The recent advances
in decision theory, which were motivated by Ellsberg’s famous experiments and Knight’s
distinction between risk and uncertainty, allow to model such strategic behavior formally.
Risk and Ambiguity
For every decision we take, we consider possible future implications. We do so by inferring
how our environment will react, and what consequences our decision could have in dif-
ferent states of the world. Knight (1921) observed that not all these possibly influencing
future events can be classified in the same way. Whereas it is easy to derive a probability
distribution for “red” at a roulette table, it is close to impossible to predict more compli-
cated things such as stock prices or if Germany wins the next world cup, with a precise
1 Parts of this introduction were published in the IMW working paper Riedel and Sass (2011). A revised
version of the working paper is published in Riedel and Sass (2013).
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probability distribution.2 While Knight’s point was mainly to draw attention to the role
of experience in making good predictions in complex circumstances3, decision theorists in-
corporated his distinction between risk and ambiguity into decision models, and this with
great success. One major achievement of ambiguity theory is to provide decision models
which resolve the famous Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg (1961)). Most prominent models are
by now the multiple-prior expected utility by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Choquet ex-
pected utility by Schmeidler (1989) and incomplete preferences by Bewley (2002). Many
other authors have added to these models by refining and extending them, others by ap-
plying them to economic and behavioral problems. Interesting applications include, e.g.,
explanation of incomplete contracts (Mukerji (1998)), ambiguity in financial markets (Rig-
otti and Shannon (2005)), asset pricing under ambiguity (Epstein and Schneider (2008)),
optimal stopping with ambiguity (Riedel (2009)), strategies in insurance fraud detection
(Lang and Wambach (2010)), and strategic voting (Ellis (2011)). See Luo and Ma (1999)
and Mukerji and Tallon (2004) for an overview of applications and Etner, Jeleva, and
Tallon (2012) for a comprehensive recent survey on decision theory under ambiguity. A
thorough review of philosophical and mathematical aspects of probability and its influence
on decision theory is presented in Binmore (2008).
Ambiguity in Games
Ambiguity is naturally present in strategic contexts. A human is a complex opponent and
hence strategic interaction can be fruitfully modeled using ambiguity in the Knightian
sense. The existing literature on ambiguity in games can be devided into two branches,
based on the co-existing interpretations of mixed strategies in the literature. The Bayesian
view of mixed strategies has been generalized to ambiguity starting with Dow and Werlang
(1994), Lo (1996), and Marinacci (2000), and followed by many other authors. There, the
interpretation of mixed strategies as beliefs about others’ actions is generalized to un-
certain beliefs in the sense of the decision-theoretic literature on Knightian uncertainty
(Schmeidler (1989), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)). The other interpretation, where a
mixed strategy is seen as an objective randomizing device, has to my knowledge not been
generalized to ambiguity until now, with one exception. Bade (2011b) allows for ambigu-
ous Anscombe-Aumann acts, and is closer to my approach in that sense. However, she
2 “The instance in question is so entirely unique that there are no others or not a sufficient number to
make it possible to tabulate enough like it to form a basis for any inference of value about any real
probability in the case we are interested in”, Knight (1921) p. 226.
3 Knight (1921) writes (p. 228): “Men do form, on the basis of experience, more or less valid opinions as to
their own capacity to form correct judgements, and even of the capacities of other men in this regard”,
and further, p. 229 therein, this is “the most important endowment for which wages are received”.
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assumes that ambiguity is a subjective part of players’ preferences, and thus generalizes
Aumann’s subjective equilibria (Aumann (1974)). In opposition to her concept using sub-
jective preferences, my approach takes purely the Von Neumann and Morgenstern point
of view. Players can use ambiguity-creating devices modeled as sets of probabilities over
the pure strategies, and players have ambiguity-averse preferences over these sets. Thus, I
generalize the classical model to incorporate Knightian uncertainty in an objective sense,
as it was recently axiomatized from a decision-theoretic point of view by Gajdos, Hayashi,
Tallon, and Vergnaud (2008).
How does the possibility to use ambiguity as a strategy change the game? I propose
in this thesis a model of Ellsberg games that differs from the classical Von Neumann and
Morgenstern model merely in the one aspect that players may use (objectively ambiguous)
Ellsberg urns in addition to mixed strategies; these Ellsberg urns are modeled as convex
and compact sets of mixed strategies. A remarkable consequence is that players, once
offered the possibility to use these Ellsberg urns, actually use them, even though they are
ambiguity-averse.4 New equilibria emerge, which are not Nash equilibria in the original
game, with outcomes that are not in the support of the original Nash equilibrium. I explain
this in Section 1.4 with an example of a peace negotiation taken from Greenberg (2000).
This game has a unique Nash equilibrium in which war is the outcome; there is another,
as I call it, Ellsberg equilibrium, in which peace is the outcome. Other examples show that,
as in the classical case, my approach will have the most fruitful applications in games of
conflict where it is in players’ own interest to conceal their behavior. The approach might
seem less plausible in common interest games. However, the theory in its abstract form
applies there as well, of course, and I think it is useful to study the consequences in such
games, too. Interestingly, the concealment of Nash equilibrium and maximin behavior
that I observe in two-player Ellsberg games in Section 2.6, has its strongest realization in
symmetric coordination games (Section 3.2).
Objective Ambiguity as a Strategy
An important modeling aspect of Ellsberg games is that ambiguity is present in an objec-
tive sense, and not in the subjective sense mostly encountered in applications of ambiguity.
I do not use ambiguity merely in the beliefs of the players, but in the actual strategies.
This has an important implication: using objective ambiguity as a strategy means that
players cannot have a look into their own urn. They intentionally choose a device that
4 In this sense, the assumption of ambiguity-aversion is parsimonious as it makes it harder for players to
introduce Knightian uncertainty. They do not use Ellsberg urns for love of uncertainty.
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leaves themselves uncertain about the pure strategy eventually played, once uncertainty
is resolved. Players choose to know less about their own play than they could know. This
may sound surprising or implausible at first. It is, however, the natural generalization of
the usual mixed strategy when it is interpreted as an objective device to conceal one’s be-
havior, as in the classical justification by Von Neumann and Morgenstern. The founders of
game theory justify the use of random devices in zero-sum games by a thought experiment.
If your opponent might find out your strategy, then it is optimal to conceal your behavior
by using a random device. I just go one step further and allow players to use Ellsberg
urns to conceal their strategy in the objective sense of Von Neumann and Morgenstern.
Notably, this modeling approach also specifies the type of strategic ambiguity we deal
with in Ellsberg games. One could imagine to model strategic ambiguity differently,
namely in a way that players pick a pure strategy which they then conceal and pretend
not to play, only to eventually stick to it anyhow. This kind of behavior is also a type
of strategic ambiguity. However, in Ellsberg games, their plan is to use a strategy that
gives no clue to the opponent in case their strategy is found out; what also implies that
the player himself knows as little (or as much) about his own strategy as his opponent.
The former kind of strategic ambiguity is also highly interesting, but is not content of my
analysis here.
Creation of Objective Ambiguity
How can players create such objective ambiguity? Indeed, some people think that it is
impossible for a player to randomize by throwing a “mental” coin, how should a player
then be able to use “mental” Ellsberg urns, which seem even more complex constructs
than simple randomizing devices. But Ellsberg urns are not necessarily more difficult
to play, on the contrary, they can make the game easier. Ellsberg urns leave room for
mistakes: in classical games with only mixed strategies, not playing the exact correct
mixture leads automatically to a suboptimal payoff. Not so in Ellsberg games. Ellsberg
equilibrium strategies can be different sets of probability distributions which all give the
same equilibrium payoff, hence, making small mistakes does not change the players’ payoff.
Another interpretation of ambiguous actions in game theory is closer to the behavioral
and psychological literature. Gigerenzer (2007), e.g., claims that not assessing all possibil-
ities and information about a choice is often better, more efficient or more satisfying for a
human decision maker. Using an Ellsberg strategy where the exact probability of choosing
an action is not specified might be viewed as one way to model such mental efficiency.
4
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Many times during my presentations of the working paper Riedel and Sass (2011), the
question came up what Ellsberg strategies could actually be in real life. This question
always led to vivid discussions, I want to present two of the suggestions made5 as examples
of Ellsberg strategies.
For the first example imagine a tax authority that is interested in minimizing tax fraud.
To this end, it uses a mechanism of selective inspection of tax payers, which is too com-
plicated to completely understand and to form a precise prior about the probability of
being inspected. Even the tax authority has designed it in a way that does not allow it
to form a precise prior, in order to protect its employees from bribery. This too complex
mechanism is an example for an Ellsberg urn.
As a second example, think of a state minister of, e.g., environment who promotes a
new law of environmental protection. He is head of a large machinery of civil servants and
if he suggests a new law, the passing of this law depends (in Germany) on the decisions
of Bundesrat and Bundespra¨sident. When the minister makes a public announcement
about the characteristics of the new law, the citizens as well as himself do not know what
the law will actually be like when it has gone through the institutional process of being
implemented. In that sense the minister is playing with an Ellsberg strategy. This in-
terpretation of Ellsberg strategies is close to the notion of imprecise information, see for
example Giraud and Tallon (2011), which is a reason why I adapted the axiomatization
of attitude towards imprecise information from Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud
(2008).
Having the above interpretations and examples in mind, I suggest the following, for the
intent and purpose of this work practical, way how to think of Ellsberg urns while reading
this thesis: the players have the possibility to delegate the creation of ambiguity to an
independent laboratory. Players can order any kind of Ellsberg urn that they might want
to use in the Ellsberg game they are facing. When it comes to playing, the players draw
a colored ball from their ambiguous urn and choose their strategy according to the color
drawn. Of course, in some games the same kind of commitment problems as with classical
mixed strategies can arise.
Why Ellsberg Games?
The important contribution of Ellsberg games to the existing game theory literature lies,
to my mind, mainly in providing a model in which people can deliberately choose how
5 I am grateful to a seminar participant at WZB in October 2012 for suggesting the first example and to
a seminar participant at Exeter University in April 2012 for suggesting the second example.
5
Introduction
ambiguous they want their strategy to be. In fact, in other models ambiguity has been
found, already some time ago, to be a most natural strategy in human interaction. For
example, in strategic information transmission models such as suggested by Crawford and
Sobel (1982), ambiguity (or vagueness, or concealment) was found to be the prevalent
strategy when conflict of interest is present. The partition equilibria in their model, i.e.,
sending the same message for an interval of types, are in interpretation closely connected
to Ellsberg equilibrium. I want to draw attention to the fact that also in games ambiguity
is a most natural strategy.
With my thesis I seek to set up such a model which allows the strategic use of ambiguity
in games, and explore its basic properties and implications. Of course, there are many
aspects which I do not cover in the present text. Furthermore, certain facets of strategic
ambiguity in games cannot be explained with the way I define Ellsberg games. However,
the modeling choices I make seem to me a good starting point in oder to explore further
how ambiguity can be used as a strategy in interactive contexts.
Topics and Main Results of this Work
My doctoral thesis consists of six chapters, Chapter 1 - 5 on strategic use of ambiguity
in normal form games and Chapter 6 on dynamic Ellsberg games. I summarize the main
results of each chapter in the following.
In Chapter 1, I first discuss the conceptual foundations of my approach. To this end,
I compare the two interpretations of mixed strategies as objective random devices (Von
Neumann and Morgenstern) or as beliefs about other players’ pure actions (the Bayesian
view). I discuss in Section 1.2 how the ambiguity-averse players in Ellsberg games eval-
uate the objective ambiguity inherent in the Ellsberg strategies. Section 1.3 deals with
the definition and first characterization of Ellsberg games in normal form. I define the
theoretical framework for Ellsberg games in Section 1.3.2, followed by the introduction of
Ellsberg equilibrium. Subsequently in Section 1.3.3, I show the equivalence of Ellsberg
equilibrium to a reduced form Ellsberg equilibrium, where the state space is represented
by the set of pure strategies. This leads to a simplification of Ellsberg equilibrium which
facilitates the calculation of equilibria. The proposition on equivalence reads
Proposition 1.3. Ellsberg equilibrium and reduced form Ellsberg equilibrium are equiv-
alent in the sense that every Ellsberg equilibrium ((Ω∗,F∗,P∗), f∗) induces a payoff-
equivalent reduced form Ellsberg equilibrium on Ω∗ = S; and every reduced form Ellsberg
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equilibrium Q∗ is an Ellsberg equilibrium ((S,F ,Q∗), f∗) with f∗ the embedding of S in
∆S.
Most importantly, Ellsberg equilibria generalize Nash equilibria, hence Ellsberg equilibria
exist. This is formulated in the following theorem in Section 1.3.4.
Theorem 1.4. Let G = 〈N, (Si), (ui)〉 be a normal form game. Then a mixed strategy
profile (P ∗1 , . . . , P ∗n) of G is a Nash equilibrium of G if and only if the corresponding
profile of singletons (P1, . . . ,Pn) with Pi = {δP ∗i } is an Ellsberg equilibrium. In particular,
Ellsberg equilibria exist when the strategy sets Si are finite.
I prove a Principle of Indifference in Distributions in Section 1.3.5. It shows that a player
is indifferent between all the mixed strategies which are part of his Ellsberg equilibrium
strategy.
Theorem 1.14 (Principle of Indifference in Distributions). Let (P∗1 , . . . ,P∗n) be an Ellsberg
equilibrium of a normal form game G = 〈N, (Si), (ui)〉. Then for all Pi ∈ P∗i ,
min
P−i∈P∗−i
ui(Pi, P−i) = c for some c ∈ R .
In Section 1.3.6, I show that strictly dominated strategies are never used in Ellsberg
equilibrium. Precisely,
Proposition 1.16. Any Ellsberg equilibrium strategy profile (P∗i )i∈N must put weight only
on strategies that are not strictly dominated.
Section 1.4 provides the leading example why Ellsberg games are an interesting object to
study, namely the peace negotiation example from Greenberg (2000) which I mentioned
earlier. The section closes with a discussion of the existing literature and the relation of
the different approaches to my model in Section 1.5.
Chapter 2 provides insight into immunization against strategic ambiguity. In normal
form Ellsberg games players often have a strategy available that immunizes them against
any ambiguity played by their opponents. The hedging effect of ambiguity aversion leads
to this phenomenon. In this chapter I look at these immunization strategies more closely. I
start by giving an example in Section 2.1 and then, after defining immunization strategies,
calculate the immunization strategies of a large class of 2× 2 games in Section 2.3. I then
provide some examples which show that in certain games players immunize themselves
against ambiguity by playing their maximin strategy. To generalize this observation, I
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prove in Section 2.5 under which circumstances in general two-player games the immu-
nization strategy is the maximin strategy of the players. The result is formulated in the
following theorem
Theorem 2.8. Let G be a square two-person normal form game with a completely mixed
Nash equilibrium (P ∗, Q∗). If player 1 (2) has an immunization strategy P¯ (Q¯) in G, then
P¯ (Q¯) is a maximin strategy of player 1 (2).
The last section, Section 2.6, uses the results of the chapter to characterize the role of im-
munization strategies in Ellsberg equilibria. I explain that in many 2× 2 games, Ellsberg
equilibria are bounded by the immunization and the Nash equilibrium strategy.
In Chapter 3, I present a number of examples and properties of Ellsberg equilibria of
normal form games with two players. I start with an explanation on how to compute
Ellsberg equilibria of two-person 2 × 2 games. Subsequently, in Sections 3.2-3.5, I look
at different classes of games: coordination games, conflict games and zero-sum games. I
analyze examples and derive general results on the Ellsberg equilibria of these classes of
normal form games, supplemented by tables (summarized in Table 3.1) for the Ellsberg
equilibria of general coordination and conflict games. Following this, I prove in Section
3.5 that two-person zero-sum games are value preserving.
Theorem 3.18. Let G be a two-person zero-sum game. Then for all i ∈ {1, 2} and every
Ellsberg equilibrium (P∗,Q∗) we have
max
Pi⊆∆Si
min
P−i⊆∆S−i
Ui(P,Q) = minP−i⊆∆S−i maxPi⊆∆Si Ui(P,Q) = Ui(P
∗,Q∗) .
In Section 3.6, I calculate the Ellsberg equilibria of some classic 2× 2 games such as, e.g.,
Hawk and Dove and the Prisoners’ Dilemma. I explain with an example by Myerson, that
also games with linear (as opposed to piecewise linear) payoff functions can have proper
Ellsberg equilibria. I close the chapter in Section 3.7 with an analysis of a special class of
3 × 3 games. I consider a slightly modified version of Rock Scissors Paper, and with the
help of the experience with 2 × 2 games I succeed in calculating the Ellsberg equilibria
of these games. For a better understanding of how the equilibria of modified circulant
games can be determined, I provide a geometric analysis of the equilibrium strategies in
the two-dimensional probability simplex.
In Chapter 4, I present some thoughts on a general interpretation of Ellsberg equilibria,
and I provide a classification of when ambiguity is an option in two-player Ellsberg equi-
libria. I am on the one hand interested in human behavior in two-person games and its
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connection to Ellsberg equilibria. In an experiment with a modified version of Matching
Pennies similar to mine, Goeree and Holt (2001) observe that Nash equilibrium prediction
was frequently violated; interestingly, Ellsberg equilibria can explain this behavior. In Sec-
tion 4.2 on the other hand, I classify Ellsberg equilibria that are supported by strategies
which are not in the support of any Nash equilibrium of the game. These Ellsberg equi-
libria arise frequently in games with weakly dominated strategies and have an interesting
behavioral interpretation. Finally, in Section 4.3, I characterize in which circumstances
and how ambiguity is used in Ellsberg equilibria in two-person games. This analysis pro-
vides an answer to the question in which 2×2 games proper Ellsberg equilibria exist. The
result is summarized by the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2. Let G be a two-person normal form game with a unique completely mixed
Nash equilibrium (P ∗, Q∗). There exist Ellsberg equilibria with unilateral full ambiguity if
and only if either P ∗ or Q∗ is maximin. The Ellsberg equilibria are of the following form:
(P ∗, [Q0, Q1]), where Q0 < Q∗ < Q1, if P ∗ = M1 ,
and ([P0, P1] , Q
∗), where P0 < P ∗ < P1, if Q∗ = M2 .
If P ∗ is also an immunization strategy for player 1, then the profiles (P ∗,Q) with Q∗ ∈ Q
form an Ellsberg equilibrium (and similar for player 2 if Q∗ is an immunization strategy).
Chapter 5 analyzes the relation of Ellsberg equilibria with subjective equilibria defined
by Aumann (1974). In the preceding chapters I presented the basic properties of Ellsberg
equilibria and analyzed how players behave when one allows them to use objective ambigu-
ity in two-player games. Naturally, I want to characterize what can happen in games with
more than two players. To tackle this problem, I first investigate the relation of Ellsberg
equilibrium to the concept of subjective equilibrium. Since there exists no other solution
concept that allows players to use sets of probabilities as their strategy, the question of
comparison has to be answered with regard to the attainability of certain outcomes. The
objective is to find out under which conditions subjective equilibria can (or cannot) have
the same support as Ellsberg equilibria.
I start in Section 5.1 with an example of a three-player game, a mediated Prisoners’
Dilemma, where an Ellsberg equilibrium exists that attains an outcome that is not in the
support of any Nash equilibria of the game, namely cooperation of the two prisoners. This
suggests that in very simple games with more than two players the prediction of Ellsberg
equilibrium can be quite different from the Nash equilibrium prediction. Subsequently, in
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Section 5.2.1, I define subjective equilibrium in the spirit of Aumann (1974) and Hallin
(1976) and subjective beliefs equilibrium like Lo (1996). I show in Section 5.2.2 that every
Ellsberg equilibrium contains a subjective equilibrium and a subjective beliefs equilibrium.
In two-player games, subjective beliefs equilibria have the same support as Nash equilibria,
but this changes for three players. This explains that in Ellsberg games with more than
two players outcomes outside the Nash equilibrium support can be attained; this is treated
in Section 5.2.3. To this end I prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5.8. If (P∗1 , . . . ,P∗n) is an Ellsberg equilibrium, then there exist µi−i ∈ P∗−i such
that (µ1−1, . . . , µn−n) is a subjective beliefs equilibrium and
arg max
Pi∈∆Si
Ui(Pi,P∗−i) ⊆ arg max
Pi∈∆Si
ui(Pi, µ
i
−i) .
Finally, in Chapter 6, the notion of Ellsberg game and Ellsberg equilibrium is extended
to dynamic games. It is straightforward that Ellsberg urns can also be used as strategies
in dynamic games. In this chapter I develop the theoretical framework to analyze such
extensive form Ellsberg games. As in classic extensive form theory, players can use an urn
to create ambiguity over their set of pure strategies, or they can place an Ellsberg urn at
every decision point in the process of the game. In the first section of the chapter, Section
6.1, I thus extend the notions of mixed strategy and behavioral strategy to extensive form
Ellsberg games.
Considering dynamic games leads directly to the question of dynamic consistency of the
players’ preferences. I discuss this in Section 6.2 and develop a formalism to translate
the notion of rectangularity by Epstein and Schneider (2003b) to extensive form Ellsberg
games. This property of Ellsberg strategies is then used to prove a version of Kuhn’s
Theorem (Kuhn (1953)) for extensive form Ellsberg games. My theorem reads
Theorem 6.7. In an extensive form Ellsberg game (F,U) with F = (T , C) satisfying
perfect recall, every rectangular Ellsberg strategy profile P induces an Ellsberg behavior
strategy profile ΘP via prior-by-prior updating; every Ellsberg behavior strategy profile Θ
induces a rectangular Ellsberg strategy profile PΘ such that prior-by-prior updating of PΘ
yields Θ. The induced strategy profiles are payoff-equivalent, i.e.,
Ui(P) = Ui(ΘP) and Ui(Θ) = Ui(PΘ) .
I present a simple two-player example for intuition, and I provide a picture of the rectangu-
lar Ellsberg strategy derived in the example in the two-dimensional probability simplex.
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Thereafter in Section 6.4, I define the notion of Ellsberg equilibrium in extensive form
Ellsberg games. With the equivalence established in Theorem 6.7, extensive form Ells-
berg games can be analyzed by considering Ellsberg behavior strategies only. However, a
thorough analysis of Ellsberg equilibria in extensive form Ellsberg games lies beyond the
scope of this chapter. Finally, in Section 6.5, I briefly comment on Ellsberg equilibria in
extensive form Ellsberg games and compare Ellsberg equilibria to some other extensive
form solution concepts.
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Introduction en franc¸ais
Il n’est pas difficile d’imaginer des situations de conflit dans lesquelles on peut be´ne´ficier
a` eˆtre ambigue¨. “Many different strategies are used to orient toward conflicting interac-
tional goals; some examples include avoiding interaction altogether, remaining silent, or
changing the topic”, explique Eric Eisenberg dans son fameux article “Ambiguity as strat-
egy in organizational communication” (Eisenberg (1984)). Il remarque que l’emploi de
l’ambigu¨ıte´ est la cle´ d’une communication re´ussie dans la pre´sence des conflits d’inte´reˆts.
Dans ma the`se, j’introduis l’emploi strate´gique de l’ambigu¨ıte´ dans les jeux. Meˆme si la
the´orie des jeux s’e´tait de´veloppe´e afin de mode´liser des conflits d’inte´reˆts, la possibilite´
d’utiliser, avec intention, l’ambigu¨ıte´ comme strate´gie n’est pas prise en compte. Pour
re´aliser cela, je me reviens aux fondements de la the´orie des jeux. Von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1953) ont introduit des strate´gies mixtes comme random devices6, utilise´es
pour dissimuler le comportement du joueur. Je reprends cette interpre´tation et propose
une ge´ne´ralisation. En re´sume´, je permets aux joueurs d’utiliser des urnes d’Ellsberg en
plus des instruments probabilistes comme la roulette ou un de´. Pre´cise´ment, un joueur
peut prendre pour base de son action la couleur d’une boule prise d’une urne avec cent
boules rouge et bleu, sur lesquelles il a comme seule information qu’il y en a entre trente et
cinquante boules rouges. Telles urnes sont objectivement ambigue¨s par construction; les
joueurs peuvent donc cre´er de l’ambigu¨ıte´. Le progre`s re´cent de la the´orie de la de´cision,
motive´ par les expe´riences d’Ellsberg et la distinction du risque et de l’incertitude de
Knight, permet de repre´senter mathe´matiquement ce comportement strate´gique.
Risque et Ambigu¨ıte´
Pour toute de´cision que nous prenons, nous conside´rons ses implications possibles dans
l’avenir. Nous infe´rons comment notre entourage re´agira, et quelles conse´quences notre
de´cision pourrait avoir dans diffe´rents e´tats du monde. Knight (1921) a observe´ que tous
ces e´ve´nements ulte´rieurs ne peuvent pas eˆtre traite´s de la meˆme manie`re. Tandis qu’il
est facile de calculer une distribution de probabilite´ pour l’e´ve´nement “rouge” dans les
jeux de roulette, il est presque impossible d’estimer des choses plus complique´es, comme
6 Une sorte de dispositif ale´atoire. Dans le texte j’utilise l’expression anglaise.
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le cours d’une action ou encore si la France gagnera la prochaine coupe du monde, avec
une distribution de probabilite´ pre´cise.7 Meˆme si le but de Knight e´tait principalement
d’attirer l’attention sur le roˆle de l’expe´rience pour pouvoir prendre des bonnes de´cisions
dans des situations complexes8, sa distinction entre risque et ambigu¨ıte´ a e´te´ inge´re´e dans
des mode`les de de´cision, et avec grand succe`s. Une conqueˆte principale de la the´orie de
l’ambigu¨ıte´ sont des mode`les de de´cision qui de´nouent le paradoxe d’Ellsberg (Ellsberg
(1961)). Les mode`les les plus connus sont jusqu’a` pre´sent le “multiple-prior expected
utility” de Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), et “Choquet expected utility” de Schmeidler
(1989) et “incomplete preferences” de Bewley (2002). Beaucoup d’autres auteurs ont
contribue´ a` ces mode`les, ils les ont affine´s et e´tendus, ou ils les ont applique´s a` des
proble`mes e´conomiques ou comportementaux. Par exemple, des applications comprennent
l’explication des contrats incomplets (Mukerji (1998)), ambigu¨ıte´ dans les marche´s de cap-
itaux (Rigotti and Shannon (2005)), asset pricing sous ambigu¨ıte´ (Epstein and Schneider
(2008)), optimal stopping avec ambigu¨ıte´ (Riedel (2009)), strate´gies contre l’escroquerie
a` l’assurance (Lang and Wambach (2010)), et e´lection strate´gique (Ellis (2011)). Dans
Luo and Ma (1999) et Mukerji and Tallon (2004) se trouve un aperc¸u des applications, et
dans Etner, Jeleva, and Tallon (2012) un survey re´cent sur la the´orie de la de´cision sous
ambigu¨ıte´. Binmore (2008) propose un historique approfondi des aspects philosophes et
mathe´matiques de la probabilite´ et leur influence sur la the´orie de la de´cision.
Ambigu¨ıte´ dans les Jeux
Ambigu¨ıte´ e´merge naturellement dans des situations strate´giques. Un eˆtre humain est
un adversaire complexe et en conse´quence l’interaction strate´gique peut eˆtre mode´lise´ de
manie`re productive avec l’usage d’incertitude Knightienne. La litte´rature qui existe sur
l’ambigu¨ıte´ dans les jeux se divise en deux parties, s’appuyant sur les deux interpre´tations
des strate´gies mixtes qui sont pre´sentes dans le domaine. La vision Baye´sienne des
strate´gies mixtes a e´te´ ge´ne´ralise´ commenc¸ant avec Dow and Werlang (1994), Lo (1996),
et Marinacci (2000), et poursuivi par beaucoup d’autres auteurs. La`, l’interpre´tation des
strate´gies mixtes comme croyance sur les strate´gies pures des adversaire est ge´ne´ralise´e
aux croyances incertaines, mode´lise´es sur la base des mode`les de de´cision avec incertitude
7 “The instance in question is so entirely unique that there are no others or not a sufficient number to
make it possible to tabulate enough like it to form a basis for any inference of value about any real
probability in the case we are interested in”, Knight (1921) p. 226.
8 Knight (1921) e´crit (p. 228): “Men do form, on the basis of experience, more or less valid opinions as to
their own capacity to form correct judgements, and even of the capacities of other men in this regard”,
et continue, p. 229 du meˆme ouvrage, cela est “the most important endowment for which wages are
received”.
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Knightienne (Schmeidler (1989), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)). L’autre interpre´tation,
ou` une strate´gie mixte est un random device objective, n’a pas e´te´ ge´ne´ralise´e a` l’ambigu¨ıte´,
autant que je sache, avec une exception. Bade (2011b) propose des Anscombe-Aumann
acts ambigus, et dans ce sens est plus pre`s de mon approche. Cependant, elle suppose
que l’ambigu¨ıte´ fait partie des pre´fe´rences subjectives du joueur, et alors ge´ne´ralise les
e´quilibres subjective de Aumann (Aumann (1974)). Contrairement a` elle utilisant des
pre´fe´rences subjectives, mon approche ge´ne´ralise purement l’ide´e de Von Neumann et
Morgenstern. Les joueurs peuvent utiliser des instruments qui cre´ent de l’ambigu¨ıte´,
mode´lise´s comme ensemble de distributions de probabilite´ sur des strate´gies pures, et
les joueurs ont des pre´fe´rences adverses a` l’ambigu¨ıte´ par rapport a` ces strate´gies. Ainsi
je ge´ne´ralise le mode`le classique pour inte´grer l’incertitude Knightienne dans un sens ob-
jective, comme c’e´tait axiomatise´ dans un travail re´cent par Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and
Vergnaud (2008).
Comment l’utilisation strate´gique de l’ambigu¨ıte´ influence-t-elle le jeu? Dans cette the`se,
je propose un mode`le de jeux d’Ellsberg, qui se distingue du mode`le classique de Von
Neumann et Morgenstern sur un unique aspect: les joueurs peuvent utiliser des urnes
d’Ellsberg (objectivement ambigue¨s) en plus des strate´gies mixtes; ces urnes d’Ellsberg
sont mode´lise´es comme ensembles convexes et compacts de strate´gies mixtes. Curieuse-
ment, les joueurs utilisent ces urnes d’Ellsberg a` l’e´quilibre, bien qu’ils soient averses a`
l’ambigu¨ıte´.9 De nouveaux e´quilibres, qui ne sont pas des e´quilibres de Nash dans le jeu
original, e´mergent. En plus, les re´alisations ne font pas force´ment parties du support
des e´quilibres de Nash. J’explique ce phe´nome`ne dans la Section 1.4 avec un exemple
sur les ne´gociations de paix de Greenberg (2000). Ce jeu a un unique e´quilibre de Nash
dans lequel la seule re´alisation est la guerre; il existe un autre, que j’appelle l’e´quilibre
d’Ellsberg, dans lequel la paix est re´alise´e. Autres exemples indiquent que, comme dans le
cadre classique, mon approche a des applications tre`s inte´ressantes dans des jeux de con-
flits, quand les joueurs sont inte´resse´s a` dissimuler leur comportement. L’approche peut
a` premie`re vue sembler moins convaincant dans des jeux a` inte´reˆt commun. Cependant
les conse´quences sont parfois remarquables. Par exemple, le raccordement d’e´quilibre de
Nash et de comportement maximin que j’observe dans des jeux d’Ellsberg a` deux joueurs
dans la Section 2.6 s’accentue plus fortement dans des jeux de coordination syme´trique.
9 Dans ce sens, l’hypothe`se d’aversion a` l’ambigu¨ıte´ est parcimonieuse, car elle rend l’introduction
d’incertitude Knightienne plus difficile pour les joueurs. Ils n’utilisent pas des urnes d’Ellsberg pour
l’amour de l’incertitude.
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Ambigu¨ıte´ Objective Comme Strate´gie
Un aspect important des jeux d’Ellsberg est la pre´sence de l’ambigu¨ıte´ dans un sens
objectif, et pas dans le sens subjectif souvent trouve´ dans des application d’ambigu¨ıte´.
Je n’utilise pas l’ambigu¨ıte´ seulement dans les croyances des joueurs, mais directement
dans leurs strate´gies. Cela a une implication importante: utilisant l’ambigu¨ıte´ objective
comme strate´gie veut dire que les joueur ne peuvent pas voir la composition pre´cise de
leur propre urne. Avec intention, ils choisissent un instrument qui les laissent dans le flou
de la strate´gie finalement re´alise´e. Les joueurs choisissent de savoir moins de leur propre
strate´gie qu’il le pourrait. Cela semble surprenant ou peu probable. Cependant, c’est
la ge´ne´ralisation naturelle de la strate´gie mixte interpre´te´e comme instrument objective
de dissimulation, comme elle e´tait introduite par Von Neumann et Morgenstern. Les
fondateurs de la the´orie des jeux justifie l’usage de random devices dans des jeux a` somme
nulle avec une expe´rience de pense´e: si ton adversaire peut de´pister ta strate´gie, il est
optimal de dissimuler ton comportement en utilisant un random device. Je surenche´ri
et donne aux joueurs la possibilite´ d’utiliser des urnes d’Ellsberg pour dissimuler leur
strate´gie dans le sens objective de Von Neumann et Morgenstern.
Remarquablement, cette approche de mode´lisation spe´cifie aussi le genre d’ambigu¨ıte´
strate´gique rencontre´ dans les jeux d’Ellsberg. On peut imaginer de mode´liser l’ambigu¨ıte´
strate´gique autrement, soit que les joueurs choisissent une strate´gie pure, puis font sem-
blant de ne pas vouloir la jouer, avec pour seule fin de la jouer de toute fac¸on. Cependant,
dans des jeux d’Ellsberg, les joueurs planifient d’utiliser une strate´gie qui ne peut pas
eˆtre de´piste´e; ce qui implique qu’eux-meˆmes savent aussi peu sur leur strate´gie que leurs
adversaires. Le premier genre d’ambigu¨ıte´ strate´gique est aussi tre`s inte´ressant, mais ne
fait pas partie de mon analyse.
Cre´ation d’Ambigu¨ıte´ Objective
Comment les joueurs peuvent cre´er une telle ambigu¨ıte´ objective? Certes, il y a des gens
qui estiment impossible pour un joueur de randomiser en jetant une pie`ce “imaginaire”,
comment pourrait-il lui eˆtre possible d’utiliser des urnes d’Ellsberg “imaginaire”, qui sem-
blent eˆtre plus complexes que des random devices. Mais les urnes d’Ellsberg ne sont pas
plus difficile a` utiliser, en contraire, ils peuvent faciliter le jeu. Les urnes d’Ellsberg don-
nent de l’espace a` des fautes: dans les jeux classiques avec seulement les strate´gies mixtes,
ne pas jouer la distribution de probabilite´ exactement correcte me`ne imme´diatement a
une re´alisation pas optimale. Ce n’est pas le cas dans des jeux d’Ellsberg. Les strate´gies
d’e´quilibres d’Ellsberg peuvent eˆtre des ensembles diffe´rents des distributions de proba-
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bilite´ qui tous donne le meˆme paiement d’e´quilibre, et alors des petites fautes des joueurs
ne changent pas le re´sultat.
Une autre interpre´tation des actions ambigue¨s dans la the´orie des jeux est plus pre`s de
la litte´rature comportementale et psychologique. Gigerenzer (2007), par exemple, affirme
que ne pas comprendre toutes les possibilite´s et toute information d’un choix est souvent
mieux, plus efficace ou plus satisfaisant pour un de´cideur humain. Utiliser une strate´gie
d’Ellsberg dans laquelle la probabilite´ exacte de choisir une action n’est pas spe´cifie´e peut
eˆtre regarde´ comme un moyen de mode´liser un telle efficacite´ mentale.
Souvent pendant mes pre´sentations du document de travail Riedel and Sass (2011), on m’a
demande´ un exemple d’une strate´gie d’Ellsberg dans la vie re´elle. Cette question a toujours
mene´e a des vives discussions, et je voudrais pre´senter deux suggestions propose´es10 comme
exemples des strate´gies d’Ellsberg.
Le premier exemple se passe dans un bureaux des contributions qui s’inte´resse a` min-
imiser la fraude fiscale. A ce fin on utilise un me´canisme d’inspection se´lective des con-
tribuables, qui est trop complique´ pour le comprendre comple`tement et pour estimer
une probabilite´ exacte d’eˆtre controˆle´. Meˆme le bureaux des contributions a construit
le me´canisme tel qu’il est impossible d’estimer une probabilite´ exacte pour les employe´s,
pour les prote´ger de corruption. Ce me´canisme complexe est un exemple d’une strate´gie
d’Ellsberg.
Pour le seconde exemple, imaginez un ministre d’e´tat de l’environnement, qui fait la
publicite´ pour une nouvelle loi de protection environnementale. Il est le chef d’une ma-
chinerie e´norme de fonctionnaires et, quand il propose une nouvelle loi, l’adoption de´pend
(en Allemagne) de la de´cision de Bundesrat et du pre´sident. Quand le ministre annonce
publiquement les de´tails de la loi, ni les citoyens ni lui-meˆme savent exactement, com-
ment la loi sera modifie´e apre`s avoir passe´e tout le processus des institutions. Dans ce
sens le ministre joue une strate´gie d’Ellsberg. Cette interpre´tation de strate´gie d’Ellsberg
est connexe a` l’ide´e d’information impre´cise, comme dans Giraud and Tallon (2011), pour
cela j’utilise l’axiomatisation d’attitude envers l’information impre´cise de Gajdos, Hayashi,
Tallon, and Vergnaud (2008).
Avec les interpre´tations et exemples a` disposition, je propose la fac¸on suivante d’imaginer
des strate´gies d’Ellsberg a` la lecture de cette the`se: les joueurs ont la possibilite´ de de´le´guer
la cre´ation de l’ambigu¨ıte´ a` un laboratoire inde´pendant. Les joueurs peuvent commander
toute sorte d’urne d’Ellsberg qu’ils voudraient utiliser dans le jeu. Quand le jeu est
10 Je remercie un intervenant de se´minaire a` WZB en octobre 2012 d’avoir propose´ le premier exemple, et
un intervenant de se´minaire a` Exeter University en avril 2012 d’avoir propose´ le deuxie`me.
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re´alise´, les joueurs prennent une boule colore´e de leur urne ambigue¨ et choisissent leur
strate´gie conforme a` la couleur re´alise´e. Bien suˆr, dans quelques jeux le meˆme proble`me
d’engagement peut e´merger qu’avec les strate´gies mixtes classiques.
Pourquoi des Jeux d’Ellsberg?
La contribution importante des jeux d’Ellsberg a` la the´orie des jeux de´ja` existante se
trouve, a` mon avis, principalement dans la provision d’un mode`le dans lequel les joueurs
peuvent choisir, avec intention, le de´gre´e d’ambigu¨ıte´ de leur strate´gie. En effet, dans
d’autres mode`les classiques, l’ambigu¨ıte´ a e´te´ de´couverte eˆtre une strate´gie totalement
naturelle dans l’interaction humaine. Par exemple, dans les mode`les de transmission
strate´gique d’information propose´s par Crawford and Sobel (1982), l’ambigu¨ıte´ (ou le
vague, ou la dissimulation) s’e´tait trouve´e eˆtre une strate´gie dominante en pre´sence des
conflits d’inte´reˆts. Les e´quilibres partitionels envoient le meˆme message pour un ensem-
ble de types et ont donc une interpre´tation connexe aux e´quilibres d’Ellsberg. De meˆme
manie`re, dans les jeux, l’ambigu¨ıte´ est une strate´gie naturelle.
Dans ma the`se, je propose un tel cadre d’analyse permettant d’utiliser l’incertitude Knight-
ienne de manie`re strate´gique, et j’explore les proprie´te´s et implications de ce changement.
Bien suˆr, il y a beaucoup d’aspects que je ne traite pas. De plus, certaines facettes
de l’ambigu¨ıte´ strate´gique ne peux pas eˆtre compris avec ma fac¸on de de´finir les jeux
d’Ellsberg. Cependant, mes choix de mode´lisation semblent un bon point de de´part pour
explorer plus profonde´ment comment l’ambigu¨ıte´ est utilise´e strate´giquement dans des
contextes interactives.
Re´sultats Principaux
Ma the`se contient six chapitres, les chapitres 1 a` 5 traitent de l’utilisation strate´gique de
l’ambigu¨ıte´ dans des jeux sous forme normale et le chapitre 6 e´tudie les jeux sous forme
extensive. Je re´sume les re´sultats principaux de chaque chapitre comme suit.
Dans le Chapitre 1, je commence avec la discussion des fondations conceptuelles de mon
approche. Pour cela je fais la comparaison des deux interpre´tations des strate´gies mixtes
comme random devices objectives (Von Neumann et Morgenstern) et comme croyances sur
les strate´gies pures des autres joueurs (vision Baye´sienne). Dans la Section 1.2 j’analyse
comment les joueurs averses a` l’ambigu¨ıte´ e´valuent l’ambiguite´ objective dans les strate´gies
d’Ellsberg. La Section 1.3 traite la de´finition et une premie`re caracte´risation des jeux
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d’Ellsberg sous forme normale. Je de´finis le cadre d’analyse des jeux d’Ellsberg dans la
Section 1.3.2, suivi par l’introduction des e´quilibres d’Ellsberg. Ensuite, dans la Section
1.3.3, je pre´sente l’e´quivalence de l’e´quilibre d’Ellsberg et sa forme re´duite, ou` l’espace des
e´tats est repre´sente´ par l’ensemble des strate´gies pures. Cela me`ne a` une simplification des
e´quilibres d’Ellsberg qui facilite le calcule des e´quilibres. La proposition sur l’e´quivalence
est la suivante.
Proposition 1.3. Les e´quilibres d’Ellsberg (de la forme normale) et ceux de la forme
re´duite sont e´quivalents dans le sens que chaque e´quilibre d’Ellsberg ((Ω∗,F∗,P∗), f∗)
induit un e´quilibre d’Ellsberg en forme re´duite avec le meˆme paiement sur Ω∗ = S; et
chaque e´quilibre d’Ellsberg en forme re´duite Q∗ est un e´quilibre d’Ellsberg ((S,F ,Q∗), f∗)
ou` f∗ est l’encadrement de S dans ∆S.
Particulie`rement, les e´quilibres d’Ellsberg ge´ne´ralisent les e´quilibres de Nash et alors, ils
existent. Cela est formule´ dans le the´ore`me suivant dans la Section 1.3.4.
Theorem 1.4. Soit G = 〈N, (Si), (ui)〉 un jeu sous forme normale. Un profil de strate´gies
mixtes (P ∗1 , . . . , P ∗n) de G est un e´quilibre de Nash de G si et seulement si le profil cor-
respondant de singletons (P1, . . . ,Pn) avec Pi = {δP ∗i } est un e´quilibre d’Ellsberg. En
conse´quence, les e´quilibres d’Ellsberg existent quand les ensembles de strate´gies Si sont
finis.
Je prouve un Principe d’Indiffe´rence en Distributions dans la Section 1.3.5. Cela montre
qu’un joueur est indiffe´rent entre toutes les strate´gies mixtes qui font partie de sa strate´gie
d’e´quilibre d’Ellsberg.
Theorem 1.14 (Principe d’Indiffe´rence en Distributions). Soit (P∗1 , . . . ,P∗n) un e´quilibre
d’Ellsberg d’un jeu sous forme normale G = 〈N, (Si), (ui)〉. Pour tout Pi ∈ P∗i ,
min
P−i∈P∗−i
ui(Pi, P−i) = c pour un c ∈ R .
Dans la Section 1.3.6, je prouve que les strate´gies strictement domine´es ne sont jamais
utilise´es dans un e´quilibre d’Ellsberg. Pre´cise´ment,
Proposition 1.16. Tout profil de strate´gies d’e´quilibre d’Ellsberg (P∗i )i∈N ne doit mettre
un pois positive que sur des strate´gies qui ne sont pas strictement domine´es.
La Section 1.4 pre´sente l’exemple principale d’inte´reˆt a` e´tudier les jeux d’Ellsberg, c’est
l’exemple des ne´gociations de paix de Greenberg (2000) que j’ai mentionne´ ci-dessus. La
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section finit avec la discussion de litte´rature proche et le rapport entre les diffe´rentes ap-
proches et mon mode`le dans la Section 1.5.
Le Chapitre 2 analyse le concept d’immunisation contre l’ambigu¨ıte´ strate´gique. Dans
les jeux d’Ellsberg sous forme normale, les joueurs ont souvent une strate´gie disponible
qui les immunise contre toute l’ambigu¨ıte´ utilise´e par leurs adversaires. L’effet “hedg-
ing” de l’aversion contre l’ambigu¨ıte´ me`ne a` ce phe´nome`ne. Dans ce chapitre, j’analyse
ces strate´gies d’immunisation de plus pre`s. Je commence avec un exemple dans la Sec-
tion 2.1 et puis, apre`s avoir de´fini les strate´gies d’immunisation, je calcule les strate´gies
d’immunisation d’une classe large de jeux 2× 2 (Section 2.3). Ensuite, je pre´sente des ex-
emples qui montrent que dans certains jeux, les joueurs s’immunisent contre l’ambigu¨ıte´ en
jouant leur strate´gie maximin. Pour ge´ne´raliser cette observation, je prouve dans la Section
2.5 sous quelles circonstances dans des jeux a` deux joueurs, la strate´gie d’immunisation
est exactement la strate´gie maximin des joueurs. Le re´sultat se trouve dans le the´ore`me
suivant.
Theorem 2.8. Soit G un jeu sous forme normale avec deux joueurs et un e´quilibre de
Nash comple`tement mixte (P ∗, Q∗). Si joueur 1 (resp. 2) a une strate´gie d’immunisation
P¯ (Q¯) dans G, P¯ (Q¯) est une strate´gie maximin du joueur 1 (resp. 2).
Dans la dernie`re partie de ce chapitre, Section 2.6, j’utilise les re´sultats obtenus pour car-
acte´riser le roˆle des strate´gies d’immunisation dans les e´quilibres d’Ellsberg. J’explique
que dans beaucoup de jeux 2× 2, les e´quilibres d’Ellsberg sont restreints par la strate´gie
d’immunisation et la strate´gie d’e´quilibre de Nash.
Dans Chapitre 3, je pre´sente des exemples et proprie´te´s d’e´quilibres d’Ellsberg dans des
jeux sous forme normale avec deux joueurs. Je commence par expliquer comment calculer
les e´quilibre d’Ellsberg des jeux 2×2. Dans ce qui suit, dans les Sections 3.2-3.5, j’analyse
des classes diffe´rentes de jeux: les jeux de coordination, de conflit ou a` somme nulle. Je
calcule des exemples et je de´duis aussi des re´sultats ge´ne´raux sur les e´quilibres d’Ellsberg
dans certains jeux sous forme normale (voir le re´sume´ dans Table 3.1 pour les e´quilibres
d’Ellsberg dans des jeux de coordination et de conflit). Apre`s cela, je prouve dans la
Section 3.5 que les jeux a` somme nulle avec deux joueurs pre´servent la valeur.
Theorem 3.18. Soit G un jeu a` somme nulle avec deux joueurs. Pour toute i ∈ {1, 2}
et tout e´quilibre d’Ellsberg (P∗,Q∗),
max
Pi⊆∆Si
min
P−i⊆∆S−i
Ui(P,Q) = minP−i⊆∆S−i maxPi⊆∆Si Ui(P,Q) = Ui(P
∗,Q∗) .
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Dans la Section 3.6, je calcule les e´quilibres d’Ellsberg d’un nombre de jeux classiques 2×2
comme, par exemple, Hawk and Dove, et Prisoners’ Dilemma. J’explique avec un exemple
de Myerson, que meˆme des jeux ayant des fonctions de paiement line´aires (a` l’inverse de
line´arite´ par morceaux) peuvent avoir des propres e´quilibres d’Ellsberg. Je finis le chapitre
dans la Section 3.7 avec une classe spe´ciale de jeux 3× 3. J’analyse une version modifie´e
de Pierre Papier Ciseaux, et avec la connaissance des re´sultats pour les jeux 2×2 j’arrive a`
calculer les e´quilibre d’Ellsberg dans ces jeux. Pour une meilleure compre´hension de com-
ment calculer les e´quilibres d’Ellsberg dans de tels jeux circulants, je montre une analyse
ge´ome´trique des strate´gies d’e´quilibres dans le simplexe de dimension deux.
Dans Chapitre 4, je discute l’interpre´tation ge´ne´rale d’e´quilibres d’Ellsberg, et je classi-
fie les jeux a` deux joueurs dans lesquels l’ambigu¨ıte´ est une option en e´quilibre d’Ellsberg.
D’une coˆte´ je m’inte´resse au comportement humain dans des jeux a` deux joueurs et sa
connexion avec des e´quilibres d’Ellsberg. Goeree and Holt (2001) observent dans une
expe´rience avec une version modifie´e de Matching Pennies similaire que celle que je con-
side`re, que la pre´diction de Nash est fre´quemment viole´e; remarquablement, les e´quilibres
d’Ellsberg peuvent expliquer ce comportement. Dans la Section 4.2, de l’autre coˆte´, je
pre´sente une classification des e´quilibres d’Ellsberg qui ont un support qui ne fait pas
partie du support de l’ensemble des strate´gies d’e´quilibres de Nash du jeu. Tels e´quilibres
d’Ellsberg e´mergent fre´quemment dans des jeux avec des strate´gies faiblement domine´es
et ont une interpre´tation comportementale inte´ressante. Finalement, dans la Section 4.3,
je caracte´rise les circonstances dans lesquels l’ambigu¨ıte´ est utilise´e dans les e´quilibres
d’Ellsberg dans des jeux a` deux joueurs. Cet analyse pre´sente une re´ponse a` la question
dans quels jeux 2×2 existent des propres e´quilibres d’Ellsberg. Le re´sultat est re´sume´ par
le the´ore`me suivant.
Theorem 4.2. Soit G un jeu sous forme normale a` deux joueurs avec unique e´quilibre
de Nash en strate´gies comple`tement mixtes (P ∗, Q∗). Il existe un e´quilibre d’Ellsberg avec
unilateral full ambiguity11, si et seulement si ou P ∗ ou Q∗ est maximin. Les e´quilibres
d’Ellsberg ont dans ce cas la forme suivante:
(P ∗, [Q0, Q1]), ou` Q0 < Q∗ < Q1, si P ∗ = M1 ,
et ([P0, P1] , Q
∗), ou` P0 < P ∗ < P1, si Q∗ = M2 .
Si P ∗ est aussi une strate´gie d’immunisation pour joueur 1, le profil (P ∗,Q) avec Q∗ ∈ Q
11 Cela de´finit une sorte d’e´quilibre d’Ellsberg dans lequel seulement un joueur emploie ambigu¨ıte´, mais
autant qu’il veut; l’autre joue une strate´gie mixte.
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est un e´quilibre d’Ellsberg (et pareil pour joueur 2 si Q∗ est un strate´gie d’immunisation).
Chapitre 5 analyse le rapport entre les e´quilibres d’Ellsberg et les e´quilibres subjectifs
de´finis par Aumann (1974). Dans les chapitres pre´ce´dents, j’ai pre´sente´ les proprie´te´s
e´le´mentaires des e´quilibres d’Ellsberg et j’ai analyse´ comment les joueurs se comportent
quand ils ont la possibilite´ d’utiliser de l’ambigu¨ıte´ strate´gique dans des jeux a` deux
joueurs. Naturellement, je m’inte´resse a` comprendre ce qu’il peut arriver dans des jeux
avec plus de deux joueurs. Pour commencer a` comprendre le changement, je commence
a` e´tudier le rapport entre les e´quilibres d’Ellsberg et le concept des e´quilibres subjectifs.
Comme il n’existe aucun autre concept de solution des jeux ou` les joueurs utilisent des
ensembles des strate´gies mixtes comme leur strate´gie, la comparaison se fait par rapport
a` l’obtention de certaines re´alisations du jeu. L’objective est de comprendre sous quelles
conditions les e´quilibres subjectifs ont (ou n’ont pas) le meˆme support que les e´quilibres
d’Ellsberg.
Je commence dans la Section 5.1 avec un exemple d’un jeu a` trois joueurs, une sorte de
Prisoners’ Dilemma avec conciliateur, qui a un e´quilibre d’Ellsberg avec re´alisation non-
Nash: la coope´ration des deux prisonniers. Cela sugge`re que dans des jeux tre`s simples avec
plus de deux joueurs, la pre´diction d’e´quilibre d’Ellsberg peut eˆtre extreˆmement diffe´rente
de la pre´diction classique. Dans ce qui suit, dans la Section 5.2.1, je de´finis l’e´quilibre
subjectif suivant Aumann (1974) et Hallin (1976) et l’e´quilibre en croyances subjectives
suivant Lo (1996). Je prouve dans la Section 5.2.2 que tout e´quilibre d’Ellsberg contient un
e´quilibre subjectif et un e´quilibre en croyances subjectives. Dans des jeux a` deux joueurs,
des e´quilibres en croyances subjectives ont le meˆme support comme les e´quilibres de Nash,
mais cela change pour trois joueurs. C’est pour cela que dans des jeux d’Ellsberg avec
plus de deux joueurs nous avons des re´alisations au-dela` des e´quilibres de Nash; je traite
ce point dans la Section 5.2.3. Dans cette partie je prouve le the´ore`me suivant.
Theorem 5.8. Si (P∗1 , . . . ,P∗n) est un e´quilibre d’Ellsberg, il existe µi−i ∈ P∗−i tel que
(µ1−1, . . . , µn−n) est un e´quilibre en croyances subjectives et
arg max
Pi∈∆Si
Ui(Pi,P∗−i) ⊆ arg max
Pi∈∆Si
ui(Pi, µ
i
−i) .
Finalement, dans le Chapitre 6, la notion des jeux d’Ellsberg et d’e´quilibre d’Ellsberg est
e´tendue aux jeux sous forme extensive. Il est naturelle que des urnes d’Ellsberg peuvent
eˆtre utilise´es dans des jeux dynamiques de la meˆme manie`re que dans des jeux sous forme
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normale. Dans ce chapitre je de´veloppe le cadre d’analyse pour de tels jeux d’Ellsberg sous
forme extensive. Comme dans la the´orie classique des jeux sous forme extensive, les joueurs
peuvent utiliser une urne pour cre´er de l’ambigu¨ıte´ sur leur ensemble des strate´gies pures,
ou ils peuvent placer une urne d’Ellsberg a` chaque ensemble d’information au courant du
jeu. Dans la premie`re partie du chapitre, Section 6.1, j’e´tends la notion de strate´gie mixte
et strate´gie comportementale pour des jeux d’Ellsberg sous forme extensive.
Travaillant avec jeux dynamiques me`ne directement a` la question de cohe´rence dynamique
des pre´fe´rences des joueurs. Je discute cette question dans la Section 6.2 et je de´veloppe le
formalisme pour transmettre la notion de rectangularite´ de Epstein and Schneider (2003b)
aux jeux d’Ellsberg sous forme extensive. Cette proprie´te´ est ensuite utilise´e pour prou-
ver une version de The´ore`me de Kuhn (Kuhn (1953)) pour jeux d’Ellsberg sous forme
extensive. Mon the´ore`me est le suivant.
Theorem 6.7. Dans un jeu d’Ellsberg sous forme extensive (F,U) avec F = (T , C)
satisfaisant me´moire parfaite, chaque profil de strate´gies d’Ellsberg rectangulaire P induit
un profil de strate´gies de comportement d’Ellsberg ΘP via prior-by-prior updating; chaque
profil de strate´gies de comportement d’Ellsberg Θ induit un profil de strate´gies d’Ellsberg
rectangulaire PΘ tel que prior-by-prior updating de PΘ donne Θ. Les profils de strate´gies
sont e´quivalents en paiement,
Ui(P) = Ui(ΘP) et Ui(Θ) = Ui(PΘ) .
Je pre´sente un exemple simple d’un jeu a` deux joueurs pour mieux comprendre l’intention
du the´ore`me, et j’explique la rectangularite´ de la strate´gie d’Ellsberg dans l’exemple avec
le simplexe de dimension deux. Ensuite, dans la Section 6.4, je de´finis la notion d’e´quilibre
d’Ellsberg dans un jeu d’Ellsberg sous forme extensive. Avec l’e´quivalence e´tablie dans
Theorem 6.7, les jeux d’Ellsberg sous forme extensive peuvent eˆtre analyse´s en conside´rant
seulement des strate´gies de comportement d’Ellsberg, ce qui simplifie largement l’analyse.
Cependant, une analyse profonde des e´quilibres d’Ellsberg dans des jeux d’Ellsberg sous
forme extensive ne fait pas partie de ce travail. Finalement, dans la Section 6.5, je pre´sente
un bref commentaire et compare les e´quilibres d’Ellsberg avec quelques autres concepts de
solution sous forme extensive.
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1 Strategic Use of Ambiguity in Normal
Form Games
In the first chapter we present the fundamentals of Ellsberg games.1 We start by discussing
the major aspect in which Ellsberg games differ from other models of ambiguity in games:
the difference between objective and subjective ambiguity and the historic development of
these notions. In Ellsberg games, players can use additional devices which create ambiguity
and these are treated differently than classic randomizing devices. Hence, in Section 1.2
we present the decision-theoretic framework of how to evaluate the utility of the strategies
used in Ellsberg games. In Section 1.3 we define the model and show some basic properties
of Ellsberg games. These include the possibility to reduce Ellsberg equilibria to the state
space of pure strategies, we show the existence of Ellsberg equilibria, and explain and
prove the Principle of Indifference in Distributions. Section 1.4 analyzes an important
example of an Ellsberg game, where the Ellsberg equilibrium predicts an outcome that
is not in the support of any Nash equilibrium of the game. Finally we discuss related
literature.
1.1 Ellsberg Urns and Mixed Strategies: Concealment
Device versus Beliefs about Opponents’ Behavior
Let us go back to the very foundations of game theory. A game consists of a finite
set N of players, a finite set of (pure) strategies Si, i ∈ N for each player, as well as
a collection of payoff functions ui : S → R defined over strategy profiles S = ×i∈NSi.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) introduce mixed strategies as probability vectors
Pi over pure strategies Si. The question then emerges how players evaluate profiles of such
mixed strategies P = (P1, . . . , Pn); as the reader knows, Von Neumann and Morgenstern
adopt expected utility (and axiomatize their choice). Here we are going back to these
foundations and propose a generalization. We allow players to use Ellsberg urns in addition
to probabilistic devices like a roulette wheel or a die. So we imagine that a player can
1 Parts of this chapter, namely Sections 1.1, 1.3.1-1.3.3, 1.3.5, 1.4 and 1.5, were published in the IMW
working paper Riedel and Sass (2011).
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credibly commit his behavior on the outcome of an Ellsberg urn whose parameters he has
chosen. To give an example, in a Matching Pennies game he would play HEAD if the
draw from an urn with 100 red and blue balls yields a red ball, while he himself and the
other players only know that the proportion of red balls lies between 30 and 50 percent.
The Ellsberg urn thus displays objective, common knowledge of ambiguity. All players
know the possible probability distributions of outcomes, but no player has an informational
advantage over others. We want to find out what the consequences for game theory are if
we change the foundations in such a way.
Before we justify our new approach conceptually, let us go back again to classical game
theory and ask how mixed strategies are justified and interpreted there. Our discussion
follows closely the excellent account delivered in Reny and Robson (2004).
From a mathematical point of view, mixed strategies lead to convex strategy sets, and
if one wants to assign a unique value to zero-sum games, e.g., such convexity is needed.
Convexity and linearity of the payoff functions are useful in many other respects as well,
of course. Just think about the indifference principle by which we usually find Nash
equilibria.
The purely mathematical aspect would not be very compelling, of course, had it not
a plausible interpretation. In the words of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953), p.
144: “In playing Matching Pennies against an at least moderately intelligent opponent,
the player will not attempt to find out the opponent’s intentions, but will concentrate on
avoiding having his own intentions found out, by playing irregularly ’heads’ and ’tails’ in
successive games. Since we wish to describe the strategy in one play – indeed we must
discuss the course in one play and not that of a sequence of plays – it is preferable to
express this as follows: The player’s strategy consists neither of playing ’tails’ and ’heads’,
but of playing ’tails’ with the probability of 1/2 and ’heads’ with the probability of 1/2.”
They then point out that this strategy protects the player against losses as his expected
gain is always zero regardless how the opponent plays.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern always interpret these strategies as objective random
devices like a fair coin or die. In particular, all players assign the same probabilities to
the device’s outcomes. In zero-sum games, the use of such mixing can be justified as
an attempt to conceal your behavior from your opponents. Indeed, Von Neumann and
Morgenstern also offer a Stackelberg game-like argument. Suppose that you have to write
down your strategy on a sheet of paper before you play. If your opponent sends a spy able
to find out what you have written down, then, in a zero-sum game, it is strictly better for
you to have concealed your behavior by writing “I will use a fair coin to determine my
behavior.” A mixed strategy, in Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s interpretation, is thus
26
1.1 Ellsberg Urns and Mixed Strategies
deliberate, objective randomization.
These arguments run into problems in common interest games as one would prefer one’s
own strategy to be found out by the opponent in simple coordination games (as has been
pointed out by Schelling (1960) and Lewis (1969) already). Harsanyi (1967)’s construction
allows to resolve this plausibility problem. He shows that mixed strategy equilibria can be
interpreted as pure strategy equilibria in nearby incomplete information games where the
payoffs are suitably perturbed, and players have private information. A common interpre-
tation of mixed strategies nowadays goes even a step further. Several authors, including
Aumann (1987), Armbruster and Boege (1979), Tan and Werlang (1988), Aumann and
Brandenburger (1995), propose to forgo Harsanyis’s construction and to interpret mixed
strategies directly as the belief about which pure strategies the other players are going to
use. Players are assumed to choose a definite action, and as other players do not know
exactly which one, the mixed strategy represents their uncertainty. For more than two
players, this requires some consistency among beliefs in equilibrium, of course. We will
come back to this below when we discuss beliefs equilibria.
Summing up, we have here two opposing interpretations of mixed strategies: on the one
hand, the “objective” interpretation by Von Neumann and Morgenstern where players
deliberately use random devices with known probabilities to conceal their behavior, on
the other hand, the “subjective” beliefs interpretation where the probability distributions
represent players’ uncertainty about other players’ pure strategy choice.2 The literature
on ambiguity in games has mainly focused on the beliefs interpretation of mixed strategies.
So far, it has usually been assumed that the players choose pure strategies and that the
opponents are uncertain in the Knightian sense about their choice. Our approach differs
from that in the literature as we take up the interpretation of mixed strategies by Von
Neumann and Morgenstern and allow players to use objective devices that create Knightian
uncertainty.
2 Both approaches are merged in the framework of Reny and Robson (2004). Reny and Robson unify
both views of mixed equilibria with the help of another construction. In their perturbed game, every
player i is characterized by a privately known subjective probability ti ∈ [a, b], 0 < a < b < 1 according
to which he believes that a spy finds out his strategy. The payoff of the perturbed game is then
(1− ti)ui(mi,m−i) + tiui(mi, bestreplyto(mi)) .
So with probability 1 − ti the normal static payoff is obtained, whereas with probability ti, the other
player finds out one’s strategy and is allowed to play a best reply to it. In such a situation, for a
generic class of games, one can approximate all Nash equilibria by suitable pure strategy equilibria of
the perturbed game, with a and b close to zero. In contrast to Harsanyi (1967), players sometimes do
use mixed strategies in the perturbed game, e.g., in zero-sum games. We refer to their insightful paper
for a more detailed discussion which is beyond the scope of our aims here.
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1.2 Evaluating Objective Ambiguity
Before we come to formalize the possibility of using Ellsberg urns to create ambiguity in
games, we show how to represent players’ preferences over these objectively ambiguous
devices. Knight (1921) is one of the earliest references for the distinction between risk
and (Knightian) uncertainty, see Arrow (1951) p. 417. In fact, Knight made the threefold
distinction between different types of uncertain outcomes into those predicted by
(1) a priori probability (deductive, “mathematical law”)
(2) statistical probability (relative frequency)
(3) estimates (“The instance in question is so entirely unique that there are no others or
not a sufficient number to make it possible to tabulate enough like it to form a basis
for any inference of value about any real probability in the case we are interested in”,
Knight (1921) p. 226).
(1) and (2) are, in the subsequent literature, summarized as “risk” and (3) is what we refer
to as uncertainty or ambiguity. There has been an ongoing debate about what implications
Knight’s observation has for preferences and decision making under uncertainty, which is
at the heart of microeconomic theory. The discussion has been fueled by the famous
Ellsberg experiment published in Ellsberg (1961) (to which the Ellsberg games treated
in this thesis owe their name) and has then gained new momentum after the publication
of Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), two articles which axiomatize
and represent ambiguity-averse preferences in a way that “solves” the Ellsberg paradox.
Maxmin expected utility by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) says, that an act f is preferred
to an act g if and only if there exists a set of priors C and a utility function u such that
min
p∈C
∫
f(u) dp ≥ min
p∈C
∫
g(u) dp .
Since this representation is derived from subjective ambiguity-averse preferences, the set
of priors C can be interpreted as the subjective beliefs of the decision maker. In effect, this
approach to ambiguity-averse preferences is entirely subjective. It generalizes the expected
utility approach with subjective probabilities by Savage (1954) that was turned into the
language of horse-races and lotteries and thus made more tractable by Anscombe and Au-
mann (1963). A number of articles provide other subjective representations of ambiguity-
averse preferences, e.g., Hansen and Sargent (2001), Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji
(2005), Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006), Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, Mari-
nacci, and Montrucchio (2011).
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After our explanations in Section 1.1 it is clear, that the maxmin expected utility rep-
resentation derived from subjective preferences is not suitable to represent the ambiguity-
averse preferences over the objectively ambiguous devices used in Ellsberg urns. What
we need to specify for Ellsberg games is rather an attitude towards imprecise risk, a term
coined by Jaffray (1989). With the same motivation as the subjective representations
mentioned above, he seeks to distinguish attitude towards risk and uncertainty, where he
understands uncertainty objectively: due to unavailable or demonstrably bad information
the decision maker is not facing a precise probability distribution. In the same spirit
Stinchcombe (2003), Olszewski (2007) and Ahn (2008) model imprecise risk directly by
sets of lotteries. We use a generalization of this approach by Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and
Vergnaud (2008), pioneered by Wang (2003), that compares pairs (P, f) where f is an act
and P is a set of probability distributions over the state space. In their representation,
(P, f) is preferred to (Q, g) if and only if
min
p∈φ(P)
∫
f(u) dp ≥ min
p∈φ(Q)
∫
g(u) dp . (1.1)
For φ the identity (φ : P → P selects the probability-possibility set and captures the
subjective part of the preferences) and a fixed set of probability distributions P, that
is, when we evaluate a pair (P, f) through the induced set of distributions on outcomes,
this yields maxmin expected utility by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), see Section 3.3 in
Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2008) for details. For a more detailed review
on literature on objective ambiguity aversion see Giraud and Tallon (2011) and Gajdos,
Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2008).
We apply the utility representation (1.1) to Ellsberg strategies ((Ω,F ,P), f) which we
define in the following section. An Ellsberg strategy consists of a convex and compact
set of probability distributions P on a state space Ω, and an act f . The utility of an
Ellsberg strategy ((Ω,F ,P), f) is defined using (1.1) with φ = id. The reduced form of an
Ellsberg strategy, which will just be a convex and compact set of probability distributions
Q, is evaluated with maxmin expected utility derived from (1.1). This representation
is mathematically identical to the representation by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989): An
Ellsberg strategy P is preferred to an Ellsberg strategy Q if and only if
min
P∈P
∫
u dP ≥ min
Q∈Q
∫
u dQ .
We thus use the terms maxmin expected utility and maxmin rule, having in mind that we
derived this representation from attitude towards objective ambiguity.
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1.3 Ellsberg Games
1.3.1 Creating Ambiguity: Objective Ellsberg Urns
Let us formalize the intuitive idea that players can create ambiguity with the help of
Ellsberg urns. An Ellsberg urn is, for us, a triple (Ω,F ,P) of a non-empty set Ω of states
of the world, a σ-field F on Ω (where one can take the power set in case of a finite Ω), and
a set of probability measures P on the measurable space (Ω,F). This set of probability
measures represents the Knightian uncertainty of the strategy. A typical example is the
classical Ellsberg urn that contains 30 red balls, and 60 balls that are either black or yellow.
One ball is drawn from that urn. The state space consists of three elements {R,B, Y },
F is the power set, and P the set of probability vectors (P1, P2, P3) such3 that P1 = 1/3,
P2 = k/90, P3 = (60− k)/90 for any k = 0, . . . , 60.
We assume that the players of our game have access to and can design the parameters of
such Ellsberg urns: imagine that there is an independent, trustworthy laboratory that sets
up such urns and reports the outcome truthfully. Note that we allow the player to choose
the degree of ambiguity of his urn. He tells the experimentalists of his laboratory to set
up such and such an Ellsberg experiment that generates exactly the set of distributions
Pi. In this sense, the ambiguity in our formulation of the game is “objective”: it is not a
matter of agents’ beliefs about the actions of other players, but rather a property of the
device used to determine his action.
1.3.2 Definition of Ellsberg Games
We come now to the game where players can use such urns in addition to the usual mixed
strategies (that correspond to roulette wheels or dice). Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of
players. Each player i has a finite strategy set Si. Let S = ×ni=1Si be the set of pure
strategy profiles. Players’ payoffs are given by functions
ui : S → R (i ∈ N) .
The normal form game is denoted G = 〈N, (Si), (ui)〉.
Players can now use different devices. On the one hand, we assume that they have
“roulette wheels” or “dice” at their disposal, i.e., randomizing devices with objectively
known probabilities. The set of these probabilities over Si is denoted ∆Si. The players
3 We are always going to work with convex sets of probability measures. In this case, this means that
we would allow for any P2, P3 ≥ 0 with P2 + P3 = 2/3 here. In our framework, this is without loss of
generality, of course.
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evaluate such devices according to expected utility, as in Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s
formulation of game theory. Moreover, and this is the new part, players can use Ellsberg
urns. As we said above, we imagine that the players can credibly commit to base their
actions on ambiguous outcomes. Technically, we model the Ellsberg urn of player i as a
triple (Ωi,Fi,Pi) as explained above. Player i acts in the game by choosing a measurable
function (or Anscombe-Aumann act)4
fi : (Ωi,Fi)→ ∆Si
which specifies the classical mixed strategy played once the outcome of the Ellsberg urn
is revealed. An Ellsberg strategy for player i is then a pair
((Ωi,Fi,Pi), fi)
of an Ellsberg urn and an act. A profile of Ellsberg strategies is then as usual
((Ω,F ,P), f) = (((Ω1,F1,P1), f1), . . . , ((Ωn,Fn,Pn), fn)) .
To finish the description of our Ellsberg game, we have to determine players’ payoffs. We
suppose that all players are ambiguity-averse: in the face of ambiguous events (as opposed
to simply random events) they evaluate their utility in a cautious and pessimistic way. This
behavior in response to ambiguity has been observed in the famous experiments of Ellsberg
(1961) and confirmed in further experiments, for example of Pulford (2009) and Camerer
and Weber (1992), see also Etner, Jeleva, and Tallon (2012) for references. For our purpose
we follow the axiomatization of attitude towards objective but imprecise information in
Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2008) which we introduced and discussed in
Section 1.2. Utility is evaluated as maxmin expected utility like in the axiomatization
of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), but with the difference of the decision maker facing
objective instead of subjective ambiguity.
The payoff of player i ∈ N at an Ellsberg strategy profile ((Ω,F ,P), f) is thus the
minimal expected utility with respect to all different probability distributions in the convex
and compact set P,
Ui(((Ω,F ,P), f)) := min
P1∈P1,...,Pn∈Pn
∫
Ω1
· · ·
∫
Ωn
ui(f(ω)) dPn . . . dP1 .
We call the described larger game an Ellsberg game. An Ellsberg equilibrium is, in the
4 We assume that all such acts in this thesis are measurable, also if not explicitly stated at each appear-
ance.
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same spirit as Nash equilibrium, a profile of Ellsberg strategies
(((Ω∗1,F∗1 ,P∗1 ), f∗1 ), . . . , ((Ω∗n,F∗n,P∗n), f∗n)) ,
where no player has an incentive to deviate, i.e., for all players i ∈ N , all Ellsberg urns
(Ωi,Fi,Pi), and all acts fi for player i we have
Ui (((Ω
∗,F∗,P∗), f∗)) ≥ Ui
(
((Ωi,Fi,Pi), fi), ((Ω∗−i,F∗−i,P∗−i), f∗−i)
)
.5
Definition 1.1. Let G = 〈N, (Si), (ui)〉 be a normal form game. A profile
(((Ω∗1,F∗1 ,P∗1 ), f∗1 ), . . . , ((Ω∗n,F∗n,P∗n), f∗n))
of Ellsberg strategies is an Ellsberg equilibrium of G if no player has an incentive to
deviate from ((Ω∗,F∗,P∗), f∗), i.e., for all players i ∈ N , all Ellsberg urns (Ωi,Fi,Pi)
and all acts fi for player i we have
Ui(((Ω
∗,F∗,P∗), f∗)) ≥ Ui(((Ωi,Fi,Pi), fi), ((Ω∗−i,F∗−i,P∗−i), f∗−i)) , that is
min
Pi∈P∗i ,P−i∈P∗−i
∫
Ω∗i
∫
Ω∗−i
ui(f
∗
i (ωi), f
∗
−i(ω−i)) dP−i dPi
≥ min
Pi∈Pi,P−i∈P∗−i
∫
Ωi
∫
Ω∗−i
ui(fi(ωi), f
∗
−i(ω−i)) dP−i dPi .
1.3.3 Reduced Form Ellsberg Games
This definition of an Ellsberg game depends on the particular Ellsberg urn used by each
player i. As there are arbitrarily many possible state spaces6, the definition of Ellsberg
equilibrium might not seem very tractable. Fortunately, there is a more concise way to
define Ellsberg equilibrium. The procedure is similar to the reduced form of a correlated
equilibrium, see Aumann (1974) or Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). Instead of working with
arbitrary Ellsberg urns, we note that the players’ payoff depends, in the end, on the set of
distributions that the Ellsberg urns and the associated acts induce on the set of strategies.
One can then work with that set of distributions directly.
5 Throughout the text, we follow the notational convention that (fi, f
∗
−i) := (f
∗
1 , . . . , f
∗
i−1, fi, f
∗
i+1, . . . , f
∗
n).
The same convention is used for profiles of pure strategies (si, s−i) and probability distributions
(Pi, P−i).
6 In fact, the class of all state spaces is too large to be a well-defined set according to set theory.
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Definition 1.2. Let G = 〈N, (Si), (ui)〉 be a normal form game. A reduced form Ellsberg
equilibrium of the game G is a profile of sets of probability measures Q∗i ⊆ ∆Si, such that
for all players i ∈ N and all sets of probability measures Qi ⊆ ∆Si we have
min
Pi∈Q∗i ,P−i∈Q∗−i
∫
Si
∫
S−i
ui(si, s−i) dP−i dPi
≥ min
Pi∈Qi,P−i∈Q∗−i
∫
Si
∫
S−i
ui(si, s−i) dP−i dPi .
The two definitions of Ellsberg equilibrium are equivalent in the following sense.
Proposition 1.3. Ellsberg equilibrium and reduced form Ellsberg equilibrium are equiv-
alent in the sense that every Ellsberg equilibrium ((Ω∗,F∗,P∗), f∗) induces a payoff-
equivalent reduced form Ellsberg equilibrium on Ω∗ = S; and every reduced form Ellsberg
equilibrium Q∗ is an Ellsberg equilibrium ((S,F ,Q∗), f∗) with f∗ the embedding of S in
∆S.
Proof. “⇐ ” Let Q∗ be a reduced form Ellsberg equilibrium according to Definition 1.2.
We choose the states of the world Ω = S to be the set of pure strategy profiles, thereby
we see that player i uses the Ellsberg urn (Si,Fi,Q∗i ), where Fi is the power set of Si. We
define the act f∗i : (Si,Fi)→ ∆Si to be the embedding f∗i (si) = δsi of Si into ∆Si, where
δsi ∈ ∆Si is the degenerate mixed strategy which puts all weight on the pure strategy si.
f∗i induces an image measure Q
f∗i
i of Qi ∈ Q∗i on ∆Si,
Q
f∗i
i : δsi 7→ Qi(f∗
−1
i (δsi)) .
The image measure Q
f∗i
i can be identified with Qi ∈ Q∗i . Thus, the reduced form Ellsberg
equilibrium Q∗ can be written as ((S,F ,Q∗), f∗). This strategy is an Ellsberg equilibrium
according to Definition 1.1.
“ ⇒ ” Let now ((Ω∗,F∗,P∗), f∗) be an Ellsberg equilibrium according to Definition 1.1.
Every Pi ∈ P∗i induces an image measure P f
∗
i
i on ∆Si that assigns a probability to a
distribution f∗i (ωi) ∈ ∆Si to occur. To describe the probability that a pure strategy si
is played, given a distribution Pi and an Ellsberg strategy ((Ω
∗
i ,F∗i ,P∗i ), f∗i ), we integrate
(f∗i (ωi))(si) over all states ωi ∈ Ωi. Thus, we can define Qi to be
Qi(si) :=
∫
Ω∗i
f∗i (ωi)(si) dPi . (1.2)
Recall that Pi is a closed and convex set of probability distributions. We call the resulting
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set of probability measures Q∗i . Q∗i is closed and convex, since P∗i is.
A straightforward, if tedious, reasoning shows that the profile (Q∗1, . . . ,Q∗n) yields the
same payoff as ((Ω∗i ,F∗i ,P∗i ), f∗i )i=1,...,n.
Now suppose Q∗ is not a reduced form Ellsberg equilibrium. Then for some player
i ∈ N there exists a set Qi of probability measures on Si that yields a higher minimal
expected utility. We can then define the Ellsberg strategy Ω˜ = Si, F˜i = PSi (the power
set of Si), and fi(s) = δs to obtain a profitable deviation in the original Ellsberg game, a
contradiction.
We henceforth call a set Qi ⊆ ∆Si an Ellsberg strategy whenever it is clear that we are in
the reduced form context. The utility of a (reduced) Ellsberg strategy profile is evaluated
as
Ui(Pi,P−i) = min
Pi∈Pi,P−i∈P−i
∫
Si
∫
S−i
ui(si, s−i) dP−i dPi .
In the definition of an Ellsberg game we assume that the Ellsberg urns (Ωi,Fi,Pi) of
all players i ∈ N are stochastically independent. This is done by using product spaces as
first suggested by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).7 We define the product (Ω,F ,P) of n
Ellsberg urns (Ωi,Fi,Pi), i = 1, . . . , n, as follows.
Ω := Ω1 × . . .× Ωn,
F := F1 ⊗ . . .⊗Fn,
and P is the closed convex hull of the set of product measures,
P := c¯o {P1 ⊗ . . .⊗ Pn | P1 ∈ P1, . . . , Pn ∈ Pn} . (1.3)
This way the Ellsberg urns are stochastically independent. We usually denote by ∆Si the
set of lotteries on the set of pure strategies Si of player i. If not otherwise specified, by
∆S := ×ni=1∆Si, or ∆S−i := ×nj=1,j 6=i∆Sj we mean the profiles of mixed strategies where
each player mixes independently.
Different notions of stochastic independence in the context of ambiguity aversion have
been discussed in the literature, see for example Klibanoff (2001), Bade (2011b) and Bade
(2011a). In the present context of objective ambiguity in the form of Ellsberg urns the
above notion seems the most natural.
7 Instead of Ellsberg urns they speak of “non-unique probability spaces” (Ω,F ,P), Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989), p. 150.
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1.3.4 Ellsberg Equilibria Generalize Nash Equilibria
Note that the classical game is contained in our formulation: players just choose a singleton
Pi = {δpii} that puts all weight on a particular (classical) mixed strategy pii. Now let
(pi1, . . . , pin) be a Nash equilibrium of the game G. Can any player unilaterally gain by
creating ambiguity in such a situation? The answer is no. Take the game in Figure 1.1
and look at the pure strategy Nash equilibrium (D,R) with equilibrium payoff 1 for both
players.
Player 1
Player 2
L R
U 3, 3 0, 0
D 0, 0 1, 1
Figure 1.1: Strategic ambiguity does not unilaterally make a player better off.
If player 1 introduces ambiguity, he will play U in some states of the world (without
knowing the exact probability of those states). But this does not help here because player
2 sticks to his strategy R, so playing U just leads to a payoff of zero. Unilateral introduction
of ambiguity does not increase one’s own payoff. We think that this is an important
property of our formulation.
Theorem 1.4. Let G = 〈N, (Si), (ui)〉 be a normal form game. Then a mixed strategy
profile (P ∗1 , . . . , P ∗n) of G is a Nash equilibrium of G if and only if the corresponding
profile of singletons (P1, . . . ,Pn) with Pi = {δP ∗i } is an Ellsberg equilibrium. In particular,
Ellsberg equilibria exist when the strategy sets Si are finite.
We show in Theorem 1.4 that a mixed strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium of a normal
form game if and only if it is an Ellsberg equilibrium of that game. The main part of the
proof is that every player can find for every profile of Ellsberg strategies a mixed strategy
that gives him at least the same utility as his Ellsberg strategy. We first prove the latter
result in the following lemma. We let pi∗i abbreviate the constant act that maps every
state of the world to the mixed strategy pi∗i ∈ ∆Si.
Lemma 1.5. Let G = 〈N, (Si), (ui)〉 be a normal form game. Then for any profile of
Ellsberg strategies (P1, . . . ,Pn) and every i ∈ N there exists a mixed strategy P ∗i ∈ ∆Si
such that Ui({δP ∗i },P−i) ≥ Ui(Pi,P−i).
Proof. As the set of pure strategies is finite, the set of mixed strategies ∆Si is compact.
The linear utility function is continuous, and thus a minimizer in the compact set Pi
exists.
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Proof of Theorem 1.4. Let P∗ with P∗i = {P ∗i } be an Ellsberg equilibrium of G; then
Ui({P ∗i }, {P ∗−i}) ≥ Ui(Pi, {P ∗−i}) holds for all i ∈ N for all Ellsberg strategies Pi ⊆ ∆Si.
In particular this holds for all singletons {Pi}, so Ui({P ∗i }, {P ∗−i}) ≥ Ui({Pi}, {P ∗−i}) and
thus ui(P
∗
i , P
∗
−i) ≥ ui(Pi, P ∗−i) for all Pi ∈ ∆Si . Therefore the profile (P ∗1 , . . . , P ∗n) is a
Nash equilibrium of G.
Next, assume that (P ∗1 , . . . , P ∗n) is a Nash equilibrium of G. Suppose it was not an
Ellsberg equilibrium of G, that is there exists an Ellsberg strategy Pi for some player
i such that Ui(Pi, {P ∗−i}) > Ui({P ∗i }, {P ∗−i}). By Lemma 1.5, there exists a P ′i such that
Ui({P ′i}, {P ∗−i}) = Ui(Pi, {P ∗−i}) > Ui({P ∗i }, {P ∗−i}) . This contradicts the assumption that
(P ∗1 , . . . , P ∗n) is a Nash equilibrium of the game G.
Theorem 1.4 proves that Ellsberg equilibria generalize Nash equilibria. Hence our formu-
lation avoids the existence pitfalls that one encounters when players are assumed to play
pure strategies and beliefs are uncertain about those pure actions.
We show that the support of an Ellsberg equilibrium, i.e., the strategies played with
probability greater than zero, is identical to the support of the corresponding reduced form
Ellsberg equilibrium. First we define what is the support of a (reduced) Ellsberg strategy.
We understand null-events in the sense of Savage (1954).8
Definition 1.6. Let ((Ωi,Fi,Pi), fi) be an Ellsberg strategy. The support of ((Ωi,Fi,Pi), fi)
is defined as the support of fi, that is
supp fi := {si ∈ Si | (fi(ωi))(si) > 0 for some non-null ωi ∈ Ωi} .
Let Qi ⊆ ∆Si be a reduced Ellsberg strategy. The support of Qi is then defined as
suppQi :=
⋃
Qi∈Qi
{si ∈ Si | Qi(si) > 0} .
Proposition 1.7. Let ((Ω∗,F∗,P∗), f∗) be an Ellsberg equilibrium of a normal form game
G, Q∗ ⊆ ∆S the equivalent reduced form Ellsberg equilibrium. Then
supp f∗ = suppQ∗ .
Proof. It suffices to show the equality for supp f∗i and suppQ∗i for some player i ∈ N .
8 Given an event E ⊆ Ω and acts f and h, let fEh be the act such that (fEh)(s) = f(s) if s ∈ E, and
(fEh)(s) = h(s) otherwise. An event E is null if fEh ∼ f ′Eh for all acts f and f ′, otherwise it is
non-null.
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Recall that Q∗i is the set of measures on Si induced by Pi ∈ P∗i under f∗i , that is
Q∗i (si) :=
{
Qi(si) =
∫
Ω∗i
f∗i (ωi)(si) dPi
∣∣∣ Pi ∈ P∗i
}
.
We first show that supp f∗i ⊆ suppQ∗i . Let si ∈ supp f∗i , then f∗i (ωi)(si) > 0 for some
ωi ∈ Ωi. Suppose, si /∈ suppQ∗i . Then
Qi(si) = 0 for all Qi ∈ Q∗i
⇒ Qi(si) =
∫
Ωi
f∗i (ωi)(si) dPi = 0 for all Pi ∈ P∗i
⇒ f∗i (ωi)(si) = 0 for all ωi ∈ Ωi
This contradicts the fact that si was in the support of f
∗
i .
Let now si ∈ suppQ∗i , then Qi(si) > 0 for some Qi ∈ Q∗i . Suppose si /∈ supp f∗i . Then
f∗i (ωi)(si) = 0 for all ωi ∈ Ωi
⇒ Qi(si) =
∫
Ωi
f∗i (ωi)(si) dPi = 0 for all ωi ∈ Ωi
This contradicts the fact that si was in the support of Q∗i .
We have seen that Nash equilibria are special cases of Ellsberg equilibria. To simplify
reference to different types of Ellsberg equilibria we introduce proper Ellsberg equilibria.
The notion serves to address exclusively those Ellsberg equilibria which are not Nash
equilibria, i.e., those in which ambiguity prevails. This is the result of Corollary 1.9 which
follows directly from Theorem 1.4.
Definition 1.8. Let G = 〈N, (Si), (ui)〉 be a normal form game with i ∈ N . G has
proper Ellsberg equilibria when the set of Ellsberg equilibria that are not Nash equilibria
is non-empty.
Corollary 1.9 (of Theorem 1.4). Let G = 〈N, (Si), (ui)〉 be a normal form game with
i ∈ N . The set of proper Ellsberg equilibria of G coincides with the set of Ellsberg equilibria
of G in which at least one player i ∈ N uses an Ellsberg strategy Pi ⊆ ∆Si which is not a
singleton.
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In the same spirit we sometimes speak of proper Ellsberg strategies when they are not
identical to a pure or mixed strategy.
1.3.5 Principle of Indifference in Distributions
An important characteristic of Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies is what we call here the
Principle of Indifference: in a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies players are indifferent
between playing the randomized strategy or playing any pure strategy that is in its support.
We restate here the corresponding lemma from Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), Lemma
33.2 therein.
Lemma. Let G be a finite normal form game. Then P ∗ ∈ ×Ni=1∆Si is a mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium of G if and only if for every player i ∈ N every pure strategy in the
support of P ∗i is a best response to P
∗
−i.
Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) conclude: “It follows that every action in the support of
any player’s equilibrium mixed strategy yields that player the same payoff.”9 In the same
section the authors point out, that this may no longer be true when players are not Von
Neumann and Morgenstern expected utility maximizers. We confirm this observation with
an example and show that an alternative version of the Principle of Indifference holds for
Ellsberg games.
In Ellsberg games players are no longer expected utility maximizers but ambiguity-
averse. Ambiguity-averse preferences have the property that the utility functions often
have kinks: in many cases the decision maker switches at some point from one boundary
of the set of probability distributions to the other and thus changes the slope of the utility
function. In the analysis of Ellsberg games this causes that the Principle of Indifference no
longer prevails. In an Ellsberg equilibrium players are in general not indifferent between
playing the Ellsberg strategy or playing the pure strategies in its support. We illustrate
this with an example.
Example 1.10. We consider a similar coordination game as before, the payoff matrix is
as in Figure 1.2. The game has an Ellsberg equilibrium in which player 1 plays strategy U
with probability P ∈ [3/4, 1] and player 2 plays strategy L with probability Q ∈ [3/4, 1]. The
maxmin expected utility of player 1 in this equilibrium is 3/4, because the worst that can
happen is that (U,L) is played with the Nash equilibrium mixture ((3/4, 1/4) , (3/4, 1/4)).
Now suppose player 1 would change to a pure strategy in the support of the Ellsberg equi-
librium, that is to U or D. When he changes to U , his minimal expected utility does not
9 Italic in the original text.
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Player 1
Player 2
L R
U 1, 1 0, 0
D 0, 0 3, 3
Figure 1.2: No indifference in pure strategies in Ellsberg equilibrium.
change, so he is indifferent in that case. On the contrary, when he plays D, his mini-
mal expected utility is 0, because he now uses for his maxmin expected utility evaluation
that player 2 plays R with probability 0. Player 1 is therefore not indifferent between his
Ellsberg equilibrium strategy and his pure strategy D.
To make this argument more precise we present the utility analysis. We first fix a
distribution P ∈ [P0, P1] for player 1 and consider his payoff function U1(P, [Q0, Q1]).
Player 1 evaluates his minimal expected payoff given player 2 plays Q ∈ [Q0, Q1]:
U1(P, [Q0, Q1]) = min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
PQ+ 3(1− P )(1−Q)
= min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
Q(4P − 3)− 3P + 3
=

Q0(4P − 3)− 3P + 3 if P > 3/4 ,
3/4 if P = 3/4 ,
Q1(4P − 3)− 3P + 3 if P < 3/4 .
In the given Ellsberg equilibrium player 1 thus evaluates
U1([3/4, 1] , [3/4, 1]) =
 3/4(4P − 3)− 3P + 3 if P > 3/4 ,3/4 if P = 3/4
= 3/4 for all P ∈ [3/4, 1] .
Now consider the two cases where player 1 plays U, that is P0 = P1 = 1, or D, that is
P0 = P1 = 0. Then
U1(1, [3/4, 1]) = 3/4(4− 3) = 3/4 ,
and U1(0, [3/4, 1]) = 1(−3) + 3 = 0 .
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The last two equations show that the indifference in pure strategies does in general not
hold.
Example 1.10 shows violation of the classical Principle of Indifference. However, we can
show that in Ellsberg equilibrium players are indifferent between all distributions that are
part of their Ellsberg equilibrium strategy. We come to this next.
Recall that a profile (P∗1 , . . . ,P∗n) is a reduced form Ellsberg equilibrium if for all i ∈ N
and all Pi ⊆ ∆Si,
Ui(P∗i ,P∗−i) ≥ Ui(Pi,P∗−i) . (1.4)
This formulation states that in equilibrium it is not profitable for any player to unilaterally
deviate. Alternatively and in analogy with Nash equilibrium, an Ellsberg equilibrium
can be defined as a profile of strategies, where each player only chooses strategies which
maximize his (in Ellsberg games) minimal expected utility. That is, (P∗1 , . . . ,P∗n) is a
reduced form Ellsberg equilibrium if for all i ∈ N and all Pi ∈ P∗i
Pi ∈ arg maxPi⊆∆Si Ui(Pi,P
∗
−i) . (1.5)
Conditions (1.4) and (1.5) are obviously equivalent. This is formulated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1.11. Let G = 〈N, (Si), (ui)〉 be a normal form game. A profile of Ellsberg
strategies (P∗1 , . . . ,P∗n) satisfies (1.4) if an only if it satisfies (1.5).
For the following theorems we need a lemma concerning the maximization and minimiza-
tion of a linear function u on some convex set ∆S (for the moment, S does not denote a
set of strategy profiles, but simply a set with m elements).
Lemma 1.12. P is a probability distribution on the set S = {s1, . . . , sm}. Let u(P ) be a
linear function that maps the m-dimensional vector P into the real numbers. We denote
by ∆S the set of probability distributions P , and by P ⊂ ∆S a closed and convex subset
of ∆S. Then
max
P⊆∆S
min
P∈P
u(P ) = max
P∈∆S
u(P ) , (1.6)
and min
P⊆∆S
min
P∈P
u(P ) = min
P∈∆S
u(P ) . (1.7)
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Proof. We start by showing equation (1.6). It is evident that
max
P∈∆S
u(P ) ≥ max
P⊆∆S
min
P∈P
u(P ) ,
so it remains to show that the left hand side is always greater than or equal to the right
hand side of (1.6). Since the function u(P ) is linear, there exists a P ′ ∈ ∆S with
max
P∈∆S
u(P ) = u(P ′) .
Now we have
max
P⊆∆S
min
P∈P
u(P ) ≥ max
P⊆∆S,P ′∈P
min
P∈P
u(P ) ,
since maximizing over a smaller number of subsets of ∆S is necessarily less than or equal
to the original maximization. Making the set over which we maximize even smaller, we
obtain
max
P⊆∆S,P ′∈P
min
P∈P
u(P ) ≥ max
P ′
min
P=P ′
u(P ) = u(P ′)
and the equality (1.6) is shown. The argument for equation (1.7) is analog:
min
P⊆∆S
min
P∈P
u(P ) ≥ min
P∈∆S
u(P )
is evident. Furthermore, there exists P ′ ∈ ∆S such that minP∈∆S u(P ) = u(P ′), and
min
P⊆∆S
min
P∈P
u(P ) ≤ min
P⊆∆S,P ′∈P
min
P∈P
u(P )
≤ min
P ′
min
P=P ′
u(P ) = u(P ′)
and the equality holds.
Since the payoff functions in Ellsberg games are multilinear, the preceding lemma gives
us the following corollary of which we will make use also in later chapters.
Corollary 1.13. Let G = 〈N, (Si), (ui)〉 be a normal form game. Then for all i ∈ N ,
max
Pi⊆∆Si
Ui(Pi,P−i) = max
Pi∈∆Si
min
P−i∈P−i
ui(Pi, P−i) ,
and min
Pi⊆∆Si
Ui(Pi,P−i) = min
Pi∈∆Si
min
P−i∈P−i
ui(Pi, P−i) .
With Corollary 1.13 we thus derive from Proposition 1.11 and Lemma 1.12 that in an
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Ellsberg equilibrium (P∗1 , . . . ,P∗n), for all i ∈ N ,
Pi ∈ arg max
P ′i∈∆Si
Ui(P
′
i ,P∗−i) for all Pi ∈ P∗i ,
or, put differently,
Ui(P∗i ,P∗−i) = max
Pi∈∆Si
min
P−i∈P∗−i
ui(Pi, P−i) . (1.8)
Suppose the left hand side of (1.8) was strictly smaller than the right hand side. Then
there exists a P ′i ∈ ∆Si which maximizes the right hand side, but is not the minimizer
of the left hand side. That means player i could deviate from P∗i to a set of probability
distributions P ′i with P ′i ∈ P ′i for which the minimizer of the left hand side of (1.8) was P ′i
and obtain a minimal expected payoff that was higher than Ui(P∗i ,P∗−i). This contradicts
the assumption that (P∗i ,P∗−i) was an Ellsberg equilibrium.
Thence, although Ui is defined as the minimal expected utility over all P1, . . . ,Pn, de
facto player i uses only maximizers in his own Ellsberg equilibrium strategy P∗i , any other
distribution would reduce his utility. In other words, all distributions Pi which player i
uses in his Ellsberg equilibrium strategy yield the same utility, that is, player i is indifferent
between any Pi ∈ P∗i . This is formulated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1.14 (Principle of Indifference in Distributions). Let (P∗1 , . . . ,P∗n) be an Ellsberg
equilibrium of a normal form game G = 〈N, (Si), (ui)〉. Then for all Pi ∈ P∗i ,
min
P−i∈P∗−i
ui(Pi, P−i) = c for some c ∈ R .
Furthermore, a necessary condition for his equilibrium strategy not to be a singleton
is therefore that Ui is constant for some strategy P−i. However, this is not a sufficient
condition for a strategy to be an Ellsberg equilibrium strategy. When Pi is a best response
to some P−i then all Pi ∈ Pi yield the same minimal expected utility, but Pi is only an
equilibrium strategy, if P−i is one, too.
An important property of the payoff functions is that they are linear in probabilities. In
particular, with the equality established in Proposition 1.11, Ui(P∗i ,P∗−i) is linear on ∆Si
for each Pi and linear on P∗j for each Pj ∈ P∗j , j 6= i. This observation suffices to fulfill the
assumptions (multilinear functions are convex in each variable) to Fan’s Minimax Theorem
in Fan (1952). Thus, we have the following minimax theorem for Ellsberg games.
Theorem 1.15 (Minimax Theorem 1). In an Ellsberg equilibrium (P∗i ,P∗−i), for all i ∈ N ,
max
Pi∈∆Si
min
P−i∈P∗−i
ui(Pi, P−i) = min
P−i∈P∗−i
max
Pi∈∆Si
ui(Pi, P−i) .
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We present more minimax results in Section 3.5 on zero-sum games.
1.3.6 Strict Domination in Ellsberg Games
In this section we show that strictly dominated strategies are never used in Ellsberg
equilibria. The question under which conditions weakly dominated strategies can be in
the support of an Ellsberg equilibrium is postponed to Section 4.2.2. In a normal form
game G = 〈N, (Si), (ui)〉 a pure strategy si ∈ Si is strictly dominated if there exists a
mixed strategy Pi ∈ ∆Si that yields a higher utility for player i for any strategy profile
s−i ∈ S−i.
Proposition 1.16. Any Ellsberg equilibrium strategy profile (P∗i )i∈N must put weight only
on strategies that are not strictly dominated.
Proof. Let s˜i be strictly dominated. Then there exists a mixed strategy Pi ∈ ∆Si with
Ui(Pi,P−i) > Ui(s˜i,P−i) for all P−i ⊆ ∆S−i. Let (P∗i ,P∗−i) be an Ellsberg equilibrium
profile. Suppose for some player i ∈ N , P ∗i (s˜i) > 0 for some P ∗i ∈ P∗i . Then we have:
Ui(P∗i ,P∗−i) = min
P ∗−i∈P∗−i
Ui(P∗i , P ∗−i) = min
P ∗−i∈P∗−i
ui(P
∗
i , P
∗
−i)
= min
P ∗−i∈P∗−i
∑
si∈Si
ui(si, P
∗
−i)P
∗
i (si)
= min
P ∗−i∈P∗−i
∑
si 6=s˜i
ui(si, P
∗
−i)P
∗
i (si) + ui(s˜i, P
∗
−i)P
∗
i (s˜i)
< min
P ∗−i∈P∗−i
∑
si 6=s˜i
ui(si, P
∗
−i)P
∗
i (si) + ui(Pi, P
∗
−i)
= min
P ∗−i∈P∗−i
∑
si 6=s˜i
ui(si, P
∗
−i)P
∗
i (si) +
∑
si∈Si
ui(si, P
∗
−i)Pi(si) . (1.9)
We construct a distribution P ′i ∈ ∆Si:
P ′i (si) :=
 P
∗
i (si)Pi(si) for si 6= s˜i ,
Pi(si) for si = s˜i .
With this distribution we can write
(1.9) = min
P ∗−i∈P∗−i
∑
si∈Si
ui(si, P
∗
−i)P
′
i (si) = Ui(P
′
i ,P−i∗) .
This is a contradiction to the assumption that (P∗i ,P∗−i) was an Ellsberg equilibrium.
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From Proposition 1.16 we get an immediate corollary.
Corollary 1.17. In two-person games, when one round of elimination of dominated strate-
gies yields a unique strategy profile, this is the unique Ellsberg equilibrium.
The iterated elimination of dominated strategies raises the question of rationalizability in
Ellsberg games. It is subject to further research to determine the exact characterization
and interdependence of rationalizability and dominance in preference models that account
for aversion to objective ambiguity, but we give a brief overview over the main existing
contributions in the area of ambiguity-averse preferences.
In classic game theory, the concept of Nash equilibrium has often been criticized in
that it assumes correct beliefs in equilibrium. A weaker solution concept that circumvents
this criticism is rationalizability. If one allows for correlation in the definition of rational-
izability, then in finite normal form games the set of correlated rationalizable strategies
coincides with the set of strategies that survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated
strategies. Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) show that these solution concepts are equiv-
alent, in some suitable sense, to a posteriori equilibrium introduced by Aumann (1974) as
a strengthening of subjective correlated equilibrium.
Naturally, it is interesting how these solution concepts relate to each other when we
depart from the Bayesian framework and allow for non-expected utility preferences. No-
tably, four papers provide results on this relation. Epstein (1997) analyzes finite normal
form games with two players, where he excludes explicit randomization over pure strate-
gies. He finds that in this case, iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies and
multiple-prior-rationalizability do in general not lead to the same set of strategies. The
equivalence is obtained when one allows for explicit randomization, as shown by Klibanoff
(1996). This equivalence is generalized by Lo (2000), who shows that rationalizable behav-
ior is indistinguishable for any model of preference satisfying Savage’s axiom P3 (eventwise
monotonicity). Finally, Chen and Luo (2012) show indistinguishability for another class
of payoff functions and ambiguity-averse preferences.
1.4 Non-Nash Outcomes: Strategic Use of Ambiguity in
Negotiation Games
Strategic ambiguity can lead to new phenomena that lie outside the scope of classical game
theory. To give the reader a first impression of interesting Ellsberg equilibria, we consider
the following peace negotiation game taken from Greenberg (2000). There are two small
countries who can either opt for peace, or war. If both countries opt for peace, all three
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players obtain a payoff of 4. If one of the countries does not opt for peace, war breaks
out, but the superpower cannot decide whose action started the war. The superpower can
punish one country and support the other. The game tree is in Figure 1.3 below.10
peacewar
A
punishB
9, 0, 0
punishA
0, 9, 1 punishB
6, 0, 1
punishA
3, 9, 0
peace
4, 4, 4
war
B
C
1
Figure 1.3: Peace negotiation.
As we deal only with static equilibrium concepts in the first chapters, we also present
the normal form in Figure 1.4. In the normal form representation of the game country A
chooses rows, country B columns, and the superpower chooses the matrix.
war peace
war 0, 9, 1 0, 9, 1
peace 3, 9, 0 4, 4, 4
punishA
war peace
war 9, 0, 0 9, 0, 0
peace 6, 0, 1 4, 4, 4
punishB
Figure 1.4: Peace negotiation in normal form.
This game possesses a unique Nash equilibrium where country A mixes with equal
probabilities, and country B opts for war. The superpower has no clue who started the
war given these strategies. It is thus indifferent about whom to punish and mixes with
equal probabilities, as well. War occurs with probability 1. The resulting equilibrium
payoff vector is (4.5, 4.5, 0.5).
10 We take the payoffs as in Greenberg’s paper. In case the reader is puzzled by the slight asymmetry
between country A and B in payoffs: it does not play a role for our argument. One could replace the
payoffs 3 and 6 for country A by 0 and 9.
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If the superpower can create ambiguity (and if the countries A and B are ambiguity-
averse), the picture changes. Suppose for simplicity, that the superpower creates maximal
ambiguity by using a device that allows for any probability between 0 and 1 for its strat-
egy punishA. The pessimistic players A and B are ambiguity-averse and thus maximize
against the worst case. For both of them, the worst case is to be punished by the super-
power, with a payoff of 0. Hence, both prefer to opt for peace given that the superpower
creates ambiguity. As this leads to a very desirable outcome for the superpower, it has
no incentive to deviate from this strategy. We have thus found an equilibrium where the
strategic use of ambiguity leads to an equilibrium outcome outside the support of the Nash
equilibrium outcome.
Let us formalize the above considerations. We claim that there is the following type of
Ellsberg equilibria. The superpower creates ambiguity about its decision. If this ambiguity
is sufficiently large, both players fear to be punished by the superpower in case of war. As
a consequence, they opt for peace. In our game with just two actions for the superpower,
we can identify an Ellsberg strategy with an interval [P0, P1] where P ∈ [P0, P1] is the
probability that the superpower punishes country A. Suppose the superpower plays so
with P0 < 4/9 and P1 > 5/9. Assume also that country B opts for peace. If A goes for
war, it uses that prior in [P0, P1] which minimizes its expected payoff, which is P1. This
yields UA(war,war, [P0, P1]) = P1 · 0 + (1−P1) · 9 < 4. Hence, opting for peace is country
A’s best reply. The reasoning for country B is similar, but with the opposite probability
P0. If both countries A and B go for peace, the superpower gets 4 regardless of what it
does; in particular, the ambiguous strategy described above is optimal. We conclude that
(peace, peace, [P0, P1]) is a (reduced form) Ellsberg equilibrium.
Proposition 1.18. In Greenberg’s game, the strategies (peace, peace, [P0, P1]) with P0 <
4/9 and P1 > 5/9 form an Ellsberg equilibrium.
Note that this Ellsberg equilibrium is very different from the game’s unique Nash equi-
librium. In Nash equilibrium, war occurs in every play of the game. However, in our
Ellsberg equilibrium, peace is the unique outcome. By using the strategy [P0, P1] which
is a set of probability distributions, the superpower creates ambiguity. This supports an
Ellsberg equilibrium where players’ strategies do not lie in the support of the unique Nash
equilibrium. We also point out that the countries A and B use different worst-case priors
in equilibrium, this is a typical phenomenon in Ellsberg equilibria that are supported by
strategies which are not in the support of any Nash equilibrium of the game.
Other equilibrium concepts for extensive form games (without Knightian uncertainty)
such as conjectural equilibrium Battigalli and Guaitoli (1988), self-confirming equilibrium
Fudenberg and Levine (1993), subjective equilibrium Kalai and Lehrer (1995) and mu-
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tually acceptable courses of action Greenberg, Gupta, and Luo (2009) can also assure
the peace equilibrium outcome in the example by Greenberg. Other equilibrium concepts
for extensive form games with Knightian uncertainty are, e.g., Battigalli, Cerreia-Vioglio,
Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2012) and Lo (1999). Postponing the analysis of the relation
of these equilibrium concepts to Ellsberg equilibrium to Chapter 6 on dynamic Ellsberg
games, we only want to stress here that in difference to the existing concepts the driving
factor in Ellsberg equilibrium is that ambiguity is employed strategically and objectively.
Greenberg refers to historic peace negotiations between Israel and Egypt (countries A and
B in the negotiation example) mediated by the USA (superpower C) after the 1973 war.
As explained by Kissinger (1982)11, the fact that both Egypt and Israel were too afraid
to be punished if negotiations broke down partly contributed to the success of the peace
negotiations. This story is supported by our Ellsberg equilibrium, a first evidence that
Ellsberg equilibria might capture some real world phenomena better than Nash equilibria.
1.5 Related Literature
Several authors introduce Knightian uncertainty into complete-information normal form
games. We discuss their concepts and compare them to our approach.
Dow and Werlang (1994), Lo (1996), Marinacci (2000), Eichberger and Kelsey (2000)
and Eichberger, Kelsey, and Schipper (2009) all extend the interpretation of Nash equilib-
rium as an equilibrium in beliefs. For example, Dow and Werlang (1994) interpret their
non-additive (Choquet) probabilities as uncertain beliefs about the other player’s action.
A pair (P1, P2) of non-additive probabilities is then a Nash equilibrium under Knightian
uncertainty if each action in a support of player 1’s belief P1 is optimal given that he uses
P2 to evaluate his expected payoff, and similarly for player 2. We thus have here a first
version of an equilibrium in beliefs. This approach is refined by Marinacci (2000) and
extended to n-person games by Eichberger and Kelsey (2000).
Lo (1996) introduces the concept of equilibrium in beliefs under uncertainty where the
beliefs are represented by multiple priors over other players’ mixed strategies. Each player
i has a set of beliefs Bi over what the other players do, so over ∆S−i. The profile (Bi)
then forms a beliefs equilibrium if player j puts positive weight only on strategies of
player i that maximize i’s minimal expected payoff given the belief set Bi. This concept
allows for disagreement of players’ beliefs, and for correlation. Lo therefore introduces the
refinement of a beliefs equilibrium with agreement in which player j and k agree about
11 See p. 802 therein, in particular.
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player i’s actions and the beliefs of i over j and k are independent. Lo proves the nice result
that every beliefs equilibrium contains a Bayesian beliefs equilibrium (where the belief sets
are singletons). As a corollary, he obtains a precursor of Bade (2011b)’s main theorem
(which we discuss in a later paragraph): in two player games, every beliefs equilibrium
contains a Nash equilibrium.
Note that all the equilibrium concepts discussed above do not specify which action will
actually be played in equilibrium. In Lo (1996) players can play any pure or mixed strategy
that is a best response to their belief set, in the other equilibrium notions mentioned,
players only have access to pure strategies in the support of the capacities. This stands in
contrast to Ellsberg equilibrium, where the equilibrium strategy is fixed by the Ellsberg
urn chosen. The strategy is a best response to the belief, and the belief coincides with the
strategy played.
Klibanoff (1996), Lehrer (2008) and Lo (2009) propose an approach similar to beliefs
equilibrium. Uncertainty is present in players’ beliefs that are represented by sets of dis-
tributions. Equilibrium is defined as a profile of beliefs and an objectively mixed (or
pure) strategy for each player, which is the strategy that he plays in equilibrium. These
strategies need to be contained in the belief sets. Accordingly, players have to anticipate
their opponents’ strategy correctly in the sense that the truth is part of their belief. This
consistency requirement is weaker than in Nash equilibrium (and weaker than in Ellsberg
equilibrium!) and typically the strategies in equilibrium are not best responses to the
actual strategies played. Klibanoff (1996) proposes a refinement where only correlated
rationalizable beliefs are allowed.12 Lehrer (2008) develops a model of decision making
under uncertainty with partially-specified probabilities, these are used to represent the
players’ uncertain beliefs about their opponents. Lo (2009) establishes formal epistemic
foundations for an equilibrium concept with ambiguity-averse preferences. He finds that
epistemically stochastic independence is not necessary for a generalized Nash equilibrium
concept. A correlated Nash equilibrium is a pair 〈σ,Φ〉 consisting of a profile of beliefs Φi
and a profile of mixed strategies σi where, for consistency, each strategy ai in the support
of σi is a best response to the belief Φi.
Bade (2011b) goes a first step in another direction, away from the beliefs interpretation
of Nash equilibrium. She allows players to use acts in the sense of Anscombe-Aumann and
players are uncertainty-averse over such acts. In an ambiguous act equilibrium, players
play best responses as in Nash equilibrium, but under the generalized framework. A large
12 Lo (1996) requires every probability distribution in the belief sets to be a best response, therefore
every beliefs equilibrium with agreement is a refinement of equilibrium with uncertainty aversion and
rationalizable beliefs (this is shown in Lo (1996), Proposition 9).
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class of ambiguity-averse preferences are covered. The possible priors for an ambiguous act
are part of the players’ preferences in her setup. Bade then adds some appropriate consis-
tency properties (agreement on null events) to exclude unreasonably divergent beliefs, and
she imposes the rather strong assumption that preferences are strictly monotone, following
Klibanoff (1996) here. This excludes beliefs on the boundary of strategy sets; such degen-
erated beliefs are sometimes important, though. For example, it excludes Ellsberg urns
with full ambiguity where it is only known that the probability for a red ball is between 0
and 1. Bade’s main theorem establishes that under her assumptions, in two-person games
the support of ambiguous act equilibria and the support of Nash equilibria coincide.
Note that Aumann (1974), Epstein (1997) and Azrieli and Teper (2011) (amongst oth-
ers) have also defined games that have Anscombe-Aumann acts as strategies, but to dif-
ferent ends. Aumann (1974) defines such a general game, then imposes Savage expected
utility and analyses properties of correlated and subjective equilibrium. Epstein (1997)
analyses games very similar to Bade’s, but is mainly interested in rationalizability and
iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies in the generalized framework. Azrieli
and Teper (2011) define an extension of an incomplete-information game.
In difference to Bade (2011b)’s setup, we let ambiguity be an objective instrument that
is not derived from subjective preferences. Players can credibly commit to play an Ellsberg
urn with a given and known degree of ambiguity. In Ellsberg games players use devices
that create ambiguity, thus we extend the objective random devices interpretation of Nash
equilibrium. The articles cited above impose non-expected utility representations derived
from subjective preferences, like maxmin expected utility by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989),
Choquet expected utility by Schmeidler (1989), or they fix only certain axioms to allow
for a large class of ambiguity-averse preferences. To model the preferences in Ellsberg
games we use the representation results by Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2008)
on attitude towards imprecise information which capture the objective ambiguity we have
in mind.
We want to mention some other approaches that introduce Knightian uncertainty into
games which are not as closely related to the concept of Ellsberg games. Crawford (1990)
was one of the earliest to define an equilibrium concept which incorporated the relaxations
of Von Neumann and Morgenstern axioms which were introduced to explain phenomena
like the Ellsberg paradox. To this end, Crawford (1990) analyzes an equilibrium concept
without the assumption of independence on the underlying preference relation. Stauber
(2011) considers incomplete information games with ambiguous beliefs and analyzes the
robustness of equilibria of these games. Finally, Perchet (2012) works in the context of
repeated games with the possibility of monitoring. The information about the opponents’
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play is “ambiguously” disturbed and hence the notion of Nash equilibrium generalized. He
also generalizes the Lemke-Howson algorithm to compute equilibria of two-player games.
In an unpublished working paper, Di Tillio, Kos, and Messner (2012) develop the concept
of ‘objective ambiguous strategies’ which leads to equilibrium concepts similar to Ellsberg
equilibrium; however, the authors focus on the implications in mechanism design. Of
course, the literature reviewed here is not exhaustive, but we hope to have mentioned all
closely related concepts.
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Ambiguity
The hedging effect of ambiguity aversion leads to what we call immunization against strate-
gic ambiguity.1 In normal form Ellsberg games players often have a strategy available that
immunizes them against any ambiguity played by their opponents. In this chapter we look
at these immunization strategies more closely. We start by giving an example and then,
after defining immunization strategies, calculate the immunization strategies of a large
class of 2 × 2 games. We then provide some examples which show that in certain games
players immunize themselves against ambiguity by playing their maximin strategy. To
generalize this observation, we prove under which circumstances in general two-player
games the immunization strategy is the maximin strategy of the players. The last section
uses the results in the chapter to characterize the role of immunization strategies in Ells-
berg equilibria. We see that in many 2× 2 games, Ellsberg equilibria are bounded by the
immunization and the Nash equilibrium strategy.
2.1 Example of an Immunization Strategy
To get an intuition for immunization we take a slightly modified version of Matching
Pennies as our example. The results generalize to a large class of two-person 2× 2 games
as we show below in Proposition 2.3. The payoff matrix for the modified Matching Pennies
game is in Figure 2.1.
Player 1
Player 2
HEAD TAIL
HEAD 3,−1 −1, 1
TAIL −1, 1 1,−1
Figure 2.1: Modified Matching Pennies I.
In our modified version of Matching Pennies, the unique Nash equilibrium is that player
1 mixes uniformly over his strategies, and player 2 mixes with (1/3, 2/3). This yields the
1 Section 2.1 was published in the IMW working paper Riedel and Sass (2011).
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equilibrium payoffs 1/3 and 0. One might guess that one can get an Ellsberg equilib-
rium where both players use a set of probability measures around the Nash equilibrium
distribution as their strategy. This is, somewhat surprisingly, at least to us, not true.
The crucial point to understand here is the following. Players can immunize themselves
against ambiguity; in the modified Matching Pennies example, player 1 can use the mixed
strategy (1/3, 2/3) to make himself independent of any ambiguity used by the opponent.
Indeed, with this strategy, his expected payoff is 1/3 against any mixed strategy of the
opponent, and a fortiori against Ellsberg strategies as well. This strategy is also the unique
best reply of player 1 to Ellsberg strategies with ambiguity around the Nash equilibrium,
in particular, such strategic ambiguity is not part of an Ellsberg equilibrium.
Let us explain this more formally. An Ellsberg strategy for player 2 can be identified
with an interval [Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, 1] where Q ∈ [Q0, Q1] is the probability to play HEAD.
Suppose player 2 uses many probabilities around 1/3, so Q0 < 1/3 < Q1. The minimal
expected payoff for player 1 when he uses the mixed strategy with probability P for HEAD
is then
U1(P, [Q0, Q1]) = min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
3PQ− P (1−Q)− (1− P )Q+ (1− P )(1−Q)
= min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
6PQ− 2P − 2Q+ 1
= min {Q0(6P − 2), Q1(6P − 2)}+ 1− 2P
=

Q1(6P − 2) + 1− 2P if P < 1/3 ,
1/3 if P = 1/3 ,
Q0(6P − 2) + 1− 2P if P > 1/3 .
(2.1)
We plot the payoff function in Figure 2.2 for Q0 = 1/4 and Q1 = 1/2. By choosing the
mixed strategy P = 1/3, player 1 becomes immune against any ambiguity and ensures the
(Nash) equilibrium payoff of 1/3. If there was an Ellsberg equilibrium with P0 < 1/2 < P1
and Q0 < 1/3 < Q1, then the minimal expected payoff would be below 1/3. Hence, such
Ellsberg equilibria do not exist.
2.2 Immunization Strategies
We call the strategy that renders the player immune against any ambiguity used by the
opponents immunization strategy.
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Figure 2.2: Player 1’s (minimal expected) payoff (2.1) as a function of the probability P
of playing HEAD when player 2 uses the Ellsberg strategy [1/4, 1/2].
Definition 2.1. Let G = 〈N, (Si), (ui)〉 be a normal form game. A mixed strategy P¯i ∈
∆Si for player i is called an immunization strategy, if there exists a vi ∈ R such that
Ui(P¯i,P−i) = vi for all sets P−i ⊆ ∆S−i.
Such immunization plays frequently a role in two-person games, and it need not always be
the Nash equilibrium strategy that is used to render oneself immune. In fact, Nash equi-
librium and immunization are in some sense opposite concepts: with a Nash equilibrium
strategy the player wants to make his opponent indifferent between all his strategies, and
with an immunization strategy the player wants to make himself indifferent. Consider,
e.g., the slightly changed payoff matrix in Figure 2.3.
Player 1
Player 2
HEAD TAIL
HEAD 1,−1 −1, 1
TAIL −2, 1 1,−1
Figure 2.3: Modified Matching Pennies II.
In the unique Nash equilibrium, player 1 still plays both strategies with probability 1/2 (to
render player 2 indifferent); however, in order to be immune against Ellsberg strategies,
he has to play HEAD with probability 3/5. Then his payoff is −1/5 regardless of what
player 2 does. This strategy does not play any role in Nash equilibrium, but note that
the payoff to the strategy is the same as in the unique Nash equilibrium in which player
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1 plays HEAD with probability 1/2 and player 2 with probability 2/5. In fact, every
strategy of player 1 in the interval [1/2, 3/5] yields the same maxmin payoff, which makes
this strategy a candidate for an Ellsberg equilibrium strategy.
For solving an Ellsberg game it is helpful to plot the (minimal expected) payoff function
as in Figure 2.2. Nevertheless, to understand the general properties of Ellsberg games and
their relation to the standard analysis of normal form games, we also have a look at the
expected payoff function of the players.
In Figure 2.4 we show player 1’s expected payoff function for Modified Matching Pennies
I in two different perspectives. Studying the plots, one can see that the payoff is indeed
independent of Q at P = 1/3, and, furthermore, P = 1/3 yields the maximal minimal
expected payoff for player 1. So P = 1/3 is player 1’s maximin strategy. We say more
about the general relation between immunization strategies and maximin strategies in
Section 2.4.
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Figure 2.4: Player 1’s expected payoff function of the modified Matching Pennies I game,
u1(P,Q) = 6PQ− 2P − 2Q+ 1, in two different perspectives.
Because of the, in some sense, inverse relation to Nash equilibrium strategies, the necessary
conditions for the existence of completely mixed immunization strategies are similar to the
existence of completely mixed Nash equilibrium. However, for immunization strategies
these are also sufficient. We call a strategy completely mixed if it puts positive probability
on every pure strategy. Denote with A (B) the payoff matrix of player 1 (2). Then player
1(2) has an immunization strategy if and only if no convex combination of columns (rows)
of A (B) dominates convex combinations of other columns (rows). However, the following
example shows that existence of completely mixed Nash equilibrium strategies does not
imply existence of completely mixed immunization strategies.
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Example 2.2. Consider the game with the following payoff matrix for player 1:
Player 1
U 2 −1
D 1 1
As Nash equilibrium strategy player 2 would choose a convex combination of columns such
that player 1 is indifferent between U and D, that is, (Q∗, 1 − Q∗) = (2/3, 1/3). But to
immunize himself, player 1 plays U with zero probability and D with probability one, which
is not a completely mixed strategy.
2.3 Immunization Strategies of General 2× 2 Games
We calculate the immunization strategies of a general two-person 2×2 game. Immunization
strategies (P¯ , 1−P¯ ) and (Q¯, 1−Q¯) for players 1 and 2 are fully described by the probability
P¯ to play U and Q¯ to play L. We use this abbreviated notation also for Nash equilibrium
(P ∗, Q∗) := ((P ∗, 1− P ∗), (Q∗, 1−Q∗)). We have the following proposition.
Proposition 2.3. Let G = 〈{1, 2}, (Si), (ui)〉 be a normal form game with payoff matrix
Player 1
Player 2
L R
U a, e b, f
D c, g d, h
Then the immunization strategy P¯ of player 1 is
P¯ =
d− c
a− b− c+ d ,
and the immunization strategy Q¯ of player 2 is
Q¯ =
h− f
e− f − g + h ,
if 0 ≤ P¯ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ Q¯ ≤ 1. That P¯ and Q¯ lie between 0 and 1 is fulfilled when
d − c ≥ 0 > b − a or d − c ≤ 0 < b − a and, respectively, h − f ≥ 0 > g − e or
h− f ≤ 0 < g − e.
Proof. We show this only for player 1, the calculation for player 2 is analog. Let P ∈
[P0, P1] denote the probability with which player 1 plays U , and Q ∈ [Q0, Q1] the prob-
ability with which player 2 plays L. Assume first that P¯ = d−ca−b−c+d . To assure that
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0 ≤ d−ca−b−c−d ≤ 1 we have either
d− c ≥ 0 and a− b− c+ d > 0 and a− b− c+ d ≥ d− c ,
or d− c ≤ 0 and a− b− c+ d < 0 and a− b− c+ d ≤ d− c .
From the first case follows d− c ≥ 0 > b− a, from the latter case d− c ≤ 0 < b− a. Now
assume without loss of generality that d− c ≥ 0 > b− a. We derive the minimal expected
utility of player 1.
U1(P, [Q0, Q1]) = min
Q∈[Q0,Q1]
aPQ+ bP (1−Q) + c(1− P )Q+ d(1− P )(1−Q)
= min
Q∈[Q0,Q1]
(a− b− c+ d)PQ+ (b− d)P + (c− d)Q+ d
= min
Q∈[Q0,Q1]
Q((a− b− c+ d)P + c− d) + (b− d)P + d
=

Q0((a− b− c+ d)P + c− d) + (b− d)P + d if P > d−ca−b−c+d ,
(b−d)(d−c)
a−b−c+d + d if P =
d−c
a−b−c+d ,
Q1((a− b− c+ d)P + c− d) + (b− d)P + d if P < d−ca−b−c+d .
Under the assumption that 0 ≤ P ≤ 1, the utility function is constant for all [Q0, Q1] if
and only if P = d−ca−b−c+d .
The completely mixed Nash equilibrium of the above general game, if it exists, is
(P ∗, Q∗) =
(
h− g
e− f − g + h ,
d− b
a− b− c+ d
)
.
It is noticeable that the immunization strategies are similar to the opponent’s Nash equi-
librium strategy. In fact, some of the standard two-person 2× 2 games have the property
that the immunization strategies are exactly the Nash equilibrium strategies of the oppo-
nent. This is the case when c = b for player 1 and f = g for player 2. This is what we
will assume in Proposition 3.7 on the Ellsberg equilibria of general competitive games in
order to make the exposition of the result more comprehensive.
2.4 Immunization as Maximin Strategy
An immunization strategy does not only make a player i indifferent about any ambiguity
used by the opponents, it makes him also indifferent to any pure or mixed strategies the
opponents might play. Playing the immunization strategy a player can assure himself
some payoff vi that is independent of the opponents’ behavior. If this payoff vi is not
56
2.4 Immunization as Maximin Strategy
less than the maximal Nash equilibrium payoff v∗i , it can be argued that playing the
immunization strategy is smarter than playing the Nash equilibrium strategy. The Nash
equilibrium strategy bears the risk of yielding a smaller payoff, if, e.g., some opponent
makes a mistake.
A similar phenomenon had been discussed in Aumann and Maschler (1972). The authors
notice that in some (and not only in zero-sum!) games the maximin payoff is the same as
the Nash equilibrium payoff. In a very instructive paper, Pruzhansky (2011) analyses this
observation further and finds, that this is the case if and only if there exists a completely
mixed Nash equilibrium and the maximin strategy is an equalizer. What the author calls
an equalizer is the same as an immunization strategy, only for pure and mixed strategies
and not for Ellsberg strategies, that is a strategy P¯i for which the expected payoff is
constant for all strategies P−i ∈ ∆S−i. It is immediate that every equalizer strategy is an
immunization strategy. If the expected payoff ui(P¯i, P−i) is constant for all P−i ∈ ∆S−i,
then minP−i∈P−i ui(P¯i, P−i) is also constant for all P−i ⊂ ∆S−i. The converse is also true,
since if minP−i∈P−i ui(P¯i, P−i) is constant for some fixed P¯i and all P−i ⊂ ∆S−i, then it is
also constant for all P−i ∈ ∆S−i.
We now state the definition of maximin strategies and discuss existence and uniqueness.
Definition 2.4. Let G = 〈N, (Si), (ui)〉 be a normal form game. A mixed strategy Pi ∈
∆Si is a maximin strategy for player i ∈ N if it maximizes his minimal expected payoff,
that is
Pi ∈ arg max
P ′i∈∆Si
min
P−i∈∆S−i
ui(P
′
i , P−i) .
We know that maximin strategies always exist, since ui is continuous and ∆Si compact
and convex for all i ∈ N . But maximin strategies are in general not unique as the following
example shows. We look at two different 2× 2 games, one with many maximin strategies,
the other with a unique one. The non-uniqueness of the maximin strategy of u1 in the
following example is due to the fact that the Nash equilibrium strategy Q∗ of player 2 lies
on the boundary, that is, Q∗ is not completely mixed.
Whenever we speak about 2×2 games, mixed strategies are represented by one variable
per player, typically in our notation (P, 1 − P ) for player 1 and (Q, 1 − Q) for player 2.
The general payoff function u1(P,Q) of player 1 with payoff matrix
A =
a b
c d
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is then
u1(P,Q) = aPQ+ bP (1−Q) + c(1− P )Q+ d(1− P )(1−Q)
= (a− b− c+ d)PQ+ (b− d)P + (c− d)Q .
Example 2.5 (Unique and non-unique maximin strategies). We look at two payoff func-
tions for player 1, u1(P,Q) = 2PQ − Q and u′1(P,Q) = 2PQ − Q − P , which are for
example the payoff functions of the following payoff matrices.
u1 :
L R
U 1 0
D −1 0 u
′
1 :
L R
U 0 −1
D −1 0
Figure 2.5: Two games with unique and non-unique maximin strategies.
The functions are plotted in Figure 2.6 and 2.7, respectively, each time shown in the two
perspectives P and Q. We see that in Figure 2.6 the indifference strategy of player 2 is
Figure 2.6: u1(P,Q) = 2PQ−Q.
zero, thus not completely mixed. The minimum over Q is 0 whenever P ≥ 1/2 and else
2P − 1, thus the maximin strategy is not unique. In Figure 2.7 the indifference strategy is
Q∗ = 1/2. The minimum over Q is −P when P ≥ 1/2 and P − 1 else. This function is
maximized over P when P = 1/2. This is the unique maximin strategy of player 1.
Finally, note that immunization strategies are not always maximin strategies as one can
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Figure 2.7: u′1(P,Q) = 2PQ−Q− P .
see immediately in the following example. The game does not have a completely mixed
Nash equilibrium. We prove in the next section that this is a necessary condition for a
game to have immunization strategies that are maximin.
Example 2.6. In the game in Figure 2.8 below, player 1’s maximin strategy is U , and
his only immunization strategy is D.
Player 1
Player 2
L R
U 2, 1 1, 0
D 0, 0 0, 1
Figure 2.8: Game in which the immunization strategy is not the maximin strategy.
2.5 Immunizing is Playing Against Your Zero-Sum-Self
Theorem 2.8 in this section relates maximin strategies and immunization strategies for two-
player games with n strategies for each player. We show that if a two-player game with such
square payoff matrices has a completely mixed Nash equilibrium, then an immunization
strategy is a maximin strategy.
We use the following notation. A two-person normal form game G is described by the
payoff matrices A and B of player 1 and player 2, we write G = (A,B). We call G square
when A and B are square matrices; in this section we only consider square games. The
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row vectors of A (B) are denoted by subscripts, ai (bi) ∈ Rn, and the column vectors by
superscripts, aj (bj) ∈ Rn. In the following it will be convenient to write the expected
utility of a mixed strategy P of player 1 with payoff matrix A as PAQ when player 2 plays
mixed strategy Q. Transpose signs are suppressed.
A necessary condition for G to have a completely mixed Nash equilibrium is that no
player has weakly or strictly dominated strategies. That is, no row (column) of A (B)
is dominated by another row (column) or a convex combination of rows (columns). This
condition can be expressed as follows. Let A˜ be the (n + 1) × n-matrix consisting of the
matrix A with an additional last column (1, . . . , 1), and B˜ the n× (n+ 1)-matrix with an
additional last row (1, . . . , 1). Furthermore let k˜ = (k, . . . , k, 1) and l˜ = (l, . . . , l, 1) with
k, l ∈ R. Then G has a completely mixed Nash equilibrium (P,Q) = (P ∗, Q∗) when it is
a nonnegative solution to the two systems of linear equations
PB˜ = k˜ ,
A˜Q = l˜ .
The existence of immunization strategies can be expressed analogously: no column (row)
of matrix A (B) is dominated by another column (row) or a convex combination of columns
(rows). Let u˜ = (u, . . . , u, 1) and v˜ = (v, . . . , v, 1) with u, v ∈ R. Player 1 has an
immunization strategy P = P¯ in G when the vector is a nonnegative solution to the
system
PA˜ = u˜ ,
and player 2 has an immunization strategy Q = Q¯ in G when the vector is a nonnegative
solution to the system
B˜Q = v˜ .
Note that for the existence of a completely mixed Nash equilibrium both solutions P ∗ and
Q∗ have to exist, whereas the immunization strategy is defined for a single player.
To a square game G we define associated zero-sum games G1 and G2. G1 is the game
with payoff matrices (A,−A), G2 the game with payoff matrices (−B,B). We first prove
the following lemma.
Lemma 2.7. Let G be a square two-person normal form game, G1 and G2 its associated
zero-sum games. If G has a completely mixed Nash equilibrium (P ∗, Q∗) and player 1
(2) has an immunization strategy P¯ (Q¯), then G1 (G2) has a Nash equilibrium (P ∗1 , Q∗1)
((P ∗2 , Q∗2)) where P ∗1 = P¯ and Q∗1 = Q∗ (P ∗2 = P ∗ and Q∗2 = Q¯).
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Proof. We show this only for player 1, the case for player 2 follows analogously. If (P ∗, Q∗)
is a completely mixed Nash equilibrium of G, then Q∗ solves the system A˜Q = l˜ for some
l ∈ R. Furthermore, if P¯ is an immunization strategy of player 1, then P¯ solves the
system PA˜ = u˜ for some u ∈ R. Then P¯ also solves P (−˜A) = −˜u and is therefore a Nash
equilibrium strategy for player 1 of the game G1.
Now, we present and prove the main result of the section which relates immunization and
maximin strategies of a square two-person normal form game.
Theorem 2.8. Let G be a square two-person normal form game with a completely mixed
Nash equilibrium (P ∗, Q∗). If player 1 (2) has an immunization strategy P¯ (Q¯) in G, then
P¯ (Q¯) is a maximin strategy of player 1 (2).
Proof. We prove the result only for player 1. P¯ is an immunization strategy of player 1
in the game G if and only if it is a nonnegative solution to the system PA˜ = u˜. Now
by assumption there exists a completely mixed Nash equilbrium (P ∗, Q∗) of G, thus with
Lemma 2.7 there exists a completely mixed Nash equilibrium (P ∗1 , Q∗1) in G1. P ∗1 is
therefore a nonnegative solution to the system P (−˜A) = k˜ for some k ∈ R. Then P ∗1 also
solves the system PA˜ = (−˜k) and we see that P ∗1 must be the immunization strategy P¯
of player 1.
Now, since G1 is a zero-sum game, P¯ is by the classic Minimax Theorem for zero-sum
games (which we state in Theorem 3.15) also the maximin strategy in G1, that means
P¯ ∈ arg max
P
min
Q
PAQ .
This condition only depends on the payoff matrix A of player 1, thus P¯ (= P ∗1 ) is the
maximin strategy in any game where player 1 has the payoff matrix A, in particular in
the game G.
To show the analog statement for player 2 we use the associated zero-sum game G2.
Lemma 1 in Pruzhansky (2011) proves a result very close to our Theorem 2.8, but with
different means by making use of geometric properties of the various types of strategies.
The interpretation of the result gets an interesting twist when we use the associated
zero-sum games as in our proof. A player who is immunizing himself against strategic
ambiguity blindfolds himself and drops the strategic element of the game. Instead of
playing the original game, he plays the associated zero-sum game which results from his
own payoff matrix. Thus, he plays his optimal strategy P¯ , the immunization strategy,
against an imaginary self that receives the negative of his own payoff.
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The assumption of a completely mixed Nash equilibrium in Theorem 2.8 is necessary.
In the following example we construct a game with a unique Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies (which is also the unique Ellsberg equilibrium) that has completely mixed im-
munization strategies which are not maximin.
Example 2.9. Consider the game with payoff matrix
Player 1
Player 2
L R
U 1, 1 0, 2
D 2, 0 3, 3
It has the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (D,R) which is also the unique
Ellsberg equilibrium, and the completely mixed immunization strategy (1/2, 1/2) for each
player. The unique maximin strategies are the pure strategies D for player 1 and R for
player 2.
2.6 Concealing Nash Equilibrium and Maximin Behavior:
Immunization as Ellsberg Equilibrium Strategy
When do players use immunization strategies in Ellsberg equilibrium? We saw in Example
2.9 that immunization strategies are not always used in Ellsberg equilibria, on the other
hand, we will see in the next chapter that in many games immunization strategies play a
decisive role in Ellsberg equilibrium. We explain why, in 2× 2 games, this is the case.
It is well-known that only in two-person zero-sum games the Nash equilibrium strategies
are always the maximin strategies. When an immunization strategy (that is, the maximin
strategy in games with a completely mixed Nash equilibrium) is not the Nash equilibrium
strategy, the game has proper Ellsberg equilibria and the immunization strategy plays a
special role in Ellsberg equilibrium. If and only if the immunization strategy is the Nash
equilibrium strategy (this happens only rarely in general two-person games) immunization
strategies are used only in Ellsberg equilibria with unilateral full ambiguity (that is, one
player plays his immunization strategy, the other anything in the whole set of probability
distributions that includes his Nash equilibrium strategy). This we prove in Theorem
4.2. This type of Ellsberg equilibrium occurs, for example, in symmetric coordination
games or of course in zero-sum games. As a result of Theorem 2.8, in two-person zero-sum
games, immunization strategies are thus always used in equilibrium, but only in Ellsberg
equilibria with unilateral full ambiguity.
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We now look at the former case in detail, when the immunization strategy is not the
Nash equilibrium strategy.
As long as the Nash equilibrium strategy of the opponent is the distribution used by the
player to evaluate his maxmin expected utility, the player is indifferent between any mixed
strategy, as the classical Principle of Indifference states. The Nash equilibrium strategy
is only used when it is at the boundary of the Ellsberg strategy of the opponent, and the
player is only indifferent between the strategies that lie between his immunization strategy
and the boundary. Any strategy outside that set makes him change his utility evaluation to
the other boundary of the opponents’ Ellsberg strategy. Therefore the Ellsberg equilibrium
strategy of the player cannot properly contain the immunization strategy in a similar way
as it cannot properly contain the Nash equilibrium strategy. The only candidates are
thus always between the immunization and the Nash equilibrium strategy, or between
the Nash equilibrium strategy and the boundary of the unit interval, if the immunization
strategy does not lie in between. In particular, in 2 × 2 coordination games of the type
Battle of the Sexes, there is always an Ellsberg equilibrium in which both players use
the set of probabilities between the Nash equilibrium and the maximin strategy, that
is ([P ∗,M1] , [Q∗,M2]) (compare Proposition 3.2). In these games, the strategic use of
ambiguity therefore implies concealment of Nash equilibrium and maximin behavior.
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3 Strategic Use of Ambiguity in
Two-Player Normal Form Games
In this chapter we present a number of examples and properties of Ellsberg equilibria in
normal form games with two players.1 We start with an explanation on how Ellsberg
equilibria of two-person 2 × 2 games are computed. Subsequently, we look at different
classes of games: coordination games (Section 3.2), conflict games (Section 3.3) and zero-
sum games (Section 3.5). We analyze examples and compute the Ellsberg equilibria of
these classes of normal form games. The Ellsberg equilibria of general coordination and
conflict games are summarized in Table 3.1 in Section 3.4. For zero-sum games we also
show that Ellsberg equilibria are value preserving. In Section 3.6 we calculate the Ellsberg
equilibria of some classic 2 × 2 games such as, e.g., Hawk and Dove and the Prisoners’
Dilemma. We explain with an example by Myerson, that also games with linear (as
opposed to in Ellsberg games often observed piecewise linear) payoff functions can have
proper Ellsberg equilibria.
We close the chapter with an analysis of a special class of 3 × 3 games. We consider a
slightly modified version of Rock Scissors Paper, and with the help of our experience with
2× 2 games we succeed in calculating the Ellsberg equilibria of these games. For a better
understanding of how the equilibria are determined, we provide a geometric analysis of
the equilibrium strategies in the two-dimensional probability simplex.
With this chapter I wish to provide a sort of compendium of the Ellsberg equilibria in the
most important normal form games and highlight some structure of Ellsberg equilibria in
2× 2 games. The reader should be able to only read certain sections and fully understand
how the Ellsberg equilibria are derived. For this reason the impression of repetition of
certain steps in the calculations is unavoidable.
1 Some parts of this chapter, namely Section 3.3.1 and the first half of Section 3.3.2, were published in
the IMW working paper Riedel and Sass (2011).
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3.1 Computing Ellsberg Equilibria in Two-Player 2× 2
Games
We calculate the Ellsberg equilibria of two-player 2 × 2 games. Here Ellsberg strategies
are completely described by the interval of probabilities [P0, P1] with which one of the
strategies is played. The other strategy is then played with some probability in the interval
[1 − P1, 1 − P0]. In this section, we thus use the notation [P0, P1] to denote the Ellsberg
strategy of player 1, and [Q0, Q1] to denote the Ellsberg strategy of player 2. When it
is useful, we also use the notation P and Q for the Ellsberg strategies of player 1 and 2,
sometimes P∗ and Q∗ is used to indicate Ellsberg equilibrium strategies. In all the 2× 2
games we analyze in this chapter, we write (P ∗, Q∗) := ((P ∗, 1 − P ∗), (Q∗, 1 − Q∗)) as a
short hand for the mixed Nash equilibrium of the game (if it exists). P is the probability
that player 1 plays U (or his upper strategy with a sometimes different name), and Q is
the probability that player 2 plays L (or his left strategy wit a sometimes different name),
throughout the chapter.
Following Proposition 1.11, in order to determine the Ellsberg equilibria of a two-person
2 × 2 game, we have to find the arg max over P ′ ∈ ∆S1 of player 1’s minimal expected
utility when P ′ is played against the equilibrium strategy Q of the opponent, and likewise
for player 2. Thus, we start by calculating the minimal expected utility for both players,
where we fix their respective mixtures P ∈ ∆S1, Q ∈ ∆S2 and minimize over the possible
Ellsberg strategies of their opponent,
U1(P, [Q0, Q1]) = min{u1(P,Q0), u1(P,Q1)} ,
U2([P0, P1] , Q) = min{u2(P0, Q), u2(P1, Q)} .
Typically this yields a piecewise linear function for each of the players, depending on the
values of P and Q, respectively. Subsequently, we find the best response correspondences
B1([Q0, Q1]) and B2([P0, P1]) by maximizing U1 and U2 over P and Q, respectively. Fol-
lowing the Principle of Indifference in Distributions (Theorem 1.14), to find proper Ellsberg
equilibria, we analyze where the minimal utility function is flat, because these are best
responses in form of intervals of probability distributions. As a final step to determine the
Ellsberg equilibria, one finds the intersections of the best response correspondences.
Finally a remark on notation. We often express relations of the value of several variables
at once. In oder to keep things as short as possible we introduce some abbreviated notation.
For example, 0 ≤ P ≤ 1/2 and 0 ≤ Q ≤ 1/2 is abbreviated by 0 ≤ P,Q ≤ 1/2. In the
same way, when a ≥ b and a ≥ c and d ≥ b and d ≥ c, we simply write a, d ≥ b, c.
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3.2 Strategic Use of Ambiguity in Two-Person Coordination
How can ambiguity be used in standard coordination games? In this section we analyze
2 × 2 games in which both players want to match each other. We start with an example
of a coordination game where both players get the same payoff when they coordinate
successfully. In what follows, we present a proposition which characterizes the Ellsberg
equilibria of general coordination games.
The section closes with further interesting examples for two-person coordination. The
first example is a non-symmetric coordination game; we see that this change to asymmetric
payoffs has important implications for the Ellsberg equilibria of the game. The second
example is of the type where the players would like to coordinate on different equilibria,
that is, games of the type Battle of the Sexes. Thirdly, we discuss the electronic mail
game by Rubinstein (1989) and see that coordination on the good equilibrium is more
likely when players can use Ellsberg strategies.
3.2.1 Example of a Symmetric Coordination Game
To start, we calculate the Ellsberg equilibria of a symmetric coordination game with the
payoffs given by the matrix in Figure 3.1.
Player 1
Player 2
L R
U 1, 1 0, 0
D 0, 0 3, 3
Figure 3.1: Symmetric coordination game.
Note that the Nash equilibria of the game are two pure strategy equilibria (U,L), and
(D,R), and a mixed strategy equilibrium
(P ∗, Q∗) = ((3/4, 1/4) , (3/4, 1/4)) .
Let [P0, P1] denote the set of probabilities with which player 1 plays U , and [Q0, Q1] the
set of probabilities with which player 2 plays L. [P0, P1] and [Q0, Q1] are thus Ellsberg
strategies of player 1 and player 2, respectively. We first fix a distribution P ∈ [P0, P1] for
player 1 and consider his payoff function U1(P, [Q0, Q1]). Player 1 evaluates his minimal
67
3 Strategic Use of Ambiguity in Two-Player Normal Form Games
expected payoff given player 2 plays Q ∈ [Q0, Q1]:
U1(P, [Q0, Q1]) = min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
PQ+ 3(1− P )(1−Q)
= min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
Q(4P − 3) + 3(1− P )
=

Q0(4P − 3) + 3(1− P ) if P > 3/4 ,
3/4 if P = 3/4 ,
Q1(4P − 3) + 3(1− P ) if P < 3/4 .
(3.1)
The maximum of (3.1) over P ∈ [P0, P1] depends on the interval [Q0, Q1]. Observe that
at the boundaries the function reduces to
U1(0 , [Q0, Q1]) = 3(1−Q1) ,
and U1(1 , [Q0, Q1]) = Q0 .
We find in particular that U1(P, [Q0, Q1]) is constant for all P , when Q0 = 3/4 = Q1 . We
distinguish six cases where Q0 and Q1 can be situated within the interval [0, 1], all these
yield different arg max of U1(P, [Q0, Q1]). Figure 3.2 pictures these cases. The distinction
depends on the mixed strategy Q0 = 3/4 = Q1 that makes player 1 indifferent between
any choice of [P0, P1] ⊆ ∆S1. This is the Nash equilibrium strategy of player 2.
We plot the payoff function in Figure 3.2. The numbering (1)-(6) of the functions refer
to (one possible) payoff function when Q0 and Q1 take different values. The values are
listed below. In the same list we present player 1’s best response analysis to the different
strategies [Q0, Q1]:
Q0 > 3/4 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = 1 (1)
Q0 = 3/4 < Q1 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = {[P0, P1] ⊆ [3/4, 1]} (2)
Q0 < 3/4 < Q1 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = 3/4 (3)
Q0 < 3/4 = Q1 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = {[P0, P1] ⊆ [0, 3/4]} (4)
Q1 < 3/4 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = 0 (5)
Q0 = 3/4 = Q1 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = {[P0, P1] ⊆ [0, 1]} (6)
As this is a symmetric game, we get the same behavior for player 2. We fix the probability
Q ∈ ∆S2 and derive the payoff functions U2([P0, P1] , Q) of player 2. Player 2 evaluates
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Figure 3.2: Coordination game: payoff function (3.1) of player 1.
his minimal expected payoff given player 1 plays P ∈ [P0, P1].
U2([P0, P1] , Q) = min
P0≤P≤P1
PQ+ 3(1− P )(1−Q)
= min
P0≤P≤P1
P (4Q− 3) + 3(1−Q)
=

P0(4Q− 3) + 3(1−Q) if Q > 3/4 ,
3/4 if Q = 3/4 ,
P1(4Q− 3) + 3(1−Q) if Q < 3/4 .
(3.2)
Analogue to the case considered before, the maximum of (3.2) over Q ∈ [0, 1] depends on
the interval [P0, P1]. The plot of U2([P0, P1] , Q) is identical to the plot in Figure 3.2. We
thus get the following best responses of player 2:
P0 > 3/4 : B2([P0, P1]) = 1
P0 = 3/4 < P1 : B2([P0, P1]) = {[Q0, Q1] ⊆ [3/4, 1]}
P0 < 3/4 < P1 : B2([P0, P1]) = 3/4
P0 < 3/4 = P1 : B2([P0, P1]) = {[Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, 3/4]}
P1 < 3/4 : B2([P0, P1]) = 0
P0 = 3/4 = P1 : B2([P0, P1]) = {[Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, 1]}
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To find the Ellsberg equilibria, we check which of the six cases lead to intersections of the
best response correspondences. We explain each of the six cases in turn.
(1) If player 2 plays Q0 > 3/4, player 1 maximizes his payoff function U1([P0, P1] , [Q0, Q1])
by playing P0 = P1 = 1 and then again the best response of player 2 is Q0 = Q1 =
1. This is an Ellsberg equilibrium. It coincides with the Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies (U,L).
(2) If player 2 plays Q0 = 3/4 < Q1, player 1’s best response is [P0, P1] ⊆ [3/4, 1]. If
he chooses the left border P0 > 3/4, player 2 can improve by playing Q0 = Q1 = 1,
so this would not be an equilibrium. But when player 1 chooses [P0, P1] = [3/4, P1]
with 3/4 ≤ P1 ≤ 1 and player 2 chooses [Q0, Q1] = [3/4, Q1] with 3/4 ≤ Q1 ≤ 1
out of his best response set, either of the players can improve by deviating. Thus,
([3/4, P1] , [3/4, Q1]) where 3/4 ≤ P1 ≤ 1 and 3/4 ≤ Q ≤ 1 is an Ellsberg equilibrium.
(3) If player 2 plays Q0 < 3/4 < Q1, player 1’s best response is the standard mixed
strategy P0 = P1 = 3/4. Player 2 stays with his strategy because he is indifferent
between all strategies. This is an Ellsberg equilibrium: (3/4, [Q0, Q1]) , where Q0 ≤
3/4 ≤ Q1.
(4) If player 2 plays Q0 < 3/4 = Q1, player 1 maximizes his payoff function by playing
any interval [P0, P1] ⊆ [0, 3/4]. This leads to an analog Ellsberg equilibrium to case
(2), ([P0, 3/4] , [Q0, 3/4]), where 0 ≤ P0 ≤ 3/4 and 0 ≤ Q0 ≤ 3/4.
(5) If player 2 plays Q1 < 3/4, player 1’s best response is P0 = P1 = 0. Thus, player
2 chooses Q0 = Q1 = 0, this is an Ellsberg equilibrium. It coincides with the Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies (D,R).
(6) Lastly, if player 2 plays Q0 = 3/4 = Q1, player 1’s payoff function is constant at
3/4, thus he is indifferent between all subsets [P0, P1] ⊆ [0, 1]. If player 1 plays
P0 ≤ 3/4 ≤ P1, this is an Ellsberg equilibrium, ([P0, P1] , 3/4), where P0 ≤ 3/4 ≤ P1.
This equilibrium includes the possibility of player 1 choosing the Ellsberg strategy
P0 = P1 = 3/4 ∈ [0, 1]. This play corresponds to the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
P ∗.
Summarizing, we get the following proposition.
70
3.2 Strategic Use of Ambiguity in Two-Person Coordination
Proposition 3.1. In the symmetric coordination game the Ellsberg equilibria are of the
form
(U,L) and (D,R) ,
([3/4, P1] , [3/4, Q1]) , where 3/4 ≤ P1, Q1 ≤ 1 ,
([P0, 3/4] , [Q0, 3/4]) , where 0 ≤ P0, Q0 ≤ 3/4 ,
(3/4, [Q0, Q1]) , where Q0 ≤ 3/4 ≤ Q1 ,
and ([P0, P1] , 3/4) , where P0 ≤ 3/4 ≤ P1 .
Looking at the Ellsberg equilibria, we see that player 1 and player 2 can coordinate to use
ambiguity. They use the Nash equilibrium to bound their Ellsberg strategies from below
or from above. Another equilibrium behavior is that one player uses ambiguity and the
other uses his immunization strategy by playing U (or R, respectively) with probability
3/4. In the symmetric coordination game the mixed Nash equilibrium strategies coincide
with the immunization strategies, we therefore get Ellsberg equilibria with full ambiguity.
This does not happen in general coordination games, as we will see later.
3.2.2 Ellsberg Equilibria in General Coordination Games
We generalize the observations of the preceding section to general 2 × 2 coordination
games. We observe two different types of Ellsberg equilibria in these games: in general,
when the Nash equilibrium strategies P ∗ and Q∗ of player 1 and 2 are different probability
distributions, there exists an Ellsberg equilibrium in which both player use ambiguity. The
sets of probability distributions used in equilibrium are bounded by the Nash equilibrium
distribution and the distribution that assures immunization against any ambiguity used
by the other player.
In the special case where P ∗ = Q∗ the Ellsberg equilibria are of a different kind. The
Ellsberg equilibria in which both players create ambiguity are now bounded by the sym-
metric Nash equilibrium strategy and 0 or 1. Furthermore, since the immunization strategy
coincides with the Nash equilibrium strategy we get Ellsberg equilibria in which one of
the players plays his immunization strategy and the other one creates as much ambiguity
as he likes.
These observations are formalized in the following proposition. Consider the 2 × 2
coordination game with payoff matrix in Figure 3.3. We assume that a, d ≥ b, c and e, h ≥
f, g with a− b− c+ d 6= 0 and e− f − g + h 6= 0.
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Player 1
Player 2
L R
U a, e b, f
D c, g d, h
Figure 3.3: General coordination game.
The conditions on the payoffs allow for different types of symmetric and non-symmetric
coordination games. Let P ∗ and Q∗ denote the Nash equilibrium strategies for player
1 and 2, respectively. The Nash equilibrium strategies can be computed using standard
methods, they are
P ∗ =
h− g
e− f − g + h and Q
∗ =
d− b
a− b− c+ d .
The immunization strategies of each player are denoted by M1 and M2. Furthermore,
player 1’s Ellsberg strategy is denoted [P0, P1], player 2’s [Q0, Q1]. Then we have the
following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. Let P ∗, Q∗ denote the mixed Nash equilibrium strategies, and M1,M2
the immunization strategies of player 1 and 2, respectively. Then the Ellsberg equilibria of
the general coordination game are of the following form.
M1 ≤ P ∗ M1 ≥ P ∗
M2 ≤ Q∗
([P ∗, P1] , [Q∗, Q1]) ([P ∗, P1] , [Q0, Q∗])
P1 ≤M1 and M2 ≤ Q0
M2 ≥ Q∗
([P0, P
∗] , [Q∗, Q1]) ([P0, P ∗] , [Q0, Q∗])
M1 ≤ P0 and Q1 ≤M2
If M1 = P
∗ or M2 = Q∗, then an additional type of Ellsberg equilibria arises,
(P ∗, [Q0, Q1]), where Q0 ≤ Q∗ ≤ Q1 when M1 = P ∗ ;
([P0, P1] , Q
∗), where P0 ≤ P ∗ ≤ P1 when M2 = Q∗ .
In any case, the pure and mixed Nash equilibria, that is (U,L), (D,R) and (P ∗, Q∗), are
also Ellsberg equilibria.
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Proof. The Nash equilibrium strategies follow from the usual analysis. To calculate the
Ellsberg equilibria of the general coordination game (Figure 3.3), we first derive the utility
functions of player 1 and player 2. Due to the assumption that a, d ≥ b, c and e, h ≥ f, g,
with a−b−c+d 6= 0 and e−f−g+h 6= 0, the denominators a−b−c+d and e−f−g+h
are positive. This reflects in the payoff functions that the game is a coordination game;
player 1 uses Q0 as a minimizer when P >
d−c
a−b−c+d , and, the same way, player 2 uses P0
as a minimizer when Q > h−fe−f−g+h .
U1(P, [Q0, Q1]) = min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
aPQ+ bP (1−Q) + c(1− P )Q+ d(1− P )(1−Q)
= min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
Q((a− b− c+ d)P + c− d) + (b− d)P + d
=

Q0((a− b− c+ d)P + c− d) + (b− d)P + d if P > d−ca−b−c+d ,
(b−d)(c−d)
a−b−c+d + d if P =
d−c
a−b−c+d ,
Q1((a− b− c+ d)P + c− d) + (b− d)P + d if P < d−ca−b−c+d ,
U2([P0, P1] , Q) = min
P0≤P≤P1
ePQ+ g(1− P )Q+ fP (1−Q) + h(1− P )(1−Q)
= min
P0≤P≤P1
P ((e− f − g + h)Q+ f − h) + (g − h)Q+ h
=

P0((e− f − g + h)Q+ f − h) + (g − h)Q+ h if Q > h−fe−f−g+h ,
(g−h)(h−f)
e−f−g+h + h if Q =
h−f
e−f−g+h ,
P1((e− f − g + h)Q+ f − h) + (g − h)Q+ h if Q < h−fe−f−g+h .
We see that
M1 =
d− c
a− b− c+ d , respectively M2 =
h− f
e− f − g + h
are the immunization strategies of player 1 and 2, respectively. At the boundaries the
utility functions become
U1(0 , [Q0, Q1]) = (c− d)Q1 + d , U2([P0, P1] , 0) = (f − h)P1 + h ,
U1(1 , [Q0, Q1]) = (a− b)Q0 + b , U2([P0, P1] , 1) = (e− g)P0 + g .
The payoff function of player 1 is constant for all P , when Q1 = Q0 = Q
∗, and the payoff
73
3 Strategic Use of Ambiguity in Two-Player Normal Form Games
function of player 2 is constant for all Q, when P1 = P0 = P
∗. We calculate the best
response correspondences:
Q0 > Q
∗ : B1([Q0, Q1]) = 1 (1)
Q0 = Q
∗ < Q1 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = {[P0, P1] ⊆ [M1, 1]} (2)
Q0 < Q
∗ < Q1 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = M1 (3)
Q0 < Q
∗ = Q1 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = {[P0, P1] ⊆ [0,M1]} (4)
Q1 < Q
∗ : B1([Q0, Q1]) = 0 (5)
Q0 = Q
∗ = Q1 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = {[P0, P1] ⊆ [0, 1]} (6)
P0 > P
∗ : B2([P0, P1]) = 1
P0 = P
∗ < P1 : B2([P0, P1]) = {[Q0, Q1] ⊆ [M2, 1]}
P0 < P
∗ < P1 : B2([P0, P1]) = M2
P0 < P
∗ = P1 : B2([P0, P1]) = {[Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0,M2]}
P1 < P
∗ : B2([P0, P1]) = 0
P0 = P
∗ = P1 : B2([P0, P1]) = {[Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, 1]}
To find the Ellsberg equilibria, we look at the different cases in turn.
(1) Q0 > Q
∗ : player 1 responds P0 = P1 = 1. If also player 2 chooses Q0 = Q1 = 1, this
is the Ellsberg equilibrium that is identical to the pure Nash equilibrium (U,L).
(2)
[
d−b
a−b−c+d , Q1
]
⇒ [P0, P1] ⊆
[
d−c
a−b−c+d , 1
]
, then, depending on the size ofM1 in relation
to P ∗, player 1 has the following choices:
• d−ca−b−c+d ≤ h−ge−f−g+h : player 1 can play either
–
[
h−g
e−f−g+h , P1
]
, then the best response of player 2 is [Q0, Q1] ⊆
[
h−f
e−f−g+h , 1
]
.
Now, depending on the size of M2 in relation to Q
∗, player 2 has the following
choices:
∗ h−fe−f−g+h ≤ d−ba−b−c+d :
[
d−b
a−b−c+d , Q1
]
, we thus have here the Ellsberg
equilibrium ([
h− g
e− f − g + h, P1
]
,
[
d− b
a− b− c+ d,Q1
])
,
that is ([P ∗, P1] , [Q∗, Q1]) .
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∗ h−fe−f−g+h ≥ d−ba−b−c+d : for all [Q0, Q1] the best response is P0 = P1 = 1,
thus no Ellsberg equilibrium arises.
– or
[
P0,
h−g
e−f−g+h
]
with d−ca−b−c+d ≤ P0 ≤ h−ge−f−g+h , then the best response of
player 2 is [Q0, Q1] ⊆
[
0, h−fe−f−g+h
]
. Now, depending on the size of M2 in
relation to Q∗, player 2 has the following choices:
∗ h−fe−f−g+h ≥ d−ba−b−c+d :
[
d−b
a−b−c+d , Q1
]
with Q1 ≤ h−fe−f−g+h , then the best
response of player 1 is [P0, P1] ⊆
[
d−c
a−b−c+d , 1
]
. We thus have here the
Ellsberg equilibrium([
P0,
h− g
e− f − g + h
]
,
[
d− b
a− b− c+ d,Q1
])
,
where
d− c
a− b− c+ d ≤ P0 and Q1 ≤
h− f
e− f − g + h ,
that is ([P0, P
∗] , [Q∗, Q1]), where M1 ≤ P0 and Q1 ≤M2 .
∗ h−fe−f−g+h ≤ d−ba−b−c+d : for all [Q0, Q1] the best response is P0 = P1 = 0,
thus no Ellsberg equilibrium arises.
• d−ca−b−c+d ≤ h−ge−f−g+h : to any [P0, P1] the best response is Q0 = Q1 = 1, thus no
Ellsberg equilibrium arises.
(3) Q0 < Q
∗ < Q1 : player 1 responds with P0 = P1 = M1. Only when M1 = P ∗, player 1
sticks to his strategy and we get the equilibrium (P ∗, [Q0, Q1]), where Q0 < Q∗ < Q1.
(4)
[
Q0,
d−b
a−b−c+d
]
⇒ [P0, P1] ⊆
[
0, d−ca−b−c+d
]
, then, depending on the size ofM1 in relation
to P ∗, player 1 has the following choices:
• d−ca−b−c+d ≥ h−ge−f−g+h : player 1 can play either
–
[
P0,
h−g
e−f−g+h
]
, then the best response of player 2 is [Q0, Q1] ⊆
[
0, h−fe−f−g+h
]
.
Now, depending on the size of M2 in relation to Q
∗, player 2 has the following
choices:
∗ h−fe−f−g+h ≥ d−ba−b−c+d :
[
Q0,
d−b
a−b−c+d
]
, we thus have here the Ellsberg
equilibrium ([
P0,
h− g
e− f − g + h
]
,
[
Q0,
d− b
a− b− c+ d
])
,
that is ([P0, P
∗] , [Q0, Q∗]) .
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∗ h−fe−f−g+h ≤ d−ba−b−c+d : for all [Q0, Q1] the best response is P0 = P1 = 0,
thus no Ellsberg equilibrium arises.
– or
[
h−g
e−f−g+h , P1
]
with h−ge−f−g+h ≤ P1 ≤ d−ca−b−c+d , then the best response of
player 2 is [Q0, Q1] ⊆
[
h−f
e−f−g+h , 1
]
. Now, depending on the size of M2 in
relation to Q∗, player 2 has the following choices:
∗ d−ba−b−c+d ≥ h−fe−f−g+h :
[
Q0,
d−b
a−b−c+d
]
with h−fe−f−g+h ≤ Q0, then the best
response of player 1 is [P0, P1] ⊆
[
0, d−ca−b−c+d
]
. We thus have here the
Ellsberg equilibrium([
h− g
e− f − g + h, P1
]
,
[
Q0,
d− b
a− b− c+ d
])
,
where P1 ≤ d− c
a− b− c+ d and
h− f
e− f − g + h ≤ Q0 ,
that is ([P ∗, P1] , [Q0, Q∗]), where P1 ≤M1 and M2 ≤ Q0 .
∗ d−ba−b−c+d ≤ h−fe−f−g+h : for all [Q0, Q1] the best response is P0 = P1 = 1,
thus no Ellsberg equilibrium arises.
• d−ca−b−c+d ≤ h−ge−f−g+h : to any [P0, P1] the best response is Q0 = Q1 = 1, thus no
Ellsberg equilibrium arises.
(5) Q1 < Q
∗ : player 1 responds P0 = P1 = 0, if player 2 chooses Q0 = Q1 = 0 this is the
Ellsberg equilibrium that is identical to the pure Nash equilibrium (D,R).
(6) Q0 = Q
∗ = Q1 : player 1 responds with [P0, P1] ⊆ [0, 1]. Only when Q∗ = M2, player 2
sticks to his strategy and we get the equilibrium ([P0, P1] , Q
∗), where P0 < P ∗ < P1.
Notably, the largest Ellsberg equilibria in the lower left and the upper right cell of the
table in Proposition 3.2 are ([M1, P
∗], [Q∗,M2]) and ([P ∗,M1], [M2, Q∗]), respectively. The
associated coordination games are those of the type Battle of the Sexes. In these games,
where despite the wish to coordinate the players are in some conflict of interest, we see
that the use of imprecise probabilistic devices consolidates Nash behavior and maximin
behavior in an even clearer way than in the conflict games discussed above: both players
use their Nash equilibrium and maximin strategies as boundaries of their largest Ellsberg
equilibrium strategies. Moreover, we observe again that knowledge of the Nash equilibrium
and immunization strategies suffices to compute all Ellsberg equilibria of the game.
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3.2.3 Further Examples of Two-Person Coordination
We now calculate the Ellsberg equilibria of three other classes of coordination games. All
these games are covered by Proposition 3.2 and can thus be simply read off the table,
but to better understand the derivation of the Ellsberg equilibria and their mathematical
structure, we present a detailed analysis. We calculate the Ellsberg equilibria of two non-
symmetric coordination games, of the game of Battle of the Sexes, and of Rubinstein’s
electronic mail game.
Two Non-Symmetric Coordination Games
We consider two examples of coordination games which are less symmetric than the game
in Figure 3.1. The first non-symmetric example of a coordination game has the payoff
matrix given in Figure 3.4. This analysis is interesting, because the game does not allow
for the same use of ambiguity in equilibrium as the very symmetric example which we
considered in the beginning. We see that as soon as the players are in some kind of
opposition to each other, the use of ambiguity gets more interesting. The Nash equilibria
Player 1
Player 2
L R
U 4, 5 1, 1
D 0, 0 3, 4
Figure 3.4: Non-symmetric coordination game I.
of the game are the two pure equilibria (U,L) and (D,R) and the mixed Nash equilibrium
(P ∗, Q∗) = ((3/7, 4/7), (1/5, 4/5)). We use the same notation as before. The payoff
function U1(P, [Q0, Q1]) for a fixed P ∈ ∆S1 is
U1(P, [Q0, Q1]) =

Q1(5P − 2) + 2− P if P < 2/5 ,
8/5 if P = 2/5 ,
Q0(5P − 2) + 2− P if P > 2/5 .
(3.3)
U1(P, [Q0, Q1]) is constant at 8/5 when
U1(0 , [Q0, Q1]) = 2− 2Q1 = 8/5 = 1 + 3Q0 = U1(1 , [Q0, Q1]) ,
this is the case when Q1 = Q0 = Q
∗ = 1/5. Thereby we get the following best response
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correspondence for player 1:
Q0 > 1/5 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = 1 (1)
Q0 = 1/5 < Q1 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = {[P0, P1] ⊆ [2/5, 1]} (2)
Q0 < 1/5 < Q1 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = 2/5 (3)
Q0 < 1/5 = Q1 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = {[P0, P1] ⊆ [0, 2/5]} (4)
Q1 < 1/5 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = 0 (5)
Q0 = 1/5 = Q1 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = {[P0, P1] ⊆ [0, 1]} (6)
The same analysis for player 2 yields the best response correspondence
P0 > 3/7 : B2([P0, P1]) = 1
P0 = 3/7 < P1 : B2([P0, P1]) = {[Q0, Q1] ⊆ [2/7, 1]}
P0 < 3/7 < P1 : B2([P0, P1]) = 2/7
P0 < 3/7 = P1 : B2([P0, P1]) = {[Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, 2/7]}
P1 < 3/7 : B2([P0, P1]) = 0
P0 = 3/7 = P1 : B2([P0, P1]) = {[Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, 1]} .
We look at the intersections of the best response correspondences to find the Ellsberg
equilibria:
(1) Q0 > 1/5 ⇒ P0 = P1 = 1, when player 2 chooses Q0 = Q1 = 1. This is the Ellsberg
equilibrium that coincides with the pure Nash equilibrium (U,L).
(2) Q0 = 1/5 < Q1 ⇒ [P0, P1] ⊆ [2/5, 1], if player 1 chooses [P0, 3/7] with 2/5 ≤ P0 < 3/7
then player 2’s best response is [Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, 2/7]. Thus, we obtain the Ellsberg
equilibrium
([P0, 3/7] , [1/5, Q1]) , where 2/5 ≤ P0 < 3/7 and 1/5 < Q1 ≤ 2/7 .
(3) Q0 < 1/5 < Q1 ⇒ P0 = P1 = 2/5⇒ Q0 = Q1 = 0. This contradicts that Q0 < 1/5 <
Q1, thus this is not an Ellsberg equilibrium.
(4) Q0 < 1/5 = Q1 ⇒ [P0, P1] ⊆ [0, 2/5]. We observe that 2/5 < 3/7, thus player
2 responds optimally with Q0 = Q1 = 0. Thus, this does not lead to an Ellsberg
equilibrium.
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(5) The case Q1 < 1/5 results, analogously to (1), in the Ellsberg equilibrium that coin-
cides with the other pure Nash equilibrium (D,R).
(6) In the last case, players find it optimal to deviate from the immunization strategy,
since it does not coincide with their Nash equilibrium strategy: Q1 = 1/5 = Q0 ⇒
[P0, P1] ⊆ [0, 1], then player 2 responds optimally with Q0 = Q1 = 2/7 and player 1
would, since 2/7 > 1/5, respond with his pure strategy U . But what player 1 can
do is respond with his respective Nash equilibrium strategy 3/7, then we have the
equilibrium (3/7, 1/5).
Proposition 3.3. The Ellsberg equilibria in the non-symmetric coordination game I are
of the form
(U,L) and (D,R) ,
([P0, 3/7] , [1/5, Q1]) , where 2/5 ≤ P0 ≤ 3/7 and 1/5 ≤ Q1 ≤ 2/7 .
This example in contrast to the symmetric coordination game, Figure 3.1, shows that
when the coordination game is not symmetric in the sense that P ∗ = Q∗, the ambiguity
intervals in equilibrium are not bounded by 0 and 1, but by the mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium or the immunization strategies (or both). Furthermore, there are no Ellsberg
equilibria with one player creating as much ambiguity as he wants and the other player
playing his Nash equilibrium strategy.
To see an application of Proposition 3.2, we quickly derive the Ellsberg equilibria of the
game in Figure 3.5 using the proposition.
Player 1
Player 2
L R
U 4, 5 3, 1
D 0, 2 4, 5
Figure 3.5: Non-symmetric coordination game II.
The mixed strategy Nash equilibria are P ∗ = 3/7 and Q∗ = 1/5, and the immunization
strategies are M1 = 4/5 and M2 = 4/7. We see that P
∗ < M1 and Q∗ < M2. Thus,
all Ellsberg equilibria are of the form ([P0, 3/7] , [Q0, 1/5]), in addition to the Ellsberg
equilibria that are identical to the pure Nash equilibria (U,L) and (D,R).
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Battle of the Sexes
The next example is the game of Battle of the Sexes. In this classic game, players wish to
coordinate, but they have different preferences on which action they want to coordinate.
We choose the payoffs as in the matrix in Figure 3.6. A popular interpretation of this
setting is a man and a woman who want to spend the evening together; the man (player
2) wants to take the woman (player 1) to watch a football match (L and U), whereas
the woman wants to take him to the opera (D and R). Both prefer spending the evening
together instead of spending it alone.
Player 1
Player 2
L R
U 1, 2 0, 0
D 0, 0 2, 1
Figure 3.6: Battle of the Sexes.
Note that the Nash equilibria of the game are two pure equilibria (U,L) and (D,R) and
a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (P ∗, Q∗) = ((1/3, 2/3) , (2/3, 1/3)). We use the same
notation as before. To find the Ellsberg equilibria of the Battle of the Sexes game, we first
derive the payoff function U1(P, [Q0, Q1]) of player 1.
U1(P, [Q0, Q1]) = min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
PQ+ 2(1− P )(1−Q)
= min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
Q(3P − 2) + 2(1− P )
=

Q0(3P − 2) + 2(1− P ) if P > 2/3 ,
2/3 if P = 2/3 ,
Q1(3P − 2) + 2(1− P ) if P < 2/3 .
Observe that at the boundaries the function reduces to
U1(0 , [Q0, Q1]) = 2(1−Q1) ,
and U1(1 , [Q0, Q1]) = Q0 .
We see that U1(P, [Q0, Q1]) is constant at 2/3 for all P ∈ ∆S1 when Q0 = 2/3 = Q1.
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Therefore we get the following best responses for player 1:
Q0 > 2/3 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = 1
Q0 = 2/3 < Q1 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = {[P0, P1] ⊆ [2/3, 1]}
Q0 < 2/3 < Q1 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = 2/3
Q0 < 2/3 = Q1 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = {[P0, P1] ⊆ [0, 2/3]}
Q1 < 2/3 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = 0
Q0 = 2/3 = Q1 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = {[P0, P1] ⊆ [0, 1]}
Now we fix the probability Q ∈ [Q0, Q1] and consider the payoff function U2([P0, P1] , Q) of
player 2. Player 2 evaluates his minimal expected payoff given player 1 plays P ∈ [P0, P1]:
U2([P0, P1] , Q) = min
P0≤P≤P1
2PQ+ (1− P )(1−Q)
= min
P0≤P≤P1
P (3Q− 1) + 1−Q
=

P0(3Q− 1) + 1−Q if Q > 1/3 ,
2/3 if Q = 1/3 ,
P1(3Q− 1) + 1−Q if Q < 1/3 .
Observe that at the boundaries the function reduces to
U2([P0, P1] , 0) = 1− P1 ,
and U2([P0, P1] , 1) = 2P0 .
We see that U2([P0, P1] , Q) is constant at 2/3 when P0 = 1/3 = P1. Therefore we get the
following best responses for player 2:
P0 > 1/3 : B2([P0, P1]) = 1 (1)
P0 = 1/3 < P1 : B2([P0, P1]) = {[Q0, Q1] ⊆ [1/3, 1]} (2)
P0 < 1/3 < P1 : B2([P0, P1]) = 1/3 (3)
P0 < 1/3 = P1 : B2([P0, P1]) = {[Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, 1/3]} (4)
P1 < 1/3 : B2([P0, P1]) = 0 (5)
P0 = 1/3 = P1 : B2([P0, P1]) = {[Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, 1]} (6)
Now we can calculate the Ellsberg equilibria:
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(1) P0 > 1/3 ⇒ Q0 = Q1 = 1 ⇒ P0 = P1 = 1. This is the Ellsberg equilibrium that
coincides with the pure strategy Nash equilibrium (U,L).
(2) P0 = 1/3 < P1 ⇒ [Q0, Q1] ⊆ [1/3, 1]. Player 2 has the possibility to play different
subsets of [1/3, 1], but only one leads to a best response that is consistent with the
original play of player 1,
[Q0, Q1] = [Q0, 2/3] , where 1/3 ≤ Q0 ≤ 2/3⇒ [P0, P1] ⊆ [0, 2/3] .
If in the last case player 1 chooses to play [P0, P1] = [1/3, P1] with 1/3 ≤ P1 ≤ 2/3,
then this is an Ellsberg equilibrium, i.e.,
([1/3, P1] , [Q0, 2/3]) , where 1/3 ≤ P1 ≤ 2/3 and 1/3 ≤ Q0 ≤ 2/3 .
(3) P0 < 1/3 < P1 ⇒ Q0 = Q1 = 1/3⇒ P0 = P1 = 0, this is not an equilibrium.
(4) P0 < 1/3 = P1 ⇒ [Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, 1/3]⇒ P0 = P1 = 0, this is not an equilibrium.
(5) P1 < 1/3 ⇒ Q0 = Q1 = 0 ⇒ P0 = P1 = 0, this is the analog Ellsberg equilibrium to
(1), which now coincides with the pure strategy Nash equilibrium (D,R).
(6) P0 = 1/3 = P1 ⇒ [Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, 1]. We consider two cases: if player 2 plays Q0 <
2/3 < Q1, player 1’s best response is P0 = P1 = 2/3, so this is not an equilibrium.
But if player 2 chooses Q0 = P0 = 2/3 and player 1 P0 = P1 = 1/3, this is an Ellsberg
equilibrium. It coincides with the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium P ∗.
Proposition 3.4. The Ellsberg equilibria in the Battle of the Sexes game are of the fol-
lowing form:
(U,L) and (D,R) ,
([1/3, P1] , [Q0, 2/3]) , where 1/3 ≤ P1 ≤ 2/3 and 1/3 ≤ Q0 ≤ 2/3 .
In the Ellsberg equilibrium the players may use Ellsberg strategies that include the whole
interval [1/3, 2/3] on U and L. Again, as in the preceding non-symmetric coordination
example, the equilibrium interval is bounded by the mixed Nash equilibrium strategy and
the immunization strategy.
This can be interpreted as an approximation of the two interests present in the Battle
of the Sexes game. Whereas in Nash equilibrium the players stick to the different distribu-
tions over their pure strategies which reflect the conflict of interest, in Ellsberg equilibrium
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they play identical strategies, each of them incorporating the Nash equilibrium strategy
of the opponent: ([1/3, 2/3] , [1/3, 2/3]).
Rubinstein’s Electronic Mail Game
As a final example we look at the following game, taken from Rubinstein (1989). Orig-
inally, Rubinstein considered two games, one with a payoff matrix as in Figure 3.7, and
a second one, where the payoffs for (U,L) and (D,R) are interchanged. He observes that
the introduction of an imperfect communication mechanism (electronic mail which fails to
reach the opponent with some small probability) leads to selection of the “better” equilib-
rium (D,R) (as opposed to (U,L)). We only look at one of these games, namely the one in
Figure 3.7, and analyze the outcome of the game when players are allowed to use Ellsberg
strategies. We find that the possibility to use Ellsberg strategies also leads to equilibrium
selection, if so in a weak sense. In the only type of proper Ellsberg equilibrium of Rubin-
stein’s electronic mail game, (U,L) can still be the outcome with some probability, but
chances are small compared to occurrence of the outcome (D,R).
Player 1
Player 2
L R
U 0, 0 0,−2
D −2, 0 1, 1
Figure 3.7: Rubinstein’s electronic mail game.
We calculate the minimal expected utility function for both players,
U1(P, [Q0, Q1]) = min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
−2(1− P )Q+ (1− P )(1−Q)
= min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
Q(3P − 3)− P + 1
=
 0 if P = 1 ,Q1(3P − 3)− P + 1 if P < 1 ,
U2([P0, P1] , Q) =
 0 if Q = 1 ,P1(3Q− 3)−Q+ 1 if Q < 1 .
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At the boundaries the functions reduce to
U1(0 , [Q0, Q1]) = −3Q1 + 1 , U2([P0, P1] , 0) = −3P1 + 1 ,
U1(1 , [Q0, Q1]) = 0 , U2([P0, P1] , 1) = 0 .
The utility functions are constant when Q1 = 1/3 and P1 = 1/3, respectively. Thus, this
is the important conclusion, in Ellsberg equilibrium, players must use 1/3 as upper bound
of their equilibrium strategy, the lower bound is variable. To have 1/3 as the lower bound
will not lead to an Ellsberg equilibrium. With this reasoning we have, for example, the
equilibrium
([0, 1/3] , [0, 1/3]) ,
in which both players play (U,L) only with a probability between 0 and 1/3. Playing this
Ellsberg equilibrium strategy thus helps to coordinate on the good equilibrium (D,R).
Note that there is no Ellsberg equilibrium that facilitates coordination on (U,L) in the
same way, because an Ellsberg strategy with lower bound 1/3 (and upper bound not equal
to 1/3) can never be a best response. These Ellsberg equilibria can of course also be read
off the table in Proposition 3.2. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.5. The Ellsberg equilibria of Rubinstein’s electronic mail game have the
following form:
(U,L) and (D,R) ,
and the proper Ellsberg equilibria ([P0, 1/3] , [Q0, 1/3]) ,
where 0 ≤ P0, Q0 ≤ 1/3 .
3.3 Strategic Use of Ambiguity in Two-Person Conflicts
Our approach to games has its most natural and fruitful applications to conflicts where
players are at least to some degree in opposition to each other. We start this section by
discussing a modified version of Matching Pennies. We then provide a general analysis
of 2 × 2 conflict games, where for reasons of clarity we first calculate the equilibria of a
more restricted case, before we prove the more general result. The general analysis will
be followed by the derivation of Ellsberg equilibria of a standard symmetric Matching
Pennies game and a non-symmetric conflict game.
While our predictions are broader than the classical Nash equilibrium, they remain re-
strictive, and, at least in principle, testable. Our results allow to explain the experimental
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findings of Goeree and Holt (2001), who show that humans tend to deviate from Matching
Pennies in asymmetric modified Matching Pennies games, but tend to play Nash equilib-
rium in symmetric Matching Pennies. This corresponds and is consistent with our Ellsberg
equilibria. We present and explain the experiment in Section 4.1 in the next chapter.
3.3.1 Example of a Conflict Game: Modified Matching Pennies
In the following game the standard Matching Pennies game is modified in an asymmetric
way such that one player gets higher payoff in one strategy profile. All other payoffs
remain the same. The game has the payoff matrix given in Figure 3.8. Observe that the
Player 1
Player 2
L R
U 3,−1 −1, 1
D −1, 1 1,−1
Figure 3.8: Modified Matching Pennies.
modification is solely an increase in player 1’s payoff in case (U,L) is played. Note that
there is a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
(P ∗, Q∗) = ((1/2, 1/2) , (1/3, 2/3))
that yields expected utility u1(P
∗, Q∗) = 1/3 and u2(P ∗, Q∗) = 0 for player 1 and player 2.
Suppose player 1 chooses to play U with some probability P ∈ [P0, P1], whereas player
2 plays U with some probability Q ∈ [Q0, Q1]. To find the Ellsberg equilibria, we first
derive the payoff function U1(P, [Q0, Q1]) of player 1.
U1(P, [Q0, Q1]) = min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
3PQ− P (1−Q)− (1− P )Q+ (1− P )(1−Q)
= min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
Q(6P − 2)− 2P + 1
=

Q0(6P − 2)− 2P + 1, if P > 1/3 ,
1/3, if P = 1/3 ,
Q1(6P − 2)− 2P + 1, if P < 1/3 .
(3.4)
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Observe that at the boundaries the utility function reduces to
U1(0 , [Q0, Q1]) = 1− 2Q1 ,
and U1(1 , [Q0, Q1]) = 4Q0 − 1 .
We see that U1(P, [Q0, Q1]) is constant at 1/3 for all P ∈ [0, 1] when Q0 = 1/3 = Q1. We
distinguish six cases where Q0 and Q1 can be situated within the interval [0, 1], all these
give different arg max of U1(P, [Q0, Q1]). Figure 3.9 pictures these cases. The distinction
depends on the mixed strategy Q0 = 1/3 = Q1 that makes player 1 indifferent between
any choice of [P0, P1] ⊆ ∆S1. This is the Nash equilibrium strategy of player 2.
We plot the payoff function in Figure 3.9. The numbering (1)-(6) of the functions refer
to (one possible) payoff function when Q0 and Q1 take different values. The values are
listed below Figure 3.9. In the same list we present player 1’s best response analysis
to the different strategies [Q0, Q1]. We see that the payoff function is constant when
Q0 = 1/3 = Q1 (case (6)), then player 1 has any set of distributions in the whole interval
[0, 1] as a best response. In cases (2) and (4), only one boundary of player 2 is fixed at
1/3, hence only subintervals of [1/3, 1] or [0, 1/3] are possible best responses for player 1.
When player 2 plays an interval around his Nash equilibrium strategy (case (3)), player
1’s best response is the classic mixed strategy 1/3.
Figure 3.9: Modified Matching Pennies: payoff function (3.4) of player 1 for different
strategies [Q0, Q1] ⊆ ∆S2.
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Q0 > 1/3 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = 1 (1)
Q0 = 1/3 < Q1 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = {[P0, P1] ⊆ [1/3, 1]} (2)
Q0 < 1/3 < Q1 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = 1/3 (3)
Q0 < 1/3 = Q1 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = {[P0, P1] ⊆ [0, 1/3]} (4)
Q1 < 1/3 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = 0 (5)
Q0 = 1/3 = Q1 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = {[P0, P1] ⊆ [0, 1]} (6)
Next we look at the behavior of player 2. We fix the probability Q ∈ ∆S2 and derive the
payoff function U2([P0, P1] , Q) of player 2.
U2([P0, P1] , Q) = min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
(1− P )Q+ (1−Q)P
= min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
P (1− 2Q) +Q
=

P0(1− 2Q) +Q, if Q < 1/2 ,
1/2, if Q = 1/2 ,
P1(1− 2Q) +Q, if Q > 1/2 .
(3.5)
Observe that at the boundaries the function reduces to
U2([P0, P1] , 0) = P0 ,
and U2([P0, P1] , 1) = 1− P1 .
The plot of U2([P0, P1] , Q) is given in Figure 3.10, and the best responses of player 2 are
listed below the figure.
P0 > 1/2 : B2([P0, P1]) = 0 (1)
P0 = 1/2 < P1 : B2([P0, P1]) = {[Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, 1/2]} (2)
P0 < 1/2 < P1 : B2([P0, P1]) = 1/2 (3)
P0 < 1/2 = P1 : B2([P0, P1]) = {[Q0, Q1] ⊆ [1/2, 1]} (4)
P1 < 1/2 : B2([P0, P1]) = 1 (5)
P0 = 1/2 = P1 : B2([P0, P1]) = {[Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, 1]} (6)
Now we can calculate the Ellsberg equilibria by finding the intersections of the best re-
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Figure 3.10: Modified Matching Pennies: payoff function (3.5) of player 2 for different
strategies [P0, P1] ⊆ ∆S2.
sponse correspondences.
(1) P0 > 1/2⇒ Q0 = Q1 = 0⇒ P0 = P1 = 0, thus this is not an equilibrium.
(2) P0 = 1/2 < P1 ⇒ [Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, 1/2]. Player 2 can choose different subsets of the
interval [0, 1/2], but only one leads to a best response of player 1 that is consistent
with his original play:
[Q0, Q1] ⊆ [1/3, 1/2]⇒ [P0, P1] ⊆ [1/3, 1] .
If player 1 chooses to play [P0, P1] = [1/2, P1] with 1/2 ≤ P1 ≤ 1, then this is an
Ellsberg equilibrium,
([1/2, P1] , [1/3, Q1]) , where 1/2 ≤ P1 ≤ 1 and 1/3 ≤ Q1 ≤ 1/2 .
(3) P0 < 1/2 < P1 ⇒ [Q0, Q1] = 1/2⇒ P0 = P1 = 1, thus this is not an equilibrium.
(4) P0 < 1/2 = P1 ⇒ [Q0, Q1] ⊆ [1/2, 1]⇒ P0 = P1 = 1, thus this is not an equilibrium.
(5) P1 < 1/2⇒ Q0 = Q1 = 1⇒ P0 = P1 = 1, thus this is not an equilibrium.
(6) P0 = 1/2 = P1 ⇒ [Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, 1]. If player 2 chooses Q0 < 1/3 < Q1, then player
1’s best response is P0 = P1 = 1/3, thus this is not an equilibrium. But if player 2
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decides to play Q0 = Q1 = 1/3 and player 1 plays P0 = P1 = 1/2, no player can gain
by deviating from this strategy. This is the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (P ∗, Q∗).
Proposition 3.6. In modified Matching Pennies the Ellsberg equilibria are of the form
([1/2, P1] , [1/3, Q1]) , where 1/2 ≤ P1 ≤ 1 and 1/3 ≤ Q1 ≤ 1/2.
In addition to the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, in asymmetric modified Matching
Pennies are Ellsberg equilibria in which both players create ambiguity. In the game ana-
lyzed above, in particular, player 2 uses a interval between his Nash equilibrium strategy
and his immunization strategy. We generalize this observation in the next section.
3.3.2 Ellsberg Equilibria in General Conflict Games
In this section we determine the Ellsberg equilibria for competitive games with more gen-
eral payoffs. We will see that in the general case when P ∗ 6= Q∗ there exists an Ellsberg
equilibrium where both players create ambiguity. The set of probability distributions
which each player uses in equilibrium is bounded by his Nash equilibrium strategy and
his immunization strategy. We provide two propositions. In Proposition 3.7 below we
restrict to the case where the immunization strategies are equal to the opponents’ Nash
equilibrium strategies. It will become clear that this simplifies the notation and the com-
prehensiveness of the result. In Proposition 3.9 we derive a further generalization.
First consider the competitive two-person 2 × 2 game with payoff matrix in Figure 3.11.
We assume that a, c > b and d, f < e .
Player 1
Player 2
L R
U a, d b, e
D b, e c, f
Figure 3.11: General conflict game I.
Due to the assumptions on the payoff, our game has conflicting interests and no pure
strategy Nash equilibria. In the unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, player 1 plays
U with probability
P ∗ =
f − e
d− 2e+ f ,
and player 2 plays L with probability
Q∗ =
c− b
a− 2b+ c .
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Proposition 3.7. The Ellsberg equilibria of the above game are the following:
For P ∗ > Q∗ all Ellsberg equilibria are of the form
([P ∗, P1] , [Q∗, Q1]) for P ∗ ≤ P1 ≤ 1, Q∗ ≤ Q1 ≤ P ∗ ;
for P ∗ < Q∗ all Ellsberg equilibria are of the form
([P0, P
∗] , [Q0, Q∗]) for 0 ≤ P0 ≤ P ∗, P ∗ ≤ Q0 ≤ Q∗ ;
and for P ∗ = Q∗ all Ellsberg equilibria are of the form
(Q∗, [Q0, Q1]) , where Q0 ≤ Q∗ ≤ Q1 ,
and ([P0, P1] , P
∗) , where P0 ≤ P ∗ ≤ P1 .
Proof. The Nash equilibrium strategies follow from the usual analysis. The conditions on
the payoffs assure that the Nash equilibrium is completely mixed, i.e., 0 < P ∗ < 1 and
0 < Q∗ < 1. Let now [P0, P1] and [Q0, Q1] be Ellsberg strategies of player 1 and 2, where
P ∈ [P0, P1] is the probability of player 1 to play U , and Q ∈ [Q0, Q1] is the probability of
player 2 to play L. Let us compute the minimal expected payoff. The minimal expected
payoff of player 1 when he plays the mixed strategy P is
min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
u1(P,Q) = min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
aPQ+ bP (1−Q) + b(1− P )Q+ c(1− P )(1−Q)
= min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
Q(b− c+ P (a− 2b+ c)) + bP + c− cP
=

Q1(b− c+ P (a− 2b+ c)) + bP + c− cP if P < c−ba−2b+c ,
ac−b2
a−2b+c if P =
c−b
a−2b+c ,
Q0(b− c+ P (a− 2b+ c)) + bP + c− cP if P > c−ba−2b+c .
Note that the payoff function is constant at P = c−ba−2b+c , which is player 2’s Nash equilib-
rium strategy. Depending on Q0 and Q1 the minimal payoff function can have six different
forms. It can be strictly increasing, strictly decreasing, have flat parts or be completely
constant. To determine how player 1 maximizes his minimal payoff for different Q0 and
Q1, we look at the borders of the minimal payoff function, where P = 0 and P = 1. This
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gives us two functions
min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
u1(0 , Q) = Q1(b− c) + c ,
and min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
u1(1 , Q) = Q0(a− b) + b .
Note that b− c < 0 and a− b > 0, that is, the minimal payoff function is decreasing with
Q1 at P = 0 and increasing with Q0 at P = 1. When
Q1 =
c− b
a− 2b+ c = Q
∗ , then min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
u1(0 , Q) =
ac− b2
a− 2b+ c ,
that is, the minimal payoff function is constant for 0 ≤ P ≤ Q∗. The same is true for the
other boundary. When
Q0 =
c− b
a− 2b+ c = Q
∗ , then min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
u1(1 , Q) =
ac− b2
a− 2b+ c ,
that is, the minimal payoff function is constant for Q∗ ≤ P ≤ 1.
With this analysis one can see immediately that when Q0 = Q
∗ = Q1, the minimal payoff
function is constant for all P ∈ [0, 1] thus any Ellsberg strategy [P0, P1] ⊆ [0, 1] is a best
response for player 1.
Assume that Q0 > Q
∗, then (since a − b > 0) the minimal payoff function is strictly
increasing and the best response of player 1 is P0 = P1 = 1. The opposite is true for
Q1 < Q
∗ and thus the best response is P0 = P1 = 0.
Observe that when Q0 < Q
∗ < Q1, the values of both boundary functions drop below
Q∗ and the function takes its maximum at the kink P = Q∗. Therefore player 1’s best
response in this case is P0 = P1 = Q
∗.
Two cases are still missing. The minimal expected payoff function can be flat exclusively
to the left or to the right of Q∗. For all P ∈
[
0, c−ba−2b+c
]
= [0, Q∗], Player 1’s utility is
constant at ac−b
2
a−2b+c when Q1 =
c−b
a−2b+c = Q
∗, and it is strictly decreasing for P > Q∗.
Hence, all P ≤ Q∗ are optimal for player 1. He can thus use any Ellsberg strategy [P0, P1]
with P1 ≤ Q∗ as a best reply. Similarly, the payoff is constant for all P ≥ Q∗ when
Q0 = Q
∗ (and strictly increasing for P < Q∗). This means that player 1’s best response
to a strategy [Q0, Q
∗] is any strategy [P0, P1] ⊆ [0, Q∗], and player 1’s best response to a
strategy [Q∗, Q1] with Q∗ ≤ Q1 ≤ 1 is any strategy [P0, P1] ⊆ [Q∗, 1].
We repeat the same analysis for player 2. His minimal expected utility when he plays
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the mixed strategy Q is
min
P0≤P≤P1
u2(P,Q) = min
P0≤P≤P1
dPQ+ eP (1−Q) + e(1− P )Q+ f(1− P )(1−Q)
= min
P0≤P≤P1
P (e− f +Q(d− 2e+ f)) + eQ+ f − fQ
=

P0(e− f +Q(d− 2e+ f)) + eQ+ f − fQ if Q < f−ed−2e+f ,
df−e2
d−2e+f if Q =
f−e
d−2e+f ,
P1(e− f +Q(d− 2e+ f)) + eQ+ f − fQ if Q > f−ed−2e+f .
Note that the payoff function has a fixed value at Q = f−ed−2e+f , which is player 1’s Nash
equilibrium strategy. Again, as for player 1, depending on P0 and P1 the minimal payoff
function can have six different forms. We note the two functions that describe the minimal
payoff function at the borders Q = 0 and Q = 1:
min
P0≤P≤P1
u1(P, 0) = P0(e− f) + f ,
and min
P0≤P≤P1
u1(P, 1) = P1(d− e) + e .
Note that e− f > 0 and d− e < 0, that is, the minimal payoff function is increasing with
P0 in P = 0 and decreasing with P1 in P = 1. When
P0 =
f − e
d− 2e+ f = P
∗ , then min
P0≤P≤P1
u2(P, 0) =
df − e2
d− 2e+ f ,
that is, the minimal payoff function is constant for 0 ≤ Q ≤ P ∗. The same is true for the
other boundary: When
P1 =
f − e
d− 2e+ f = P
∗ , then min
P0≤P≤P1
u2(P, 1) =
df − e2
d− 2e+ f ,
that is, the minimal payoff function is constant for P ∗ ≤ Q ≤ 1.
Similar to the analysis of player 1 we now get the following best responses of player 2.
When P0 = P
∗ = P1 player 2 can use any strategy [Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, 1], when P0 > P ∗ the
best response is Q0 = Q1 = 0 and when P1 < P
∗ then Q0 = Q1 = 1. When P0 < P ∗ < P1
the minimal payoff function takes its maximum at the kink Q = P ∗ and accordingly player
2’s best response is Q0 = Q1 = P
∗.
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Finally note that player 2’s utility is constant at df−e
2
d−2e+f for all Q ∈
[
0, f−ed−2e+f
]
= [0, P ∗]
when P0 =
f−e
d−2e+f = P
∗, and it is strictly decreasing for Q > P ∗. Hence, all Q ≤ P ∗ are
optimal for player 2. He can thus use any Ellsberg strategy [Q0, Q1] where Q1 ≤ P ∗ as
a best reply. Similarly, the payoff is constant for all Q ≥ P ∗ when P0 = P ∗ (and strictly
increasing for Q < P ∗). This means that player 2’s best response to a strategy [P ∗, P1]
is any strategy [Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, P ∗], and player 2’s best response to a strategy [P ∗, P1] with
P ∗ ≤ P1 ≤ 1 is any strategy [Q0, Q1] ⊆ [P ∗, 1].
In Ellsberg equilibrium no player wants to unilaterally deviate from his equilibrium
strategy. We analyze in the following which Ellsberg strategies have best responses such
that no player wants to deviate.
We assume first that Q∗ < P ∗. Three Ellsberg strategies can quickly be excluded to
be part of an Ellsberg equilibrium. Suppose player 2 plays [Q0, Q1] with Q0 > Q
∗, then
player 1’s best response is P0 = P1 = 1 and since we are looking at a competitive game,
player 2 would want to deviate from his original strategy to Q0 = Q1 = 0. A similar
reasoning leads to the result that an Ellsberg strategy [Q0, Q1] with Q1 < Q
∗ cannot be
an equilibrium strategy. Thirdly, suppose player 2 plays [Q0, Q1] with Q0 < Q < Q1, then
player 1 would respond with P0 = P1 = Q
∗. Since Q∗ < P ∗ player 2 would deviate from
his original strategy to Q0 = Q1 = 1.
Now suppose player 2 plays Q0 = Q1 = Q
∗, then player 1 can respond with any [P0, P1] ⊆
[0, 1]. Any choice with P0 ≥ P ∗, P1 < P ∗ or P0 < P ∗ < P1 leads to contradictions similar
to the cases above. The possibilities that P0 and P1 are such that P0 < P1 = P
∗ or
P0 = P1 = P
∗ (which are Ellsberg equilibria), are contained in the Ellsberg equilibria that
arise in the two remaining cases below.
Suppose player 2 plays [Q∗, Q1] with Q∗ ≤ Q1 ≤ 1, then if player 1 responds with [P0, P1] =
[P ∗, P1] with P ∗ ≤ P1 ≤ 1 player 2 would play any strategy [Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, P ∗] as a best
response. Because Q∗ < P ∗, player 2 can choose [Q0, Q1] = [Q∗, Q1] with Q∗ ≤ Q1 ≤ P ∗.
These strategies are Ellsberg equilibria
([P ∗, P1] , [Q∗, Q1]) , where P ∗ ≤ P1 ≤ 1 and Q∗ ≤ Q1 ≤ P ∗ .
In the case Q∗ < P ∗ this is the only type of Ellsberg equilibrium. Note that the Nash
equilibrium is contained in these equilibrium strategies.
When we assume that P ∗ < Q∗, the analysis is very similar. We skip the first four
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cases and only look at the cases where the minimal payoff function has flat parts. Suppose
player 2 plays [Q0, Q
∗] with 0 ≤ Q0 ≤ Q∗, then if we let player 1 pick [P0, P1] ⊆ [P0, P ∗]
with 0 ≤ P0 ≤ P ∗, player 2’s best response is any subset [Q0, Q1] ⊆ [P ∗, 1]. Again, because
P ∗ < Q∗, he can choose [Q0, Q1] = [Q0, Q∗] with P ∗ ≤ Q0 ≤ Q∗ as a best response. Player
1 would not want to deviate and thus these strategies are Ellsberg equilibria
([P0, P
∗] , [Q0, Q∗]) , where 0 ≤ P0 ≤ P ∗ and P ∗ ≤ Q0 ≤ Q∗ .
As before, this is the only type of Ellsberg equilibrium in the case P ∗ < Q∗.
Finally let P ∗ = Q∗. Repeat the considerations above having in mind the equality of
the Nash equilibrium strategies. Since it was precisely the difference between P ∗ and Q∗
that led to the Ellsberg equilibria in the above cases, we see that no Ellsberg equilibria
exist where both players create ambiguity. But, in difference to the above analysis, two
types of Ellsberg equilibria with unilateral ambiguity arise that could not be sustained
above.
Remember that when player 2 plays [Q0, Q1] with Q0 < Q
∗ < Q1 then it is optimal
for player 1 to respond with P0 = P1 = Q
∗. Since P ∗ = Q∗, these strategies are in
equilibrium, even for Q0 ≤ Q∗ ≤ Q1. One observes that, as long as player 2 makes sure
that the mixed Nash equilibrium strategy Q∗ is strictly contained in his Ellsberg strategy,
player 1 responds with Q∗ and we have Ellsberg equilibria, in which player 1 immunizes
against the ambiguity of player 2. An analogous type of Ellsberg equilibrium exists for
player 2 immunizing against the ambiguity of player 1 by playing Q0 = Q1 = P
∗. Thus,
we have the following Ellsberg equilibria
(Q∗, [Q0, Q1]) , where Q0 ≤ Q∗ ≤ Q1 ,
and ([P0, P1] , P
∗) , where P0 ≤ P ∗ ≤ P1 .
These equilibria do not exist in the non-symmetric case P ∗ 6= Q∗ since the immunization
strategies are in general not equilibrium strategies. Due to the assumptions on the payoffs
in this proposition, the immunization strategy equals the Nash equilibrium strategy of
the opponent. Thereby the immunization strategy is an equilibrium strategy only when
P ∗ = Q∗.
Remarks 3.8. 1. In Proposition 3.7 we restrict to the case with (U,D) and (L,R)
giving the same payoffs (b, e) for both players. The more general competitive game
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yields two more types of Ellsberg equilibria as we find in Proposition 3.9. The nice
feature of the above restriction is that players use the mixed Nash equilibrium strategy
of their respective opponent as their immunization strategy.
2. Observe the asymmetry in the Ellsberg equilibria in the preceding proposition: no
matter if P ∗ < Q∗ or Q∗ < P ∗, it is always player 2 who creates ambiguity between
the Nash equilibrium strategies, player 1 never does so. This is due to the assump-
tions on the payoffs. If we assume that a, c < b and d, f > e, player 1 plays between
P ∗ and Q∗.
For a further generalization consider now the 2 × 2 conflict game with payoff matrix in
Figure 3.12. We assume that a, d > b, c and e, h < f, g.
Player 1
Player 2
L R
U a, e b, f
D c, g d, h
Figure 3.12: General conflict game II.
As before, P ∗ and Q∗ are the probabilities with which U respectively L are played. Let
P ∗ =
h− g
e− f − g + h , respectively Q
∗ =
d− b
a− b− c+ d
denote the Nash equilibrium strategies for player 1 and 2, respectively. The immunization
strategies of each player are denoted by M1, respectively M2.
Proposition 3.9. Let P ∗, Q∗ denote the mixed strategy Nash equilibria and M1,M2 the
immunization strategies of player 1 and 2, respectively. Then the Ellsberg equilibria of the
general conflict game above are of the following form.
M1 ≤ P ∗ M1 ≥ P ∗
M2 ≤ Q∗
([P0, P
∗] , [Q∗, Q1]) ([P0, P ∗] , [Q0, Q∗])
M1 ≤ P0 M2 ≤ Q0
M2 ≥ Q∗
([P ∗, P1] , [Q∗, Q1]) ([P ∗, P1] , [Q0, Q∗])
Q1 ≤M2 P1 ≤M1
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If M1 = P
∗ or M2 = Q∗, then an additional type of Ellsberg equilibria arises,
(P ∗, [Q0, Q1]), where Q0 ≤ Q∗ ≤ Q1 when M1 = P ∗;
([P0, P1] , Q
∗), where P0 ≤ P ∗ ≤ P1 when M2 = Q∗.
In any case, we have the Ellsberg equilibrium which is identical to the Nash equilibrium in
mixed strategies, (P ∗, Q∗).
Proof. The Nash equilibrium strategies follow from the usual analysis. To calculate the
Ellsberg equilibria of the general conflict game II (Figure 3.12), we first derive the utility
functions of player 1 and player 2. Due to the assumption that a, d > b, c and e, h < f, g,
the denominator a− b− c+ d is positive, and the denominator e− f − g + h is negative.
This reflects the competitiveness of the game in the payoff functions; player 1 uses Q0 as a
minimizer when P > d−ca−b−c+d , and on the contrary, player 2 uses P0 as a minimizer when
Q < h−fe−f−g+h .
U1(P, [Q0, Q1]) = min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
aPQ+ bP (1−Q) + c(1− P )Q+ d(1− P )(1−Q)
= min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
Q((a− b− c+ d)P + c− d) + (b− d)P + d
=

Q0((a− b− c+ d)P + c− d) + (b− d)P + d if P > d−ca−b−c+d ,
(b−d)(c−d)
a−b−c+d + d if P =
d−c
a−b−c+d ,
Q1((a− b− c+ d)P + c− d) + (b− d)P + d if P < d−ca−b−c+d ,
U2([P0, P1] , Q) = min
P0≤P≤P1
ePQ+ g(1− P )Q+ fP (1−Q) + h(1− P )(1−Q)
= min
P0≤P≤P1
P ((e− f − g + h)Q+ f − h) + (g − h)Q+ h
=

P0((e− f − g + h)Q+ f − h) + (g − h)Q+ h if Q < h−fe−f−g+h ,
(g−h)(h−f)
e−f−g+h + h if Q =
h−f
e−f−g+h ,
P1((e− f − g + h)Q+ f − h) + (g − h)Q+ h if Q > h−fe−f−g+h .
We see that
M1 =
d− c
a− b− c+ d , respectively M2 =
h− f
e− f − g + h
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are indeed the immunization strategies of player 1 and 2 respectively. At the boundaries
the utility functions become
U1(0 , [Q0, Q1]) = (c− d)Q1 + d , U2([P0, P1] , 0) = (f − h)P0 + h ,
U1(1 , [Q0, Q1]) = (a− b)Q0 + b , U2([P0, P1] , 1) = (e− g)P1 + g .
The payoff function of player 1 is constant when Q0 = Q1 = Q
∗, and the payoff function
of player 2 is constant when P0 = P1 = P
∗. The best response correspondences for both
players are listed below. We see immediately that, of course, there cannot be an Ellsberg
equilibrium in pure strategies: when player 2 plays L, player 1 best responds U , and
when player 1 plays U , player 2 best responds R. The intersections of the best response
correspondences are discussed in detail below.
Q0 > Q
∗ : B1([Q0, Q1]) = 1 (1)
Q0 = Q
∗ < Q1 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = {[P0, P1] ⊆ [M1, 1]} (2)
Q0 < Q
∗ < Q1 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = M1 (3)
Q0 < Q
∗ = Q1 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = {[P0, P1] ⊆ [0,M1]} (4)
Q1 < Q
∗ : B1([Q0, Q1]) = 0 (5)
Q0 = Q
∗ = Q1 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = {[P0, P1] ⊆ [0, 1]} (6)
P0 > P
∗ : B2([P0, P1]) = 0
P0 = P
∗ < P1 : B2([P0, P1]) = {[Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0,M2]}
P0 < P
∗ < P1 : B2([P0, P1]) = M2
P0 < P
∗ = P1 : B2([P0, P1]) = {[Q0, Q1] ⊆ [M2, 1]}
P1 < P
∗ : B2([P0, P1]) = 1
P0 = P
∗ = P1 : B2([P0, P1]) = {[Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, 1]}
To find the Ellsberg equilibria, we look at the different cases in turn.
(1) Q0 > Q
∗ : player 1 responds P0 = P1 = 1 and player 2 chooses Q0 = Q1 = 0, thus
this is not an Ellsberg equilibrium.
(2)
[
d−b
a−b−c+d , Q1
]
⇒ [P0, P1] ⊆
[
d−c
a−b−c+d , 1
]
, then, depending on the size ofM1 in relation
to P ∗, player 1 has the following choices:
• d−ca−b−c+d ≤ h−ge−f−g+h : player 1 can play either
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–
[
h−g
e−f−g+h , P1
]
, then the best response of player 2 is [Q0, Q1] ⊆
[
0, h−fe−f−g+h
]
.
Now, depending on the size of M2 in relation to Q
∗, player 2 has the following
choices:
∗ h−fe−f−g+h ≥ d−ba−b−c+d :
[
d−b
a−b−c+d , Q1
]
with Q1 ≤ h−fe−f−g+h , we thus have
here the Ellsberg equilibrium([
h− g
e− f − g + h, P1
]
,
[
d− b
a− b− c+ d,Q1
])
,
where Q1 ≤ h− f
e− f − g + h ,
that is ([P ∗, P1] , [Q∗, Q1]), where Q1 ≤M2 .
∗ h−fe−f−g+h ≤ d−ba−b−c+d : for all [Q0, Q1] the best response is P0 = P1 = 0,
thus no Ellsberg equilibrium arises.
– or
[
P0,
h−g
e−f−g+h
]
with d−ca−b−c+d ≤ P0 ≤ h−ge−f−g+h , then the best response of
player 2 is [Q0, Q1] ⊆
[
h−f
e−f−g+h , 1
]
. Now, depending on the size of M2 in
relation to Q∗, player 2 has the following choices:
∗ h−fe−f−g+h ≤ d−ba−b−c+d :
[
d−b
a−b−c+d , Q1
]
, then the best response of player 1
is [P0, P1] ⊆
[
d−c
a−b−c+d , 1
]
. We thus have here the Ellsberg equilibrium
([
P0,
h− g
e− f − g + h
]
,
[
d− b
a− b− c+ d,Q1
])
,
where
d− c
a− b− c+ d ≤ P0 ,
that is ([P0, P
∗] , [Q∗, Q1]), where M1 ≤ P0 .
∗ h−fe−f−g+h ≥ d−ba−b−c+d : for all [Q0, Q1] the best response is P0 = P1 = 1,
thus no Ellsberg equilibrium arises.
• d−ca−b−c+d ≥ h−ge−f−g+h : to any [P0, P1] the best response is Q0 = Q1 = 0, thus no
Ellsberg equilibrium arises.
(3) Q0 < Q
∗ < Q1 : player 1 responds with P0 = P1 = M1. Only when M1 = P ∗, player 1
sticks to his strategy and we get the equilibrium (P ∗, [Q0, Q1]), where Q0 < Q∗ < Q1.
(4)
[
Q0,
d−b
a−b−c+d
]
⇒ [P0, P1] ⊆
[
0, d−ca−b−c+d
]
, then, depending on the size ofM1 in relation
to P ∗, player 1 has the following choices:
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• d−ca−b−c+d ≥ h−ge−f−g+h : player 1 can play either
–
[
P0,
h−g
e−f−g+h
]
, then the best response of player 2 is [Q0, Q1] ⊆
[
h−f
e−f−g+h , 1
]
.
Now, depending on the size of M2 in relation to Q
∗, player 2 has the following
choices:
∗ h−fe−f−g+h ≤ d−ba−b−c+d :
[
Q0,
d−b
a−b−c+d
]
with h−fe−f−g+h ≤ Q0, we thus have
here the Ellsberg equilibrium([
P0,
h− g
e− f − g + h
]
,
[
Q0,
d− b
a− b− c+ d
])
,
where
h− f
e− f − g + h ≤ Q0 ,
that is ([P0, P
∗] , [Q0, Q∗]), where M2 ≤ Q0 .
∗ h−fe−f−g+h ≥ d−ba−b−c+d : for all [Q0, Q1] the best response is P0 = P1 = 1,
thus no Ellsberg equilibrium arises.
– or
[
h−g
e−f−g+h , P1
]
with h−ge−f−g+h ≤ P1 ≤ d−ca−b−c+d , then the best response of
player 2 is [Q0, Q1] ⊆
[
0, h−fe−f−g+h
]
. Now, depending on the size of M2 in
relation to Q∗, player 2 has the following choices:
∗ d−ba−b−c+d ≤ h−fe−f−g+h :
[
Q0,
d−b
a−b−c+d
]
, then the best response of player 1
is [P0, P1] ⊆
[
0, d−ca−b−c+d
]
. We thus have here the Ellsberg equilibrium
([
h− g
e− f − g + h, P1
]
,
[
Q0,
d− b
a− b− c+ d
])
,
where P1 ≤ d− c
a− b− c+ d ,
that is ([P ∗, P1] , [Q0, Q∗]), where P1 ≤M1 .
∗ d−ba−b−c+d ≥ h−fe−f−g+h : for all [Q0, Q1] the best response is P0 = P1 = 0,
thus no Ellsberg equilibrium arises.
• d−ca−b−c+d ≤ h−ge−f−g+h : to any [P0, P1] the best response is Q0 = Q1 = 0, thus no
Ellsberg equilibrium arises.
(5) Q1 < Q
∗ : player 1 responds P0 = P1 = 0 and player 2 chooses Q0 = Q1 = 1 thereafter,
thus this is not an Ellsberg equilibrium.
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(6) Q0 = Q
∗ = Q1 : player 1 responds with [P0, P1] ⊆ [0, 1]. Only when M2 = Q∗, player 2
sticks to his strategy and we get the equilibrium ([P0, P1] , Q
∗), where P0 < P ∗ < P1.
3.3.3 Further Examples of Two-Person Conflicts
Now we calculate the Ellsberg equilibria of some more examples of conflict games. We
start with the classic symmetric Matching Pennies game to observe how the Ellsberg
equilibria change compared to the modified case above. Then we apply Proposition 3.9 to
a non-symmetric conflict game.
Matching Pennies
We look at a symmetric Matching Pennies game with the payoff matrix given in Figure
3.13. Note that the game has a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in which both
players mix with equal probabilities,
(P ∗, Q∗) = ((1/2, 1/2) , (1/2, 1/2)) .
Player 1
Player 2
L R
U 1,−1 −1, 1
D −1, 1 1,−1
Figure 3.13: Symmetric Matching Pennies.
Suppose player 1 chooses to play U with probability P ∈ [P0, P1], whereas player 2 plays
U with probability Q ∈ [Q0, Q1]. To find the Ellsberg equilibria, we first derive the payoff
function U1(P, [Q0, Q1]) of player 1,
U1(P, [Q0, Q1]) = min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
PQ− (1− P )Q− P (1−Q) + (1− P )(1−Q)
= min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
Q(4P − 2)− 2P + 1
=

Q0(4P − 2)− 2P + 1 if P > 1/2 ,
0 if P = 1/2 ,
Q1(4P − 2)− 2P + 1 if P < 1/2 .
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Observe that at the boundaries the function reduces to
U1(0 , [Q0, Q1]) = 1− 2Q1 ,
and U1(1 , [Q0, Q1]) = Q0 − 1 .
We see that U1(P, [Q0, Q1]) is constant at 0 when Q0 = Q1 = 1/2. Therefore the best
responses of player 1 are as follows:
Q0 > 1/2 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = 1
Q0 = 1/2 < Q1 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = {[P0, P1] ⊆ [1/2, 1]}
Q0 < 1/2 < Q1 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = 1/2
Q0 < 1/2 = Q1 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = {[P0, P1] ⊆ [0, 1/2]}
Q1 < 1/2 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = 0
Q0 = 1/2 = Q1 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = {[P0, P1] ⊆ [0, 1]}
We get an analog behavior for player 2, just for the opposite strategies. We fix the
probability Q ∈ ∆S2 and derive the payoff function U2([P0, P1] , Q) of player 2. Player 2
evaluates his minimal expected payoff given player 1 plays P ∈ [P0, P1].
U2([P0, P1] , Q) = min
P0≤P≤P1
−PQ+ (1− P )Q+ P (1−Q)− (1− P )(1−Q)
= min
P0≤P≤P1
P (−4Q+ 2) + 2Q− 1
=

P0(−4Q+ 2) + 2Q− 1 if Q < 1/2 ,
0 if Q = 1/2 ,
P1(−4Q+ 2) + 2Q− 1 if Q > 1/2 .
Observe that at the boundaries the function reduces to
U2([P0, P1] , 0) = 2P0 − 1 ,
and U2([P0, P1] , 1) = 1− 2P1 .
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The best response correspondence of player 2 is thus the following:
P0 > 1/2 : B2([P0, P1]) = 0 (1)
P0 = 1/2 < P1 : B2([P0, P1]) = {[Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, 1/2]} (2)
P0 < 1/2 < P1 : B2([P0, P1]) = 1/2 (3)
P0 < 1/2 = P1 : B2([P0, P1]) = {[Q0, Q1] ⊆ [1/2, 1]} (4)
P1 < 1/2 : B2([P0, P1]) = 1 (5)
P0 = 1/2 = P1 : B2([P0, P1]) = {[Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, 1]} (6)
Now we can solve for the Ellsberg equilibria by finding the intersections of the best response
correspondences.
(1) P0 > 1/2⇒ Q0 = Q1 = 0⇒ P0 = P1 = 0, this contradicts the original play by player
1, thus this is not an equilibrium.
(2) P0 = 1/2 < P1 ⇒ [Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, 1/2] ⇒ [P0, P1] ⊆ [0, 1/2], this again contradicts the
original play by player 1, thus this is not an equilibrium.
(3) P0 < 1/2 < P1 ⇒ Q0 = Q1 = 1/2 ⇒ [P0, P1] ⊆ [0, 1], this is an Ellsberg equilibrium,
([P0, P1] , 1/2), where P0 < 1/2 < P1.
(4) P0 < 1/2 = P1 ⇒ [Q0, Q1] ⊆ [1/2, 1]⇒ P0 = P1 = 1, thus this is not an equilibrium.
(5) P1 < 1/2⇒ Q0 = Q1 = 1⇒ P0 = P1 = 1, thus this is not an equilibrium.
(6) P0 = 1/2 = P1 ⇒ [Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, 1]. We consider two cases: if player 2 chooses Q0 <
1/2 < Q1, then player 1’s best response is P0 = P1 = 1/2, thus (1/2, [Q0, Q1]), where
Q0 < 1/2 < Q1, is an Ellsberg equilibrium. If player 2 decides to play Q0 = Q1 = 1/2,
no player can gain by deviating from this strategy. This is the mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium (P ∗, Q∗).
Proposition 3.10. In Matching Pennies the Ellsberg equilibria are ([P0, P1] , 1/2), where
P0 < 1/2 < P1, and (1/2, [Q0, Q1]), where Q0 < 1/2 < Q1.
The Ellsberg equilibria can also be derived by applying Proposition 3.9. We see in this
symmetric example that essentially no other behavior than in the mixed Nash equilibrium
arises. The players may create complete ambiguity about their randomization, but this
does not affect the opponent’s best response.
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Non-symmetric Conflict Game
To demonstrate the application of Proposition 3.9, we derive the Ellsberg equilibria of the
game in Figure 3.14.
Player 1
Player 2
L R
U 3,−1 −2, 4
D 0, 5 4, 2
Figure 3.14: Non-symmetric conflict game.
We find that P ∗ = 3/8, Q∗ = 2/3 and M1 = 4/9, M2 = 1/4. That means, since
M1 > P
∗ and M2 < Q∗, the Ellsberg equilibria of the above game are of the form
([P0, 3/8] , [Q0, 2/3]), where 1/4 ≤ Q0 ≤ 2/3.
3.4 Overview of Ellsberg Equilibria in Coordination and
Conflict Games
In the preceding sections we derived the Ellsberg equilibria of different two-person 2 × 2
games. We summarize the results of Propositions 3.2 and 3.9 in Table 3.1. It gives
an overview over the Ellsberg equilibria of general coordination and conflict games with
payoff matrices as in Figure 3.15. For coordination games we assume that a, d > c, b
Player 1
Player 2
L R
U a, e b, f
D c, g d, h
Figure 3.15: General game.
and e, h > g, f , and for competitive games we assume that a, d < c, b and e, h < g, f .
We denote by P ∗ (Q∗) the probability that player 1 (2) play U (L) in the mixed Nash
equilibrium, and by M1 (M2) the probability of U (L) in the immunization strategies of
the respective players. Then the Ellsberg equilibria are as in Table 3.1.
Remark 3.11. When any of the weak inequalities between Nash equilibrium strategies and
immunization strategies are in fact equalities, some of the Ellsberg equilibria in Table 3.1
become redundant but not wrong.
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Table 3.1: Ellsberg equilibria in general coordination (blue) and conflict games.
M1 ≤ P ∗ M1 ≥ P ∗
M2 ≤ Q∗
([P ∗, P1] , [Q∗, Q1]) ([P ∗, P1] , [Q0, Q∗])
P1 ≤M1 and M2 ≤ Q0
([P0, P
∗] , [Q∗, Q1]) ([P0, P ∗] , [Q∗, Q1])
M1 ≤ P0 M2 ≤ Q0
M2 ≥ Q∗
([P0, P
∗] , [Q∗, Q1]) ([P0, P ∗] , [Q0, Q∗])
M1 ≤ P0 and Q1 ≤M2
([P ∗, P1] , [Q∗, Q1]) ([P ∗, P1] , [Q0, Q∗])
Q1 ≤M2 P1 ≤M1
If M1 = P
∗ or M2 = Q∗, then in both types of games an additional type of Ellsberg
equilibria arises,
(P ∗, [Q0, Q1]) , where Q0 ≤ Q∗ ≤ Q1 when M1 = P ∗ ;
([P0, P1] , Q
∗) , where P0 ≤ P ∗ ≤ P1 when M2 = Q∗ .
In both types of games and all the above cases we have the Ellsberg equilibria which are
identical to the Nash equilibria in pure (if they exist) and mixed strategies.
The results assembled in the above table cover all generic games, except when there is
exactly one pure Nash equilibrium. In that case the pure Nash equilibrium is the only
Ellsberg equilibrium. We showed this in Section 1.3.6.
3.5 Zero-Sum Games
Historically, much interest was paid to two-person zero-sum games which describe situa-
tions in which players are in pure opposition to each other. One player maximizing his
own payoff is equivalent to him trying to minimize the payoff of his opponent: this makes
these games mathematically very tractable.
Naturally, it is interesting to see what the Ellsberg equilibria of these zero-sum games
are. A two-person zero-sum game is a game G = 〈{1, 2}, (Si), (ui)〉 such that
u2(s1, s2) = −u1(s1, s2) for all s1 ∈ S1 and s2 ∈ S2 .
We showed in Theorem 2.8 that in two-person games with a completely mixed Nash
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equilibrium immunization strategies are maximin strategies. In the context of two-person
zero-sum games this implies that immunizing against ambiguity is an equilibrium strategy.
This observation is not true for general games as we have seen in the preceding sections,
and it is crucial for the type of Ellsberg equilibria that arise in two-person zero-sum games.
This is the content of the first part of this section. One player always finds it optimal
to play his immunization strategy, and thus no Ellsberg equilibria in which both players
create ambiguity arise. We prove this result in Proposition 3.12 and Corollary 3.13 for
2× 2 games, a more general case is treated in Theorem 4.2 in the next chapter.
The second part of this section treats Minimax Theorems in Ellsberg games which assure
that Ellsberg equilibria of zero-sum games are value preserving.
3.5.1 Ellsberg Equilibria in Two-Person 2× 2 Zero-Sum Games
Note that Proposition 3.7 on the Ellsberg equilibria of general competitive games holds
likewise for zero-sum games, but due to the assumptions on the payoffs the proposition
restricts to zero-sum games where P ∗ = Q∗. This can be seen easily by setting d := −a,
−c := f and e := −b, then P ∗ = f−ed−2e+f = c−ba−2b+c = Q∗. Therefore, in the Ellsberg
equilibria of two-person 2 × 2 zero-sum games under the assumptions of Proposition 3.7
only one player creates ambiguity. This also holds for general two-person 2× 2 zero-sum
games, although in those games in general P ∗ 6= Q∗. The result then hinges on the fact
that the immunization strategy of player i is always equal to his own Nash equilibrium
strategy.
We now calculate the Ellsberg equilibria of a general two-person 2 × 2 zero-sum game
with the payoff matrix given in Figure 3.16. We assume without loss of generality that
a, b, c, d ≥ 0. Player 1’s Ellsberg strategy is as usual denoted [P0, P1], player 2’s [Q0, Q1].
Player 1
Player 2
L R
U a,−a b,−b
D c,−c d,−d
Figure 3.16: General zero-sum game.
Proposition 3.12. (a) In the general two-person zero-sum game in Figure 3.16 the play-
ers’ immunization strategies are their own Nash equilibrium strategies. By immuniz-
ing themselves against ambiguity they can assure themselves the value of the game,
ad−bc
a−b−c+d and − ad−bca−b−c+d , respectively.
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(b) Assume that a, d > b, c or b, c > a, d. Then the Ellsberg equilibria of the game are of
the form
([P0, P1] , Q
∗) , where 0 ≤ P0 ≤ P ∗ ≤ P1 ≤ 1 ,
and (P ∗, [Q0, Q1]) , where 0 ≤ Q0 ≤ Q∗ ≤ Q1 ≤ 1 .
(c) Assume that a = c and b > d, i.e., U is a weakly dominant strategy for player 1. We
further assume without loss of generality d < c < b. The Ellsberg equilibria in this
case are
([P0, P1] , 1) , where P1 >
d− c
d− b and 0 ≤ P0 ≤ P1 ,
and
(
d− c
d− b , [Q0, 1]
)
, where 0 ≤ Q0 ≤ 1 .
Proof. (a) The Nash equilibrium of the game in Figure 3.16 is (P ∗, Q∗), where P ∗ =
d−c
a−b−c+d and Q
∗ = d−ba−b−c+d . We first calculate the minimal expected utility of player 1,
when he plays P ∈ [P0, P1].
U1(P, [Q0, Q1]) = min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
aPQ+ bP (1−Q) + c(1− P )Q+ d(1− P )(1−Q)
= min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
Q(P (a− b− c+ d) + c− d) + (b− d)P + d
=

Q0(P (a− b− c+ d) + c− d) + (b− d)P + d if P > P ∗ ,
ad−bc
a−b−c+d if P = P
∗ ,
Q1(P (a− b− c+ d) + c− d) + (b− d)P + d if P < P ∗ .
The same analysis for player 2 yields
U2([P0, P1] , Q) =

P0(Q(−a+ b+ c− d)− b+ d) + (−c+ d)Q− d if Q < Q∗ ,
bc−ad
a−b−c+d if Q = Q
∗ ,
P1(Q(−a+ b+ c− d)− b+ d) + (−c+ d)Q− d if Q > Q∗ .
As usual we look at the utility function on the borders, this gives
U1(0 , [Q0, Q1]) = Q1(c− d) + d , U2([P0, P1] , 0) = P0(d− b)− d ,
U1(1 , [Q0, Q1]) = Q0(a− b) + b , U2([P0, P1] , 1) = P1(b− a)− c .
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The utility function of player 1 is constant when player 2 plays his Nash equilibrium
strategy Q∗, that is at the same time his immunization strategy. Player 2’s utility func-
tion is constant when player 1 plays his Nash equilibrium (and immunization) strategy P ∗.
(b) Because the Nash and the immunization strategy coincide, we see immediately that
the two types of Ellsberg equilibria stated in the proposition are indeed equilibria. Due
to the competitiveness of the game we conclude that no other Ellsberg equilibria exist.
(c) Since a = c, we find the following utility functions for player 1 and player 2:
U1(P, [Q0, Q1]) = min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
Q(P (d− b) + c− d) + (b− d)P + d
=

Q0(P (d− b) + c− d) + (b− d)P + d if P < d−cd−b ,
c if P = d−cd−b ,
Q1(P (d− b) + c− d) + (b− d)P + d if P > d−cd−b .
U2([P0, P1] , Q) = min
P0≤P≤P1
P (Q(b− d)− b+ d) + (d− c)Q− d
=
 −c if Q = 1 ,P1(Q(b− d) + d− b) + (d− c)Q− d if Q < 1 .
As usual we look at the utility function on the borders, this gives
U1(0 , [Q0, Q1]) = Q0(c− d) + d , U2([P0, P1] , 0) = P1(d− b)− d ,
U1(1 , [Q0, Q1]) = Q1(c− b) + b , U2([P0, P1] , 1) = −c .
We see in the best response correspondences that player 2 finds it optimal to play Q0 =
Q1 = 0 when player 1 plays P1 >
d−c
d−b and Q0 = Q1 = 1 when P1 <
d−c
d−b . When player 1
plays exactly P1 =
d−c
d−b , player 2 is indifferent between all distributions in [0, 1].
When Q0 = Q1 = 1 player 1 is indifferent between all distributions in [0, 1]. For all
Q0 < 1 = Q1 player 1 responds optimally with [P0, P1] ⊆
[
d−c
d−b , 1
]
and finally when
Q1 < 1 player 1 wants to play P0 = P1 = 1.
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From this analysis we find that the Ellsberg equilibria are
([P0, P1] , 1) , where P1 >
d− c
d− b ,
and
(
d− c
d− b , [Q0, 1]
)
, where 0 ≤ Q0 ≤ 1 .
The cases treated in parts (b) and (c) of Proposition 3.12 are exhaustive in the sense that
any other constellation of payoffs would have strictly dominant strategies and we know
from Proposition 1.16 that those games do not have proper Ellsberg equilibria. Thus, we
can state the following corollary.
Corollary 3.13. In two-person 2× 2 zero-sum games, no proper Ellsberg equilibria exist
in which both players create ambiguity.
To apply Proposition 3.12 we consider the following example.
Example 3.14. We derive the Ellsberg equilibria of the zero-sum game in Figure 3.17 by
applying Proposition 3.12 (c).
Player 1
Player 2
L R
U 2,−2 3,−3
D 2,−2 1,−1
Figure 3.17: Example of a zero-sum game.
The Ellsberg equilibria of the game are of the form
([P0, P1] , 1), where P1 > 1/2 and (1/2, [Q0, 1]) .
3.5.2 Minimax Theorems in Ellsberg Games
We let G = 〈{1, 2}, (Si), (ui)〉 be a zero-sum game throughout the whole section, that is
u2(s1, s2) = −u1(s1, s2) for all s1 ∈ S1 and s2 ∈ S2. The following proposition collects the
classic Minimax results for zero-sum games, see, e.g., Myerson (1997) p. 123, for a proof.
Proposition 3.15. Let G be a zero-sum game with value v.
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(i) (P ∗, Q∗) is a Nash equilibrium of G if and only if
P ∗ ∈ arg max
P∈∆S1
min
Q∈∆S2
u1(P,Q)
and Q∗ ∈ arg min
Q∈∆S2
max
P∈∆S1
u1(P,Q) . (3.6)
(ii) If (P ∗, Q∗) is a Nash equilibrium of G, then
u1(P
∗, Q∗) = max
P∈∆S1
min
Q∈∆S2
u1(P,Q) = min
Q∈∆S2
max
P∈∆S1
u1(P,Q) = v . (3.7)
The proposition says that player 1 wants to maximize his minimal expected payoff, and
player 2 likewise. This interpretation of the result is possible, since for any function
f(x), maxx(−f(x)) = −minx(f(x)) and arg minx(−f(x)) = arg maxx f(x), and therefore
expression (3.6) reads
Q∗ ∈ arg max
Q∈∆S2
min
P∈∆S1
u2(P,Q) . (3.8)
If we want to state a similar relation for Ellsberg games, we must be careful, since it is
not true in general that U2(P,Q) = −U1(P,Q). Therefore the equivalence between (3.6)
and (3.8) does not carry over to Ellsberg games. Anyhow, we can show an equivalent of
the classical minimax theorem (3.7) and thus find that in two-person zero-sum games the
Ellsberg equilibria all yield the same payoff, and this payoff is the value v of the game
for player 1, and −v for player 2. We prove two lemmas that yield the result, which is,
thereafter, presented in Theorem 3.18.
Lemma 3.16. Let G be a zero-sum game with two players. Then the following holds.
min
Q⊆∆S2
max
P⊆∆S1
U1(P,Q) (1)= maxP⊆∆S1 minQ⊆∆S2 U1(P,Q)
(2)
= u1(P
∗, Q∗) = v , (3.9)
and min
P⊆∆S1
max
Q⊆∆S2
U2(P,Q) (1)= maxQ⊆∆S2 minP⊆∆S1 U2(P,Q)
(2)
= −u1(P ∗, Q∗) = −v . (3.10)
Proof. We start by showing equality (2) of equation (3.9), followed by equality (1). (3.10)
is shown below. For all equalities we use the fact that for all linear functions f(x, y),
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minx miny f(x, y) = miny minx f(x, y), and Lemma 1.12.
max
P⊆∆S1
min
Q⊆∆S2
U1(P,Q) = maxP⊆∆S1 minQ⊆∆S2 minP∈P minQ∈Qu1(P,Q)
= max
P⊆∆S1
min
Q⊆∆S2
min
Q∈Q
min
P∈P
u1(P,Q)
Lemma 1.12
= max
P⊆∆S1
min
Q∈∆S2
min
P∈P
u1(P,Q)
= max
P⊆∆S1
min
P∈P
min
Q∈∆S2
u1(P,Q)
Lemma 1.12
= max
P∈∆S1
min
Q∈∆S2
u1(P,Q) = u1(P
∗, Q∗) = v .
To proof equality (1) of equation (3.9) we need the Minimax Theorem 1 which we presented
in Theorem 1.15. Then we have
min
Q⊆∆S2
max
P⊆∆S1
U1(P,Q) = minQ⊆∆S2 maxP⊆∆S1 minP∈P minQ∈Qu1(P,Q)
= min
Q⊆∆S2
max
P∈∆S1
min
Q∈Q
u1(P,Q)
Thm. 1.15
= min
Q⊆∆S2
min
Q∈Q
max
P∈∆S1
u1(P,Q)
= min
Q∈∆S2
max
P∈∆S1
u1(P,Q) = u1(P
∗, Q∗) = max
P⊆∆S1
min
Q⊆∆S2
U1(P,Q) .
We now come to equality (2) of equation (3.10).
max
Q⊆∆S2
min
P⊆∆S1
U2(P,Q) = maxQ⊆∆S2 minP⊆∆S1 minQ∈QminP∈P u2(P,Q)
= max
Q⊆∆S2
min
P⊆∆S1
min
P∈P
min
Q∈Q
u2(P,Q)
Lemma 1.12
= max
Q⊆∆S2
min
P∈∆S1
min
Q∈Q
u2(P,Q)
= max
Q⊆∆S2
min
Q∈Q
min
P∈∆S1
u2(P,Q)
Lemma 1.12
= max
P∈∆S1
min
Q∈∆S2
u2(P,Q)
= max
P∈∆S1
min
Q∈∆S2
−u1(P,Q) = −u1(P ∗, Q∗) = v .
Lastly, we show equality (1) of equation (3.10).
min
P⊆∆S1
max
Q⊆∆S2
U2(P,Q) = minP⊆∆S1 maxQ⊆∆S2 minQ∈QminP∈P u2(P,Q)
= min
P⊆∆S1
max
Q∈∆S2
min
P∈P
u2(P,Q)
Thm. 1.15
= min
P⊆∆S1
min
P∈P
max
Q∈∆S2
−u1(P,Q)
= min
P∈∆S1
max
Q∈∆S2
−u1(P,Q) = −u1(P ∗, Q∗) = maxQ⊆∆S2 minP⊆∆S1 U2(P,Q) .
Lemma 3.17. Let (P∗,Q∗) be an Ellsberg equilibrium of the two-person zero-sum game
110
3.5 Zero-Sum Games
G. Then
U1(P∗,Q∗) = u1(P ∗, Q∗) = v , (3.11)
and U2(P∗,Q∗) = −u1(P ∗, Q∗) = −v . (3.12)
Proof. We start by showing equation (3.11). Equation (3.12) follows analogously.
U2(P∗,Q∗) ≥ U2(P∗,Q) for all Q ⊆ ∆S2
⇒ U2(P∗,Q∗) = maxQ⊆∆S2 U2(P
∗,Q)
⇒ min
P∈P∗
min
Q∈Q∗
u2(P,Q) = maxQ⊆∆S2
min
P∈P∗
min
Q∈Q∗
u2(P,Q)
⇒ min
P∈P∗
min
Q∈Q∗
u2(P,Q) = max
Q∈∆S2
min
P∈P∗
u2(P,Q)
⇒ max
P∈P∗
max
Q∈Q∗
u1(P,Q) = min
Q∈∆S2
max
P∈P∗
u1(P,Q)
⇒ max
P∈P∗
max
Q∈Q∗
u1(P,Q) ≤ min
Q∈∆S2
max
P∈∆S1
u1(P,Q) .
Furthermore,
U1(P∗,Q∗) ≥ U1(P,Q∗) for all P ⊆ ∆S1
⇒ U1(P∗,Q∗) = maxP⊆∆S1 U1(P,Q
∗)
⇒ min
P∈P∗
min
Q∈Q∗
u1(P,Q) = maxP⊆∆S1
min
P∈P
min
Q∈Q∗
u1(P,Q)
⇒ min
P∈P∗
min
Q∈Q∗
u1(P,Q) = max
P∈∆S1
min
Q∈Q∗
u1(P,Q)
⇒ min
P∈P∗
min
Q∈Q∗
u1(P,Q) ≥ max
P∈∆S1
min
Q∈∆S2
u1(P,Q) .
From the above relations and Proposition 3.15 follows that
max
P∈P∗
max
Q∈Q∗
u1(P,Q) ≤ min
Q∈∆S2
max
P∈∆S1
u1(P,Q) = max
P∈∆S1
min
Q∈∆S2
u1(P,Q) ≤ min
P∈P∗
min
Q∈Q∗
u1(P,Q)
and we finally have U1(P∗,Q∗) = u1(P ∗, Q∗) = v .
From the two preceding lemmas we get the following minimax theorem for Ellsberg games.
Since, as explained above, in general U2(P,Q) 6= −U1(P,Q), the equation is shown and
stated for both players 1 and 2. In the classic mixed strategy case it suffices to state the
minimax relation for one of the players.
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Theorem 3.18 (Minimax Theorem 2). Let G be a two-person zero-sum game. Then for
all i ∈ {1, 2} and every Ellsberg equilibrium (P∗,Q∗) we have
max
Pi⊆∆Si
min
P−i⊆∆S−i
Ui(P,Q) = minP−i⊆∆S−i maxPi⊆∆Si Ui(P,Q) = Ui(P
∗,Q∗) .
3.6 Ellsberg Equilibria of Some Classic 2× 2 Games
We have already seen the Ellsberg equilibria of some important classes of games: of
symmetric and asymmetric coordination games, competitive games and zero-sum games.
In an undergraduate game-theory course one analyzes usually three more types of games
that became sort of classic, the Hawk and Dove game, the Prisoners’ Dilemma and the Stag
Hunt. We derive the Ellsberg equilibria of these games and find some special properties
which we present in this section. These games have in common that the payoff functions
only depend on the lower bound of the probability interval of the opponent. Thus they
are linear, opposed to the piecewise linearity observed in the preceding examples. We
then present a fourth game with linear payoff functions which is an example by Myerson
(1997). We demonstrate that despite the well-behaved (i.e., linear) payoff functions, in
some of these games proper Ellsberg equilibria arise.
3.6.1 Hawk and Dove
We start with the two-player game which is known as Hawk and Dove with the payoff
matrix in Figure 3.18.
Player 1
Player 2
D H
D 3, 3 1, 4
H 4, 1 0, 0
Figure 3.18: Hawk and Dove.
The game has two pure Nash equilibria, (H,D) and (D,H) and a Nash equilibrium in
mixed strategies, (P ∗, Q∗) = ((1/2, 1/2) , (1/2, 1/2)). We stay with the notation used in
the preceding sections and denote by [P0, P1] the set of probabilities with which player
1 plays D, whereas player 2 plays D with the set of probabilities [Q0, Q1]. To find the
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Ellsberg equilibria, we first derive the payoff function U1(P, [Q0, Q1]) of player 1.
U1(P, [Q0, Q1]) = min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
3(PQ+ P (1−Q)) + 4(1− P )Q
= min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
Q(4− 2P ) + P
= Q0(4− 2P ) + P for all P ∈ [P0, P1] .
The payoff function is linear and depends only on the lower bound of [Q0, Q1]. The best
response of player 1 is P0 = P1 = 0 when Q0 < 1/2, and P0 = P1 = 1 when Q0 > 1/2,
these lead to the pure Nash equilibria (H,D) and (D,H). When player 2 chooses Q0 = 1/2
the payoff function is constant at 2, thus the best response of player 1 is [P0, P1] ⊆ [0, 1].
This is an Ellsberg equilibrium, as long as P0 < 1/2 < P1. Furthermore, player 1 may
choose P0 = P1 = 1/2 which results in the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium P
∗. Since
the game is symmetric, the analysis for player 2 yields the same results. Hence we get the
following proposition.
Proposition 3.19. The Ellsberg equilibria in the Hawk and Dove game are
([P0, P1] , 1/2) , where P0 < 1/2 < P1,
and (1/2, [Q0, Q1]) , where Q0 < 1/2 < Q1.
It is not surprising that in this completely symmetric game only Ellsberg equilibria exist
which do not add interesting behavior to the analysis. When a player creates ambiguity
about his Nash equilibrium strategy, the optimal response of his opponent does not change
compared to the usual analysis.
3.6.2 Prisoners’ Dilemma
Let us now look at the Prisoners’ Dilemma with the payoff matrix in Figure 3.19.
Player 1
Player 2
C D
C 3, 3 0, 4
D 4, 0 1, 1
Figure 3.19: Prisoners’ Dilemma.
This game has a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (D,D). To find the Ellsberg
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equilibrium, we first derive the payoff function U1(P, [Q0, Q1]) of player 1.
U1(P, [Q0, Q1]) = min
Q∈[Q0,Q1]
3PQ+ 4(1− P )Q+ (1−Q)(1− P )
= min
Q∈[Q0,Q1]
3Q− P + 1
= 3Q0 − P + 1 for all P ∈ [P0, P1] .
The payoff function is again linear and depends only on the lower bound of [Q0, Q1]. The
best response of player 1 is always P0 = P1 = 0, no matter where Q0 lies in the interval
[0, 1]. The analysis for player 2 yields the same result, since the game is symmetric. This
results in the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (D,D).
Proposition 3.20. The Ellsberg equilibrium of the Prisoners’ Dilemma is (D,D).
Because the only Nash equilibrium of the game is in strictly dominant strategies, the
possibility of using ambiguity is not seized. However, when we add a mediator to the
Prisoners’ Dilemma, this mediator causes the prisoners to cooperate. We analyze the
three-player mediated Prisoners’ Dilemma with non-Nash outcome in Section 5.1.
3.6.3 Stag Hunt
Next we calculate the Ellsberg equilibria of the Stag Hunt game. We choose the following
payoff matrix.
Player 1
Player 2
S H
S 2, 2 0, 1
H 1, 0 1, 1
Figure 3.20: Stag Hunt.
The game has two pure Nash equilibria (S, S) and (H,H), and one Nash equilibrium
in mixed strategies (P ∗, Q∗) = ((1/2, 1/2), (1/2, 1/2)). We calculate the minimal payoff
functions of the two players.
U1(P, [Q0, Q1]) = min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
2PQ+ (1− P )Q+ (1− P )(1−Q)
= min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
2PQ− P + 1
= 2PQ0 − P + 1 for all P ∈ [0, 1] ,
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and U2([P0, P1] , Q) = 2P0Q− P + 1 for all Q ∈ [0, 1] .
The payoff function of player 1 is constant at 1 for Q0 = 1/2, and the payoff function
of player 2 likewise for P0 = 1/2. They are increasing for Q0 ≥ 1/2 (P0 ≥ 1/2) and
decreasing for Q0 ≤ 1/2 (P0 ≤ 1/2). Thus, we can immediately see that ambiguity is only
used when P0 = Q0 = 1/2, and then the best responses are the whole interval [0, 1] for
both players. Therefore, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.21. The Ellsberg equilibria of the Stag Hunt game are (S, S), (H,H) and
the proper Ellsberg equilibria
([1/2, P1] , [1/2, Q1]) , where 1/2 ≤ P1 ≤ 1 and 1/2 ≤ Q1 ≤ 1 .
This proposition shows that in the Stag Hunt game the payoff dominant equilibrium (S, S)
is preferred over the risk dominant equilibrium (H,H), when ambiguity as a strategy is
allowed.
3.6.4 Example by Myerson
The last example of this section is taken from Myerson (1997). He chose this example to
show the power and limits in the interpretation of Nash equilibrium. We present it here,
because it has linear payoff functions also for ambiguity-averse players, and nevertheless
proper Ellsberg equilibria. The game has the payoff matrix depicted in Figure 3.21. It has
the unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies (P ∗, Q∗) = ((3/4, 1/4) , (1/2, 1/2)) with
expected payoff (0 , 0), but it can be argued that it would be more reasonable for players
to coordinate on (U,L) and thus guarantee an equilibrium payoff of 0. Of course, this is
not a Nash equilibrium since player 1 would want to deviate.
Player 1
Player 2
L R
U 0, 0 0,−1
D 1, 0 −1, 3
Figure 3.21: Myerson’s game.
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We calculate the payoff functions of the two players.
U1(P, [Q0, Q1]) = min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
(1− P )Q− (1− P )(1−Q)
= min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
Q(2− 2P ) + P − 1
=
 Q0(2− 2P ) + P − 1, if P < 1 ,0, if P = 1 . (3.13)
Note that for P equal to 1, the utility function of player 1 is 0, and for P = 0 it is equal
to 2Q0 − 1. In Figure 3.22 one can easily derive the best responses of player 1 which are
listed below.
Figure 3.22: Payoff function (3.13) of player 1 in Myerson’s game.
Q0 > 1/2 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = {[P0, P1]|P0 = P1 = 0}
Q0 = 1/2 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = {[P0, P1] ⊆ [0, 1]}
Q0 < 1/2 : B1([Q0, Q1]) = {[P0, P1]|P0 = P1 = 1}
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We do the same analysis for player 2.
U2([P0, P1] , Q) = min
P0≤P≤P1
−P (1−Q) + 3(1− P )(1−Q)
= min
P0≤P≤P1
P (4Q− 4)− 3Q+ 3
=
 0, if Q = 1 ,P1(4Q− 4)− 3Q+ 3, if Q < 1 .
Similarly to case U1, utility function of player 2 is 0 when Q is equal to 1, and for Q = 0
it is 3 − 4P1. The plot of U2 looks very much like the payoff function for player 1. The
best responses of player 2 are
P1 < 3/4 : B2([P0, P1]) = {[Q0, Q1]|Q0 = Q1 = 0}
P1 = 3/4 : B2([P0, P1]) = {[Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, 1]}
P1 > 3/4 : B2([P0, P1]) = {[Q0, Q1]|Q0 = Q1 = 1} .
Hence, we obtain
Proposition 3.22. The Ellsberg equilibria in Myerson’s game are
([P0, 3/4] , [1/2, Q1]) , where 0 ≤ P0 ≤ 3/4 and 1/2 ≤ Q1 ≤ 1 .
Thus, both players may use ambiguity in equilibrium, although the payoff functions of
both players are linear. In a sense, one of the Ellsberg equilibria, that is (3/4, [1/2, 1]),
makes coordination on the outcome (U,L) more likely.
We make an interesting observation studying these examples: even when both payoff
functions are linear (and not, as often in Ellsberg games, piecewise linear) there exist
Ellsberg equilibria in which ambiguity is used. But the existence of a unique strict Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies as in the Prisoners’ Dilemma causes, of course, that no
ambiguity is used even when we allow for it. We proved this in Section 1.3.6.
3.7 Ellsberg Equilibria of 3× 3 Games and Their Geometry
We can apply the insights on the Ellsberg equilibria of 2×2 games in the preceding sections
to investigate the Ellsberg equilibria of larger games. We discuss the Ellsberg equilibria
of a special class of modified 3 × 3 zero-sum games, that is, modified circulant games.
Circulant games have square payoff matrices in which the payoffs are circularly permuted
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in every row (column). A general circulant 3× 3 zero-sum game has the following payoff
matrix for some a, b, c ∈ R.
Player 1
Player 2
L M R
T a,−a b,−b c,−c
C c,−c a,−a b,−b
B b,−b c,−c a,−a
Figure 3.23: General circulant game.
For example, the classic game Rock Scissors Paper (RSP) is a circulant game, this is the
game we analyze in this section. Our RSP has the payoff matrix given in Figure 3.24, the
strategies are denoted R for Rock, S for Scissors, P for Paper.
Player 1
Player 2
R S P
R 0, 0 1,−1 −1, 1
S −1, 1 0, 0 1,−1
P 1,−1 −1, 1 0, 0
Figure 3.24: Rock Scissors Paper.
We fix some new notation for Ellsberg strategies when we deal with games with more
than two pure strategies. An Ellsberg strategy for player 1 is, as before, denoted by
P, for player 2 by Q. They are convex sets of probability distributions (P1, P2, P3) and
(Q1, Q2, Q3) in ∆S1 and ∆S2, respectively, that is P ⊆ ∆S1, Q ⊆ ∆S2. An Ellsberg
strategy P is described as follows. Fix two vectors x, y ∈ [0, 1]3 in the unit cube with
components (x1, x2, x3) and (y1, y2, y3). Then
P =
{
(P1, P2, P3) ∈ R3
∣∣∣ 3∑
i=1
Pi = 1, Pi ≥ 0, xi ≤ Pi ≤ yi, i = 1, 2, 3
}
. (3.14)
Note that P is completely described by giving the possible range of probabilities P1 and
P2. The range of P3 (given by x3 and y3) then follows directly from the assumption that
every triple (P1, P2, P3) ∈ P is a probability distribution and some careful calculations.
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We use the following abbreviation for (3.14):
P = ({xi ≤ Pi ≤ yi})i=1,2,3 = ({x1 ≤ P1 ≤ y1}, {x2 ≤ P2 ≤ y2}, {x3 ≤ P3 ≤ y3}) .
We write {xi ≤ Pi} when yi = 1, and {Pi ≤ yi} when xi = 0. We drop the subscript
i = 1, 2, 3 when no confusion can arise. To describe an Ellsberg strategy Q for player 2,
we use the vectors w, z ∈ [0, 1]3. An Ellsberg strategy for player 1 is then for example
({1/3 ≤ P1 ≤ 1/2}, {P2 ≤ 2/3}, {P3 ≤ 2/3}) .
When we calculate Ellsberg equilibria, we typically find a large number of equilibria which
are very similar but differ in that one or more boundaries of the set of probability distri-
butions are variable. Then we use the following notation. Fix xˆ, yˆ ∈ [0, 1]3, then
({xˆi ≤ xi ≤ Pi ≤ yi ≤ yˆi})
:= {({xi ≤ Pi ≤ yi}) | for all x, y ∈ [0, 1]3 such that xˆi ≤ xi ≤ yi ≤ yˆi} .
As before, we suppress xˆi and yˆi when they are 0 or 1, respectively. Such a set of Ellsberg
strategies is then for example
({1/3 ≤ P1 ≤ y1 ≤ 1/2}, {x2 ≤ P2 ≤ 2/3}, {P3 ≤ y3 ≤ 2/3}) .
Note that this describes the set of Ellsberg strategies which necessarily include the proba-
bility distribution (1/3, 2/3, 0) at the boundary of each Ellsberg strategy contained in the
set. This is the type of set of Ellsberg strategies which we encounter frequently in Ellsberg
equilibrium analysis.
We use the following notation. We denote by P1(Q1) the probability with which
player 1(2) plays R, P2(Q2) the probability with which player 1(2) plays S, P3(Q3) the
probability with which player 1(2) plays P . The only Nash equilibrium of the game is
(P ∗, Q∗) = ((1/3, 1/3, 1/3), (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)). As RSP’s equilibrium strategies are Nash,
maximin, and immunization strategies according to Theorem 4.2, RSP has Ellsberg equi-
libria with unilateral ambiguity, and, according to Theorem 3.18, the value of all Ellsberg
equilibria is equal to the minimax value.
Proposition 3.23. All Ellsberg equilibria of RSP have the (minimal) expected payoff zero.
119
3 Strategic Use of Ambiguity in Two-Player Normal Form Games
Ellsberg equilibria with unilateral ambiguity of RSP are, e.g.,
(({Pi = 1/3}), ({wi ≤ Qi ≤ zi})) ,
where 0 ≤ wi ≤ 1/3 ≤ zi ≤ 1 for all i = 1, 2, 3 ,
and (({xi ≤ Pi ≤ yi}), ({Qi = 1/3})) ,
where 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1/3 ≤ yi ≤ 1 for all i = 1, 2, 3 .
As in the Matching Pennies game, the situation changes when we slightly modify the
original zero-sum game. We consider the following modification (Figure 3.25), where player
1 gets a payoff of 2, instead of 1, when (R,S) is played.
Player 1
Player 2
R S P
R 0, 0 2,−1 −1, 1
S −1, 1 0, 0 1,−1
P 1,−1 −1, 1 0, 0
Figure 3.25: Modified Rock Scissors Paper.
Now the Nash equilibrium is
(P ∗, Q∗) = ((1/3, 1/3, 1/3), (1/3, 1/4, 5/12)) .
As in 2 × 2 games, the immunization strategies play an important role in the Ellsberg
equilibria of the modified RSP. In our modified game, they are
(M1,M2) = ((1/4, 1/3, 5/12), (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)) .
We have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.24. The profiles
(({1/3 ≤ P1 ≤ y1 ≤ 2/3}, {P2 = 1/3}, {x3 ≤ P3 ≤ 1/3}),
({w1 ≤ Q1 ≤ 1/3}, {1/4 ≤ Q2 ≤ z2 ≤ 1/3}, {5/12 ≤ Q3 ≤ z3 ≤ 3/4}))
are nontrivial Ellsberg equilibria of the modified RSP.
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This Ellsberg equilibrium can be read as player 1 using the strategy: “I will play Rock
at least with probability 1/3 but not with probability higher than 2/3, I will play Paper
with probability less than 1/3 and Scissors with exactly probability 1/3.”
Before we prove this, we discuss the intuition of the result. We know from the analysis
of 2× 2 games that ambiguity can only be a best response if the opponent uses his Nash
equilibrium probability at the boundary of his Ellsberg strategy, and additionally this
is the worst case measure which the player uses in his utility evaluation. In this case,
the utility function has flat parts and the player best responds with ambiguity. When
the opponent plays exactly his Nash equilibrium distribution (without using ambiguity
himself), the whole utility function of the player is flat and he can play any Ellsberg
strategy he likes, it will always be a best response. However, recall that this can only
be an Ellsberg equilibrium if the opponent’s Nash equilibrium strategy is exactly his
immunization strategy.
Consider the Ellsberg equilibrium in Proposition 3.24. We can draw the Ellsberg strate-
gies as a projection into the 2-simplex (see, e.g., Ritzberger (2002) p. 36 for an introduc-
tion) to understand how the characteristics we observe in 2× 2 games are apparent in the
modified RSP.
To this end we use the ’largest’ Ellsberg equilibrium, that is
(({1/3 ≤ P1 ≤ 2/3}, {P2 = 1/3}, {P3 ≤ 1/3}),
({Q1 ≤ 1/3}, {1/4 ≤ Q2 ≤ 1/3}, {5/12 ≤ Q3 ≤ 3/4})) .
In the equilateral triangle in Figures 3.26 and 3.27, for every point on the edge opposite
the vertex R, the probability that R is played is zero. On the other hand, at the vertex R,
R is played with probability one and S and P with probability zero. Sets of probability
distributions, as we encounter in Ellsberg equilibria, are drawn as gray areas. The gray
areas are the possible probabilities for each component of (P1, P2, P3) ∈ P (in Figure
3.26) and (Q1, Q2, Q3) ∈ Q (in Figure 3.27), the intersection is then the set of probability
distributions which satisfy all three conditions of the Ellsberg strategy. The intersection
is framed by a thick black line.
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P ∗
M1
R S
P
Figure 3.26: Ellsberg equilibrium strategy of player 1 in the modified RSP.
As one can see in Figure 3.26, the Ellsberg equilibrium strategy of player 1 is a line,
because {P2 = 1/3} contains only a single element. His Nash equilibrium strategy P ∗ =
(1/3, 1/3, 1/3) lies at the boundary of the Ellsberg equilibrium strategy. Player 2 plays a
set of probability distributions depicted in Figure 3.27. Again, Q∗ = (1/3, 1/4, 5/12) lies
at the boundary of the Ellsberg equilibrium strategy. As we have seen in 2× 2 games, the
’largest’ Ellsberg equilibrium is bounded by the immunization strategy M2.
M2
Q∗
R S
P
Figure 3.27: Ellsberg equilibrium strategy of player 2 in the modified RSP.
Proof of Proposition 3.24. We start by calculating the minimal expected utility functions
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of player 1 and 2. Player 1 minimizes over Q1 and Q2. Q3 is expressed as 1 − Q1 − Q2.
The lower and upper bounds of Q1 and Q2 are w1, z1 and w2, z2, respectively.
U1(P1, P2, Q1, Q2)
= min
Q1,Q2
2P1Q2 − P1(1−Q1 −Q2)− P2Q1
+ P2(1−Q1 −Q2) + (1− P1 − P2)Q1 − (1− P1 − P2)Q2
= min
Q2

w1(1− 3P2) + 4P1Q2 − P1 + P2 −Q2 if P2 < 1/3 ,
4P1Q2 − P1 −Q2 + 1/3 if P2 = 1/3 ,
z1(1− 3P2) + 4P1Q2 − P1 + P2 −Q2 if P2 > 1/3
=

w2(4P1 − 1)− 3P2w1 + w1 − P1 + P2 if P1 > 1/4 ,
w1 − 3P2w1 − 1/4 + P2 if P1 = 1/4 ,
z2(4P1 − 1)− 3P2w1 + w1 − P1 + P2 if P1 < 1/4 ,
P2 < 1/3 ,
w2(4P1 − 1) + 1/3− P1 if P1 > 1/4 ,
1/12 if P1 = 1/4 ,
z2(4P1 − 1) + 1/3− P1 if P1 < 1/4 ,
P2 = 1/3 ,
w2(4P1 − 1)− 3P2z1 + z1 − P1 + P2 if P1 > 1/4 ,
z1 − 3P2z1 − 1/4 + P2 if P1 = 1/4 ,
z2(4P1 − 1)− 3P2z1 + z1 − P1 + P2 if P1 < 1/4 ,
P2 > 1/3 .
Player 2 minimizes over P1 and P2, P3 is expressed as 1− P1 − P2. The lower and upper
bounds of P1 and P2 are x1, y1 and x2, y2, respectively.
U2(P1, P2, Q1, Q2)
= min
P1,P2
−P1Q2 + P1(1−Q1 −Q2) + P2Q1
− P2(1−Q1 −Q2)− (1− P1 − P2)Q1 + (1− P1 − P2)Q2
= min
P2

x1(1− 3Q2) + 3P2Q1 − P2 −Q1 +Q2 if Q2 < 1/3 ,
3P2Q1 − P2 −Q1 + 1/3 if Q2 = 1/3 ,
y1(1− 3Q2) + 3P2Q1 − P2 −Q1 +Q2 if Q2 > 1/3
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=

x2(3Q1 − 1)− 3Q2x1 + x1 −Q1 +Q2 if Q1 > 1/3 ,
x1 − 3Q2x1 − 1/3 +Q2 if Q1 = 1/3 ,
y2(3Q1 − 1)− 3Q2x1 + x1 −Q1 +Q2 if Q1 < 1/3 ,
Q2 < 1/3 ,
x2(3Q1 − 1) + 1/3−Q1 if Q1 > 1/3 ,
0 if Q1 = 1/3 ,
y2(3Q1 − 1) + 1/3−Q1 if Q1 < 1/3 ,
Q2 = 1/3 ,
x2(3Q1 − 1)− 3Q2y1 + y1 −Q1 +Q2 if Q1 > 1/3 ,
y1 − 3Q2y1 − 1/3 +Q2 if Q1 = 1/3 ,
y2(3Q1 − 1)− 3Q2y1 + y1 −Q1 +Q2 if Q1 < 1/3 ,
Q2 > 1/3 .
Now we proceed as follows to derive the Ellsberg equilibria. Recall the Nash equilibria
and immunization strategies of the game:
(P ∗, Q∗) = ((1/3, 1/3, 1/3), (1/3, 1/4, 5/12)) ,
and (M1,M2) = ((1/4, 1/3, 5/12), (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)) .
Player 1 has to use his Nash equilibrium strategies at the boundary of his Ellsberg equi-
librium strategy, except for the component P2, where the Nash equilibrium probability is
the same as the immunization strategy. Furthermore, the set of probability distributions
in the Ellsberg equilibrium may not extend across the immunization strategy.
Hence, for the first component for player 1, we consider either {1/4 ≤ x1 ≤ P1 ≤ 1/3},
or {1/3 ≤ P1}. In Ellsberg equilibrium, player 2 uses 1/3 as his worst case measure,
thus in the first case we only consider those elements of U2 which use y1 as worst case
measure, in the second case only those which use x1. y1 is only used when Q2 ≥ 1/3. Since
the range of Q2 must contain 1/4 at the boundary, which is impossible when Q2 ≥ 1/3,
{1/4 ≤ x1 ≤ P1 ≤ 1/3} cannot be an Ellsberg equilibrium strategy. We proceed with the
second case: x1 is only used for Q2 ≤ 1/3, this is compatible with the Nash equilibrium
strategy and yields {1/4 ≤ Q2 ≤ z2 ≤ 1/3}. Finally we check if {1/3 ≤ P1} is a best
response to {1/4 ≤ Q2 ≤ z2 ≤ 1/3}. Player 1 must use w2 in his utility evaluation U1,
this is true whenever P1 ≥ 1/4 which is compatible with the strategy {1/3 ≤ P1}. Thence
we have found a best response pair.
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In the second component, player 1 can play {P2 = 1/3}, which is his Nash equilibrium
probability and therefore makes player 2 indifferent between all {w1 ≤ Q1 ≤ z1}, and
at the same time his best response to player 2 playing any probability {w1 ≤ Q1 ≤ z1}
with 0 ≤ w1 ≤ 1/3 ≤ z1 ≤ 1. Or, conversely, player 2 can play {Q1 = 1/3} and player
1 {x2 ≤ P2 ≤ y2} with 0 ≤ x2 ≤ 1/3 ≤ y2 ≤ 1. The latter case collapses to Nash
equilibrium. The restrictions on w1, z1, which are 0 ≤ w1 ≤ 1/3 = z1, follow from the
third component and the fact that each element of the Ellsberg equilibrium strategy must
be a probability distribution.
We cannot determine the range for P3 and Q3 from the two utility functions, since P3
and Q3 are only implicitly given. Thus, we derive the utility functions again, now using
(P1, 1 − P1 − P3, P3) and (1 − Q2 − Q3, Q2, Q3) as probabilities. Since we already know
that only the boundaries x1 and w2 are relevant for the equilibrium, we get
U1(P1, P3, Q2, Q3)
= min
Q2,Q3
2P1Q2 − P1Q3 − (1− P1 − P3)(1−Q2 −Q3)
+ (1− P1 − P3)Q3 + P3(1−Q2 −Q3)− P3Q2
=

w3(2− 3P1 − 3P3) + w2(P1 − 3P3 + 1) + 2P3 + P1 − 1 if P3 < 2/3− P1 ,
w2(5/3− 4P3) + P3 − 1/3 if P3 = 2/3− P1 ,
z3(2− 3P1 − 3P3) + w2(P1 − 3P3 + 1) + 2P3 + P1 − 1 if P3 > 2/3− P1 ,
when P1 > 3P3 − 1.
On the other hand,
U2(P1, P3, Q2, Q3)
= min
P1,P3
−P1Q2 + P1Q3 + (1− P1 − P3)(1−Q2 −Q3)
− (1− P1 − P3)Q3 − P3(1−Q2 −Q3) + P3Q2
=

x3(3Q2 + 3Q3 − 2) + x1(3Q3 − 1)−Q2 − 2Q3 + 1 if Q2 > 2/3−Q3 ,
x1(3Q3 − 1)−Q3 + 1/3 if Q2 = 2/3−Q3 ,
y3(3Q2 + 3Q3 − 2) + x1(3Q3 − 1)−Q2 − 2Q3 + 1 if Q2 < 2/3−Q3 ,
when Q3 > 1/3.
Now we use the following reasoning: we see from U2 that Q3 must be greater than (or in
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fact equal to, this is suppressed in the shortened statement of U2) 1/3. Since 5/12 is the
Nash equilibrium probability of Q3, we get the two following possible probability sets for
Q3:
either {1/3 ≤ w3 ≤ Q3 ≤ 5/12} , or {5/12 ≤ Q3 ≤ z3} .
In the first case, player 1 must use z3 in his utility evaluation, according to U1 this is the
case only when P3 ≥ 2/3−P1. We know that P1 ≥ 1/3, therefore P3 ≥ 1/3. This leads to
the set of probabilities {1/3 ≤ P3 ≤ y3 ≤ 5/12} for P3, since 1/3 as the Nash equilibrium
probability must be part of the set. Here x3 is used by player 2, hence from U2 we see
this is only the case if Q2 ≥ 2/3 −Q3. Q3 ≥ 1/3 and therefore Q2 must be greater than
1/3. This is not possible, since we have already found Q2 to be played with the set of
probabilities {1/4 ≤ Q2 ≤ z2 ≤ 1/3}.
Consider the second possible set for Q2. Here w3 is used by player 1, and hence P2 ≤ 1/3.
This leads to {x3 ≤ P3 ≤ 1/3} for P3. Player 2 uses y3 and we conclude that Q2 must
be less than or equal to 1/3. This is exactly what we found to be true for Q2 before.
Therefore we have found that the profile
(({1/3 ≤ P1 ≤ y1 ≤ 2/3}, {P2 = 1/3}, {x3 ≤ P3 ≤ 1/3}),
({w1 ≤ Q1 ≤ 1/3}, {1/4 ≤ Q2 ≤ z2 ≤ 1/3}, {5/12 ≤ Q3 ≤ z3 ≤ 3/4}))
is an Ellsberg equilibrium of the modified RSP game.
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Observational Implications
In this chapter we present some thoughts on a general interpretation of Ellsberg equilibria
and a classification of when ambiguity is an option in two-player Ellsberg equilibria.1
We are on the one hand interested in human behavior in two-person games and its
connection to Ellsberg equilibria. In an experiment with a modified version of Matching
Pennies, Goeree and Holt (2001) observed that Nash equilibrium prediction was frequently
violated; interestingly, our Ellsberg equilibria can explain this behavior. In Section 4.2 on
the other hand, we classify Ellsberg equilibria that are supported by strategies which are
not in the support of any Nash equilibrium of the game. These Ellsberg equilibria arise
frequently in games with weakly dominated strategies and have an interesting behavioral
interpretation. Finally in Section 4.3, we characterize in which circumstances and how
ambiguity is used in equilibrium in two-person games. This analysis provides an answer
to the question in which two-person games proper Ellsberg equilibria exist.
4.1 Human Behavior in Matching Pennies Games and
Ellsberg Equilibria
We have now seen a number of different two-player games and have calculated their Ells-
berg equilibria. Recall the modified Matching Pennies example in Section 3.3.1. Whereas
the support of the Ellsberg and Nash equilibria of the game is obviously the same, we think
that the Ellsberg equilibria reveal a new class of behavior not encountered in game theory
before. It might be very difficult for humans to play exactly a randomizing strategy with
equal probabilities. Indeed, the ability to do so has been a source of debate since the early
days of game theory, and some claim that humans cannot randomize, see Dang (2009)
for a recent account and references therein. Our result shows that it is not necessary
to randomize exactly to support a similar equilibrium outcome (with the same expected
payoff). It is just enough that your opponent knows that you are randomizing with some
1 Some parts of this chapter, namely Section 4.1 and the first part of Section 4.2, were published in the
IMW working paper Riedel and Sass (2011).
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probability, and that it could be that this probability is one half, but not less. It is thus
sufficient that the player is able to control the lower bound of his device. This might be
easier to implement than the perfectly random behavior required in classical game theory.
In fact, there are experimental findings which suggest that the Ellsberg equilibrium
strategy in the modified Matching Pennies game is closer to real behavior than the Nash
equilibrium prediction. To illustrate this, let us consider the interesting results by Goeree
and Holt (2001) who ran experiments on three different versions of Matching Pennies; the
three payoff matrices can be seen in Table 4.1.
In the first game, we have a typical symmetric conflict game with a unique mixed Nash
equilibrium in which both players randomize uniformly over both pure strategies. The
aggregate play of humans in the experiment is closely consistent with the Nash equilibrium
prediction, 48% of players choosing “Top” or “Left”, respectively. Remember that the
probabilities in a mixed strategy equilibrium are chosen in such a way as to render the
opponent indifferent between his two pure strategies. As a consequence, if we change
the payoffs of player 1 only (while keeping the ordering of payoffs), his Nash equilibrium
strategy does not change because he has to make player 2 indifferent between his two pure
actions, and player 2’s payoffs have not been modified.
In the second game, called the asymmetric Matching Pennies game, player 1 gets 320
instead of 80 in the upper left outcome. All other payoffs remain the same. Many humans
now deviate from Nash, as is reported in brackets, 96% of the players taking the action
“Top”. Interestingly, also the humans playing the role of player 2 change their behavior,
and most of them play “Right”, the best reply to “Top”.
In the third case, player 1’s payoff in the upper left outcome is decreased to a lowly 44.
Then only 8% of players choose “Top”; 80% of humans in the role of player 2 choose “Left”.
While aggregate behavior by humans is certainly inconsistent with the predictions of
Nash equilibrium, it is consistent with Ellsberg equilibria. We summarize the results in
Table 4.2.
In the symmetric game, our Proposition 3.7 essentially predicts only Nash equilibrium be-
havior, and this is what we observe in the experiment as well. In the asymmetric Matching
Pennies game, the Nash equilibrium strategies are P ∗ = 1/2 for player 1 and Q∗ = 1/8 for
player 2. According to our proposition, the Ellsberg equilibria allow for probabilities in
the interval [1/2, 1] for player 1 choosing “Top”, and for the interval [1/8, 1/2] for player
2 choosing “Left”. The observed percentages of 96% and 16% do lie in these intervals.
And in the “reversed” version of the game, the Nash equilibrium strategies are P ∗ = 1/2
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Table 4.1: The Goeree-Holt results on three different versions of Matching Pennies.
Left (48) Right (52)
Symmetric Top (48) 80,40 40,80
Bottom (52) 40,80 80,40
Left (16) Right(84)
Asymmetric Top (96) 320,40 40,80
Bottom (4) 40,80 80,40
Left (80) Right (20)
Reversed Top (8) 44,40 40,80
Bottom (92) 40,80 80,40
Table 4.2: Comparison of Nash and Ellsberg predictions with the experimental observa-
tions. We record the probabilities (or intervals of probabilities) for each player
to play the first pure strategy (“Top”, respectively “Left”) and the observed
aggregate frequency of these actions in the Goeree-Holt experiments.
Game Nash Equilibrium Ellsberg Equilibrium Observations
Player 1 Player 2 Player 1 Player 2 Player 1 Player 2
symmetric 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.48 0.48
asymmetric 0.5 0.125 [0.5,1] [0.125,0.5] 0.96 0.16
reversed 0.5 0.90 [0,0.5] [0.5,0.90 ] 0.08 0.8
and Q∗ = 10/11. So we have the reversed relation Q∗ > P ∗. The Ellsberg equilibria
allow for probabilities for “Top” in the interval [0, 1/2] for player 1, and for probabilities
in [1/2, 10/11] for player 2. The aggregate observed quantities of 8% and 80% do lie in
these intervals.
4.2 Observational Implications of Ellsberg Equilibria
Game Theory studies equilibrium outcomes of social conflicts when rational agents inter-
act. Human beings are quite different from rational agents in general, so one can only
expect to see a consistency with Nash equilibrium predictions and human behavior when
the situation is controlled in such a way as to bring out the rational part of humans.
Nevertheless, it does make sense to ask what the observational implications of our theory
are. For three player games, this is quite clear, as our theory predicts new equilibria outside
the support of Nash equilibria. This is a testable implication, and we shall proceed one
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day to carry out such a test.
For two player games, the situation is more subtle. Both the Nash equilibrium and the
Ellsberg equilibria have full support, so the only thing that we can learn from our theory
seems to be that either action is fine in a one shot game. This is indeed the stance of Bade
(2011b), in line with a number of predecessors.
There is, however, a way to distinguish the predictions of Ellsberg equilibria and Nash
equilibria even in two player games. To understand this, we first need to explain what
the law of large numbers looks like under ambiguity. The classical law states that the
frequency of HEAD in an infinite sequence of independent coin tosses will converge to
the probability of HEAD. Now let us look at a typical Ellsberg urn that contains 100
balls, red and black, and we only know that the number of red balls is between 30 and
60. What can we say about the average frequency drawn from independent repetitions of
the Ellsberg experiment? The natural guess would be that the average lies in the interval
between 30% and 60% in the long run. This is indeed correct, and mathematical versions
of that theorem have recently been proven, see Maccheroni and Marinacci (2005) and
Epstein and Schneider (2003a), e.g., Peng (2007) has obtained the result that the average
frequency will indeed fluctuate between both bounds, and every point in the interval
[0.3, 0.6] is an accumulation point of the sequence.
What is then the empirical content of such laws of large numbers? If we adhere to the
point of view that our observed humans play independently one shot games, and that
they should play equilibrium strategies, then the average frequency will converge to the
Nash equilibrium strategy according to the classical theory, and will fluctuate between
two bounds according to the new Ellsberg theory.
We thus do get observational differences between the two theories, and we interpret the
Goeree-Holt results as a first evidence that our theory can accommodate deviations from
Nash equilibrium observed in laboratories.
4.2.1 Two-Player Games: Strategies Outside the Nash Support
We now present a two-player example in which a strategy is supported in Ellsberg equilib-
rium which is not in the support of a Nash equilibrium of the game. When this happens,
an Ellsberg equilibrium is observationally different to any Nash equilibrium of the game:
if an outside observer watched two players play a one-shot strategic game, he would be
able to distinguish if the players used ambiguity in equilibrium or not.
Bade (2011b) introduces the notion of observational equivalence to strategic two-person
games with subjective randomization devices. She shows that in two-person games with
fairly general preference structure observational equivalence is always satisfied. To make
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the theorem hold she uses one assumption on the preferences which is not common to the
mostly used preference representations, the property of strict monotonicity.
The following example is taken from Bade (2011b). She chooses it to show that without
the condition of strict monotonicity the conditions of the theorem are not fulfilled and thus
we have observational differences. In opposition to her, we think that the introduction of
ambiguity offers an interesting outcome of the game. In addition, our analysis allows to
give a full description of all possible Ellsberg equilibria of this game. The payoff matrix
of the game is given in Figure 4.1.
Player 1
Player 2
L R
U 10, 1 0, 0
D 11, 0 0, 1
Figure 4.1: Example of a 2 × 2 game which has Ellsberg equilibria with support outside
the Nash equilibrium support.
We first explain why strict monotonicity is not fulfilled in this game. Strict monotonicity
means that if there is one non-null state2 in which an Ellsberg strategy is strictly preferred
to another, this should be so in all non-null states. Player 1 strictly prefers D to U when in
some state player 2 plays L with positive probability. Whenever player 2 plays L with some
Ellsberg strategy [0, P1], P1 > 0, player 1 discounts in his utility evaluation completely
the possibility of L to occur, although it is not a null-state. Thus, D is not for all states
strictly preferred to U .
The game has a pure Nash equilibrium (D,R). Notice that the game does not have
a Nash equilibrium with full support, since L is never played in equilibrium. One must
admit that although U is a weakly dominated strategy, it would be appealing for player 1
if he could get player 2 to play L. Player 1 could assure himself a payoff of 10 as opposed
to a payoff of 0. Nash equilibrium does not allow this “coordination” on (U,L). We will
now see that this is different when we look at the Ellsberg equilibria of the game.
We calculate the Ellsberg equilibria. Suppose player 1 chooses to play U with the set of
probabilities [P0, P1], whereas player 2 plays L with the set of probabilities [Q0, Q1]. To
2 Bade (2011b) also defines non-null events in the sense of Savage (1954).
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find the Ellsberg equilibria, we first derive the payoff function U1(P, [Q0, Q1]) of player 1.
U1(P, [Q0, Q1]) = min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
10PQ+ 11(1− P )Q
= min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
Q(11− P )
= Q0(11− P ) for all P ∈ [P0, P1] . (4.1)
The payoff function is linear and depends only on the lower bound of [Q0, Q1]. On the
boundaries we have
U1(0, [Q0, Q1]) = 11Q0 ,
U1(1, [Q0, Q1]) = 10Q0 .
The best response of player 1 is P0 = P1 = 0 when Q0 > 0, only when Q0 = 0 the payoff
function is constant equal to zero and thus player 1 is indifferent between any subsets of
[0, 1]. Thus, his best response in the latter case is [P0, P1] ⊆ [0, 1]. This can be easily
observed in the plot of (4.1) in Figure 4.2. We plot U1(P, [Q0, Q1]) for (1) Q0 = 0, (2)
Q0 = 1/2 and (3) Q0 = 1.
Figure 4.2: Payoff function (4.1) of player 1 for the cases (1) Q0 = 0, (2) Q0 = 1/2 and
(3) Q0 = 1.
The case is different for player 2, here we get a dependence on the lower and upper bound
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of [P0, P1], and thus kinks in the payoff function.
U2([P0, P1] , Q) = min
P0≤P≤P1
QP + (1−Q)(1− P )
= min
P0≤P≤P1
P (2Q− 1) + 1−Q
=

P0(2Q− 1) + 1−Q, if Q > 1/2 ,
1/2, if Q = 1/2 ,
P1(2Q− 1) + 1−Q, if Q < 1/2 .
(4.2)
The maximum of (4.2) over Q ∈ [Q0, Q1] depends on the interval [P0, P1]. Observe that
at the boundaries player 2’s payoff function is the following.
U2([P0, P1] , 0) = 1− P1 ,
U2([P0, P1] , 1) = P0 .
Player 2 maximizes (4.2) over [Q0, Q1], his best responses are
P0 > 1/2 : B2([P0, P1]) = 1 (1)
P0 = 1/2 < P1 : B2([P0, P1]) = {[Q0, Q1] ⊆ [1/2, 1]} (2)
P0 < 1/2 < P1 : B2([P0, P1]) = 1/2 (3)
P0 < 1/2 = P1 : B2([P0, P1]) = {[Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, 1/2]} (4)
P1 < 1/2 : B2([P0, P1]) = 0 (5)
P0 = 1/2 = P1 : B2([P0, P1]) = {[Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, 1]} (6)
Now we can solve for the Ellsberg equilibria by finding the intersections of the best response
correspondences.
(1) P0 > 1/2⇒ Q0 = Q1 = 1⇒ P0 = P1 = 0, thus this is not an equilibrium.
(2) P0 = 1/2 < P1 ⇒ [Q0, Q1] ⊆ [1/2, 0]⇒ P0 = P1 = 0, thus this is not an equilibrium.
(3) P0 < 1/2 < P1 ⇒ Q0 = Q1 = 1/2⇒ P0 = P1 = 0, thus this is not an equilibrium.
(4) P0 < 1/2 = P1 ⇒ [Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, 1/2]. We look at different subsets of the interval
[0, 1/2]. When player 2 chooses Q0 > 0, then player 1 always finds it optimal to play
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P0 = P1 = 0. But when player 2 chooses [Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, Q1] with 0 ≤ Q1 ≤ 1/2, then
player 1 is indifferent on the whole interval of P and may choose [P0, P1] ⊆ [0, 1]. If
in the latter case player 1 chooses to play [P0, P1] = [P0, 1/2] with 0 ≤ P0 ≤ 1/2, then
this is an Ellsberg equilibrium, i.e.,
([P0, 1/2] , [0, Q1]) , where 0 ≤ P0 ≤ 1/2 and 0 ≤ Q1 ≤ 1/2 .
(5) P1 < 1/2 ⇒ Q0 = Q1 = 0 ⇒ [P0, P1] ⊆ [0, 1], thus if player 1 chooses [P0, P1] with
0 ≤ P0 ≤ P1 ≤ 1/2 this is an Ellsberg equilibrium. Note that the pure strategy Nash
equilibrium (D,R) is contained in this Ellsberg equilibrium.
(6) P0 = 1/2 = P1 ⇒ [Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, 1]. We again consider two cases: if player 2 chooses
[Q0, Q1] = [Q0, 1] with 0 ≤ Q0 ≤ 1, then player 1’s best response is P0 = P1 = 0,
thus this is not an equilibrium. But if player 2 decides to play [Q0, Q1] = [0, Q1] with
0 ≤ Q1 ≤ 1 and player 1 plays P0 = P1 = 1/2 ∈ [0, 1], no player can gain by deviating
from this strategy. We get the Ellsberg equilibrium
(1/2, [0, Q1]) , where 0 ≤ Q1 ≤ 1 .
Proposition 4.1. The Ellsberg equilibria of the game in Figure 4.1 are of the form
([P0, 1/2] , [0, Q1]) , where 0 ≤ P0 ≤ 1/2 and 0 ≤ Q1 ≤ 1/2 ,
([P0, P1] , 0) , where 0 ≤ P0 ≤ P1 ≤ 1/2 ,
and (1/2, [0, Q1]) , where 0 ≤ Q1 ≤ 1 .
In the first and third of the Ellsberg equilibria there is some chance that (U,L) is played.
Player 2 creates ambiguity and makes sure that the probability that L is not played at
all is contained in his Ellsberg strategy. Then player 1 finds it optimal to play U with
positive probability, either by playing a random strategy as in the third equilibrium, or
by creating ambiguity himself.
Of course, in all these equilibria the minimal expected utility of player 1 is 0. Therefore
player 1, being ambiguity-averse, in his own estimation does not gain any utility by using
an Ellsberg strategy instead of the pure Nash equilibrium strategy. Even more, player 2
can assure himself at most a utility of 1/2 which is worse than his (strict) Nash equilib-
rium payoff. Nevertheless, these Ellsberg equilibria are in some sense pareto dominating,
because with some positive probability the outcome of the game is (U,L).
The preceding example (Figure 4.1) suggests that if we allow for not strictly monotonous
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payoff functions in two-person games (which is the case in most ambiguity averse preference
representations) we can obtain Ellsberg equilibria which are supported by pure strategies
that do not appear in the support of any Nash equilibrium. These equilibria pareto
dominate the Nash equilibria of these games.
4.2.2 Weakly Dominated Strategies and Observational Differences
Different papers have found that the existence of weakly dominated strategies plays an
important role in the classification of games with ambiguity averse players. We comment
on some of the existing results.
Theorem 5 in Klibanoff (1996) shows that Weak Admissibility (WA) of a preference rela-
tion <:3
for all acts f, g, if for all s ∈ S f(s) < g(s) , then f < g and
[f  g if and only if for some non-null event E , f(s)  g(s) for all s ∈ E]
implies agreement on null events (AGR),
let Pi be a closed and convex subset of ∆Si
P (E) = 0 if and only if for all P ∈ Pi , P (E) = 0
in the maxmin expected utility representation by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). The same
holds for the objective ambiguity representation we use in Ellsberg games. Agreement on
null events has the following interpretation in the context of games. Each event (that is,
e.g., each strategy of the opponent) is given either zero probability by all distributions
in Pi, or positive probability by all distributions in Pi (i.e., the distributions in Pi are
mutually absolutely continuous, see, e.g., Epstein and Marinacci (2007)).
Practically, this excludes proper Ellsberg strategies which touch the boundary of the
simplex. In 2× 2 games that would be strategies of the type [0, P1] and [P0, 1]. When we
exclude these types of strategies, those Ellsberg strategies in Proposition 4.1 that have a
support outside the Nash support, collapse.
And really, two-player games with weakly dominated strategies (where the indifference is
at the minimal payoff) have to be excluded if we want to assure no observational differences
between Ellsberg equilibria and Nash equilibria in two-person normal form games. This
is proved in Theorem 1 on observational equivalence in Bade (2011b) for a large class of
3 This is the same property as strict monotonicity of preferences, in Schmeidler (1989) (axiom vi) and
Bade (2011b) (MON).
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ambiguity averse preferences which also includes Ellsberg games. She finds that (WA) is
a necessary condition for the theorem to hold.
In a similar spirit, Eichberger and Kelsey (2000) prove in Proposition 5.1, that in n-
person normal form games where the minimal payoffs for each strategy are different, in
an “equilibrium under uncertainty” no weakly dominated strategies are used. But note
that in their concept of equilibrium under uncertainty players are not allowed to use
mixed strategies, thus weak domination in the proposition is only weak domination in
pure strategies.
4.3 Existence of Proper Ellsberg Equilibria: When is
Ambiguity an Option?
In the preceding examples one could observe that in some games ambiguity is played
in equilibrium, either by both or at least by one of the players, and in some games no
proper Ellsberg equilibria exist. In, e.g., the Prisoners’ Dilemma which has a unique Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies, no ambiguity is observed in Ellsberg equilibrium: in fact,
the only Ellsberg equilibrium is the unique Nash equilibrium. In the modified Matching
Pennies game exist Ellsberg equilibria where both players create ambiguity, and in zero-
sum games no more than one player uses ambiguity in Ellsberg equilibrium. We now have
a closer look at the conditions under which proper Ellsberg equilibria (see Definition 1.8)
are possible.
Intuitively, when thinking about ambiguity in normal form games, we imagine players
using some kind of ambiguity “around” their mixed Nash equilibrium strategies. If we
take P ∗ to be the mixed Nash equilibrium strategy, this would be some Ellsberg strategy
[P ∗− , P ∗+ ] with  > 0. Surprisingly, these kind of equilibria, where both players create
ambiguity around their Nash strategy, never exist. When one of the players uses this type
of strategy in Ellsberg equilibrium we speak of Ellsberg equilibrium with unilateral full
ambiguity, i.e., equilibrium profiles of the types (P ∗,∆S2) or (∆S1, Q∗). “Full”, because
the player can then use as much ambiguity as he wants (also the whole simplex), as long
as his mixed Nash equilibrium strategy is contained in the set.
There is only one type of generic 2 × 2 games in which such Ellsberg equilibria arise:
when the immunization strategy of one player is exactly his Nash equilibrium strategy.
Then the opponent can use any set of probability measures, as long as his Nash equilibrium
is an element of that Ellsberg strategy. We generalize this observation to games with more
strategies.
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Theorem 4.2. Let G be a two-person normal form game with a unique completely mixed
Nash equilibrium (P ∗, Q∗). There exist Ellsberg equilibria with unilateral full ambiguity if
and only if either P ∗ or Q∗ is maximin. The Ellsberg equilibria are of the following form:
(P ∗, [Q0, Q1]), where Q0 < Q∗ < Q1, if P ∗ = M1 ,
and ([P0, P1] , Q
∗), where P0 < P ∗ < P1, if Q∗ = M2 .
If P ∗ is also an immunization strategy for player 1, then the profiles (P ∗,Q) with Q∗ ∈ Q
form an Ellsberg equilibrium (and similar for player 2 if Q∗ is an immunization strategy).
Proof. Let
(
P¯ ,∆S2
)
be an equilibrium with unilateral full ambiguity. Then P¯ is a best
reply to ∆S2, or in other words, P¯ is a maximin strategy.
By the indifference principle (Theorem 1.14), player 2 is indifferent between all Q ∈ ∆S2
when player 1 plays P¯ . It follows that (P¯ , Q∗) is a Nash equilibrium. As we have assumed
uniqueness of Nash equilibrium, P¯ = P ∗, and P ∗ is therefore maximin.
Similarly, if P ∗ is maximin, then the singleton P ∗ is a best reply in the Ellsberg game
to ∆S2. Also, player 2 is indifferent against P
∗, so ∆S2 is a best reply to P ∗ for player 2.
Now suppose that P ∗ is also an immunization strategy. Let v∗ = u1(P ∗, Q∗) be the Nash
equilibrium payoff, and v¯ = minQ∈∆S2 u1(P ∗, Q) be the maximin payoff. As P ∗ immunizes
player 1, we have v∗ = v¯. As P ∗ is part of a completely mixed Nash equilibrium, any
Q ⊂ ∆S2 is a best reply in the Ellsberg game for player 2.
In an unpublished working paper, Ryan (1999) proves a result for 2 × 2 normal form
games using the Beliefs Equilibrium concept by Lo (1996). Beliefs Equilibrium is a wider
(it allows correlation of beliefs) and entirely subjective concept (see Section 1.5 on the
related literature for details), however, the result applies to 2 × 2 Ellsberg games. He
shows that if Q is a closed and convex subset of ∆S2 and player 1’s set of best responses
B1(Q) does not contain pure strategies, then player 1 has a unique maximin strategy M1
and B1(Q) = M1. The property of no pure strategies in the set of best responses has
the geometric representation of a minimal expected utility function with a unique optimal
point in the interior of [0, 1] (see, e.g., graph (3) in Figure 3.2). Theorem 4.2 adds to this
result. The Ellsberg strategy Q with the property above is part of an Ellsberg equilibrium,
if and only if B1(Q) = M1 and M1 = P ∗ is the Nash equilibrium strategy of player 1.
The result of Theorem 4.2 also provokes reflection on the robustness of Ellsberg equi-
libria. From what we have seen, when player 1’s Nash equilibrium strategy is equal to his
immunization strategy, Ellsberg equilibrium has the particular form that player 1 plays
his Nash equilibrium strategy and player 2 can play an arbitrarily large set of probability
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distributions (provided this set contains his Nash equilibrium strategy). When we change
the game just a little by adding  to some payoff of player 1, this Ellsberg equilibrium type
collapses and player 2 is now much more constrained in his equilibrium play (compare
table 3.1). Thus, the equilibrium type in Theorem 4.2 is not robust to small changes in
the payoff matrix. On the other hand, starting from a game where the Nash equilibrium
strategies are not identical to the immunization strategies, the Ellsberg equilibria change
continuously with changes in the payoff matrix.
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Behavior
In the preceding chapters we presented the basic properties of Ellsberg equilibria and
how players behave when we allow them to use objective ambiguity in two-player games.
Naturally, we want to characterize what can happen in games with more than two players.
To tackle this problem, we first investigate the relation of Ellsberg equilibrium to the
concept of subjective equilibrium. Since there exists no other solution concept that lets
players use sets of probabilities as their strategy, the question of comparison has to be
answered with regard to the attainability of certain outcomes. The objective is to find
out under which conditions subjective equilibria can (or cannot) have the same support
as Ellsberg equilibria.
We start with an example of a three-player game, where an Ellsberg equilibrium exists
that attains an outcome that is not in the support of any Nash equilibria of the game. This
suggests that in very simple games with more than two players, the prediction of Ellsberg
equilibrium can be quite different from the Nash equilibrium prediction. Subsequently,
we define subjective equilibrium in the spirit of Aumann (1974) and Hallin (1976) and
subjective beliefs equilibrium like Lo (1996). We show that every Ellsberg equilibrium
contains a subjective equilibrium and a subjective beliefs equilibrium. In two player games,
subjective beliefs equilibria have the same support as Nash equilibria, but this changes for
three players. This explains that in Ellsberg games with more than two players outcomes
outside the Nash equilibrium support can be attained.
5.1 Three-Person Games with Non-Nash Outcomes
We want to give a simple example of a game with more than two players, where an Ellsberg
equilibrium predicts very different behavior than the Nash equilibrium. To this end, we
consider a classic example from Aumann (1974). He presents a three-person game where
one player has some mediation power to influence his opponents’ choice. The original
game is given by the payoff matrix in Figure 5.1, where we let player 1 choose rows, player
2 choose columns and player 3 choose matrices.
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L R
U 0, 8, 0 3, 3, 3
D 1, 1, 1 0, 0, 0
l
L R
U 0, 0, 0 3, 3, 3
D 1, 1, 1 8, 0, 0
r
Figure 5.1: Aumann’s example.
Player 3 is indifferent between his strategies l and r, since he gets the same payoffs for
both. As long as player 3 chooses l with a probability higher than 3/8, L is an optimal
strategy for player 2 regardless what player 1 does; and player 1 would subsequently play
D. By the same reasoning, as long as player 3 plays r with a probability higher than 3/8,
D is optimal for player 1, and player 2 plays L then. Thus, the Nash equilibria of this
game are all of the form (D,L, P ∗), where P ∗ is any classical mixed strategy.
This example has also been analyzed in other literature on ambiguity in games, see
Eichberger, Kelsey, and Schipper (2009), Lo (2009) and Bade (2011b). Bade chooses one
ambiguous act equilibrium with maxmin expected utility preferences to show that non-
Nash outcomes can be sustained in games with more than two players. We characterize
all Ellsberg equilibria1 and provide an interpretation of the example which highlights the
strategic use of ambiguity as a mediation tool.
Let us now explain how Aumann’s example can be interpreted to illustrate the strategic
use of ambiguity. Suppose players 1 and 2 are prisoners, and player 3 the police officer. Let
us rearrange the matrix game and put it in the form displayed in Figure 5.2. We swap the
strategies of player 2 and rename the strategies of player 1 and 2 to C = “cooperate” and
D = “defect” as in the classical Prisoners’ Dilemma. We can merge the two matrices into
one, because the strategy choice of the police officer is simply the choice of a probability
that influences the payoffs of prisoners 1 and 2 in case of unilateral defection from (C,C).
If he chooses P = 1, this corresponds to strategy l in the original game (i.e., prisoner
2 gets all the reward), P = 0 would be strategy r (i.e., prisoner 1 gets all the reward).
The choice of the objectively mixed strategy P = 1/2 leads to the classical symmetric
Prisoners’ Dilemma with a payoff of 4 in case of unilateral defection.
In this interpretation, players 1 and 2 are facing a sort of Prisoners’ Dilemma situation
mediated by a player 3, the police officer. Given the payoffs, the police officer is most
interested in cooperation between the prisoners. The police officer can influence how high
1 In this special game and the preference representation chosen by Bade, the ambiguous act equilibrium
coincides with one of the Ellsberg equilibria. Recall that in difference to ambiguous act equilibria,
Ellsberg equilibria use ambiguity objectively.
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the reward would be for unilateral defection by using an objective randomizing device.
Nevertheless, in every Nash equilibrium of the game, the players obtain the inefficient
outcome of 1.
Prisoner 1
Prisoner 2
C D
C 3, 3, 3 0, 8P, 0
D 8(1− P ), 0, 0 1, 1, 1
Figure 5.2: Mediated Prisoners’ Dilemma.
Now suppose we let the players use Ellsberg strategies. The police officer could create
ambiguity by announcing: “I’m not sure about who of you I will want to punish and who
I will want to reward for reporting on your partner. I might also reward you both equally...
I simply don’t tell you what mechanism I will use to decide about this.”
Let us exhibit Ellsberg strategies that support this behavior. If prisoner 2 expects P
to be lower than 3/8 and prisoner 1 expects P to be higher than 5/8, they would prefer
to cooperate. This behavior corresponds to the police officer playing an Ellsberg strategy
[P0, P1] with 0 ≤ P0 < 3/8 and 5/8 < P1 ≤ 1. The ambiguity averse prisoners 1 and 2
evaluate their utility with P = P0 and P = P1, respectively. Consequently they would
prefer to play (C,C). This gives an Ellsberg equilibrium in which the prisoners cooperate.
Proposition 5.1. In the mediated Prisoners’ Dilemma, the Ellsberg strategy profiles
(C,C, [P0, P1]) with P0 < 3/8 and P1 > 5/8
are Ellsberg equilibria that achieve the efficient outcome (3, 3, 3).
Again, as in the example by Greenberg (see Figure 1.3 in Section 1.4), it is important to
see that both prisoners use different worst-case probabilities to compute their expected
payoffs. Aumann (1974) has already commented on this behavior. He observes that (C,C)
can be a “subjective equilibrium point” if players 1 and 2 have non-common beliefs about
the objectively mixed strategy player 3 is going to use. In his analysis player 1 believes
P = 3/4 and player 2 believes P = 1/4. Note that in Ellsberg equilibrium the players
have the common belief P ∈ [P0, P1].
5.2 Subjective Equilibria and Ellsberg Equilibria
In a subjective equilibrium the players may base their actions on events of which the
probability of realization is not commonly agreed on. These events are thus not the
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outcome of the roll of a die, but something more subjective such as the outcome of a horse
race, certain stock exchange fluctuations or the outcome of a soccer match. For a game
this implies that a player may best respond to a belief he has about his opponents’ play,
but this belief does not have to coincide with the actual strategy played.
The notion of subjective equilibrium as a static concept has been first introduced by
Aumann (1974). The only authors that to our knowledge subsequently worked with this
static notion were Hallin (1976) and Brandenburger and Dekel (1987). Hallin (1976) shows
under which conditions subjective equilibrium payoffs can be attained by an objective equi-
librium, and when, on the other hand, subjective equilibrium payoffs can strictly dominate
objective ones. In both results he allows for correlated beliefs and correlated strategies.
Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) show that correlated rationalizability is equivalent to a
special case of subjective equilibria, that is subjective correlated equilibria that are also
optimal after the state of the world is revealed (Aumann (1974) calls these “a posteriori
equilibria”). Subjectivity in extensive form or repeated games has been defined and ex-
amined in another branch of literature not treated in this section.
We give an example of a subjective equilibrium before stating the definition. Consider the
standard matching pennies game in Figure 5.3.
Player 1
Player 2
L R
U 1,−1 −1, 1
D −1, 1 1,−1
Figure 5.3: Matching Pennies game.
This game has only one Nash equilibrium (in Aumann (1974)’s language: equilibrium
in objective mixed strategies, objective, because all players have the same probability
distribution on the state space, and mixed, because the strategies cannot be correlated),
that is when both players mix with probabilities (1/2, 1/2). The expected payoff is then
zero for both players. Now we relax the assumption that the beliefs in equilibrium have to
be correct. Then (U,L) can be a subjective equilibrium when player 1 beliefs player 2 will
play L (which is true), but player 2 thinks player 1 will play D and thus correctly best
responds to his belief by playing L. Obviously this equilibrium seems unsatisfying, since
one of the players beliefs something wrong. Nevertheless, this is a subjective equilibrium
of the matching pennies game, with subjective expected utility (1, 1).
Aumann (1974) considers a similar equilibrium of the matching pennies game in example
(2.2) of that article. He supposes that there is an event to which players 1 and 2 ascribe
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subjective probabilities 1 and 0, respectively. Player 2 plays left in any case (he does not
observe D), player 1 plays U if D occurs, else he plays D. Aumann claims, p. 76, that
these strategies form an equilibrium in subjective mixed strategies, but I believe it only
works when the strategies are correlated. At least player 1 has to believe that player 2
plays a strategy that is correlated to his. Else player 1’s strategy cannot be a best response
to any belief player 1 might have.
5.2.1 Definition of Subjective Equilibrium
As we said above, a subjective equilibrium relaxes the common belief assumption in Nash
equilibrium by letting players base their actions on events that players may assign different
probabilities to.
Let N = 1, . . . , n denote the set of players, Si the set of pure strategies of each player. A
normal form game G = 〈N, (Si), (ui)〉 is defined by the players’ strategies and their utility
functions. We equip each player i with a subjective randomizing device Ωi that is the
set of future states of the world. Each player i has a subjective probability distribution
pii = (pii1, . . . , pi
i
n) on the profile Ω = (Ω1, . . . ,Ωn). We assume that all the state spaces
are stochastically independent. A subjectively mixed strategy for player i is a measurable
function fi : Ω→ ∆Si, where ∆Si is the set of lotteries over pure strategies si ∈ Si. The
set of measurable functions fi is denoted (∆Si)
Ω, lotteries over Si, i.e., mixed strategies,
are denoted by pi. The utility for player i of a profile f of subjectively mixed strategies is
evaluated as subjective payoff expectation,
U¯i(f1, . . . , fn) :=
∫
Ω
ui(f(ω)) dpi
i .
Definition 5.2. A subjective equilibrium of the strategic game G = 〈N, (Si), (ui)〉 is a
profile (f∗1 , . . . , f∗n) of subjectively mixed strategies, such that for all i ∈ N there exists a
profile of probability distributions pii on Ω, such that
f∗i ∈ arg max
fi∈(∆Si)Ω
∫
Ωi
∫
Ω−i
ui(fi(ωi), f
∗
−i(ω−i)) dpi
i
−i dpi
i
i .
Or alternatively, if for all i ∈ N there exists a profile of probability distributions pii on Ω,
such that for all fi : Ω→ ∆Si,
U¯i(f
∗
i , f
∗
−i) ≥ U¯i(fi, f∗−i) .
Note that we gave a definition for the private event case. Every player bases his action on a
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private event, and the state spaces of all the players are stochastically independent. Hallin
(1976) gave the analog definition for the public event case and thus leaves the possibility
for players to correlate their actions and have correlated beliefs.
The above definition can, the same as correlated and Ellsberg equilibrium, be reduced
to the case where the states of the world are the pure strategies of each player. To this end,
let µi−i = (µ
i
1, . . . , µ
i
i−1, µ
i
i+1, . . . , µ
i
n) denote a profile of probability distributions over the
sets ∆S1, . . . ,∆Si−1,∆Si+1, . . . ,∆Sn, respectively, this means µi−i ∈ ∆(∆S−i). µi−i is the
belief of player i about which mixed strategy players N \{i} will play, therefore it has to be
a probability distribution over the set of mixed strategies. We state the definition below.
The subjective expected payoff U¯i of the profile of acts f now reduces to the subjective
expected payoff of the beliefs which are represented by mixed strategies. Therefore we
denote the subjective expected payoff in the reduced case by ui.
Definition 5.3. A reduced form subjective equilibrium of a strategic game
G = 〈N, (Si), (ui)〉 is a profile (p∗1, . . . , p∗n) of mixed strategies, if for each i ∈ N there
exists a profile of probability distributions µi−i on the set of lotteries ∆S−i, such that
p∗i ∈ arg max
pi∈∆Si
ui(pi, µ
i
−i) = arg max
pi∈∆Si
∫
Si
∫
S−i
ui(si, s−i) dµi−i dpi .
Or alternatively, if for all i ∈ N there exists a profile of probability distributions µi−i on
the set of lotteries ∆S−i, such that for all pi ∈ ∆Si,
ui(p
∗
i , µ
i
−i) ≥ ui(pi, µi−i) .
Proposition 5.4. The definitions 5.2 and 5.3 are equivalent.
Proof. The proof is analog to the proof of Proposition 1.3 on the reduced form Ellsberg
equilibrium.
In the reduced form subjective equilibria players formulate their beliefs directly about
which strategy their opponents will play, in the non-reduced form the belief is formed
about the probability distribution governing the state space that each opponent uses to
subjectively mix their strategy.
Whichever definition the reader prefers, since the beliefs are inconsistent (that is, they
can differ between the players), Aumann (1974) argues that in subjective equilibria some-
one might want to renegotiate after the state of the world is revealed. This can be observed
very well in the example of a subjective equilibrium of the matching pennies game pre-
sented at the beginning of the chapter. In that equilibrium player 2 best responds to a
144
5.2 Subjective Equilibria and Ellsberg Equilibria
completely false belief and thus is happy with his choice only before the state D is revealed.
A posteriori he would obviously like to change his action.
These problems can be avoided by making further assumptions on the equilibrium.
Aumann (1974) calls them “a posteriori equilibria”, when he assumes that no player
wants to unilaterally deviate even after the state of the world is revealed. In his definition
of a posteriori equilibria he allows for correlated randomizing. He shows that the set of
payoffs to a posteriori equilibrium points coincides with the set of payoffs to subjective
correlated equilibrium points, when the pii are mutually continuous with respect to each
other. That is, if pii(ω) = 0 for one i, then pii(ω) = 0 for all i ∈ N . This property is also
called agreement on null-events.
Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) go even further and show that the set of payoffs to a
posteriori equilibria coincides with the set of correlated rationalizable payoffs.
5.2.2 Relation with Ellsberg Equilibrium
We now analyze how Ellsberg equilibria are connected with subjective equilibria. With
his definition of a subjectively mixed strategy, Aumann (1974) was the first to model a
strategy that is based on an uncertain event in the Knightian sense. Of course, at the
time, no ambiguity averse preference representations were available and Aumann assumes
that an uncertain event is characterized by the fact that players may have different priors
on its realization. Thus, he assumes that players have a probability distribution on the set
of states of the world Ω according to Savage (1954) subjective expected utility. With this
assumption the use of subjectively mixed strategies boils down to the fact that the beliefs
of the players may differ in equilibrium. When we get rid of the subjective expected utility
assumption and instead assume ambiguity averse preferences, these lead to ambiguous acts
as defined by Bade (2011b). In contrast, by playing Ellsberg strategies players may pick
any kind of ambiguous randomizing device that they find reasonable, that is, which is
utility maximizing. Preferences are imposed upon the existence of objective ambiguity.
In spite of the different preference representations in Aumann (1974) and our setup,
both concepts rely on the fact that each player may base his action on a set of states
of the world for which different probability distributions exist. In Aumann (1974) each
player may have a different one, but every player has only one distribution, in Ellsberg
games all players have the same prior, but the prior is a set of probability distributions on
each of the state spaces. How do the sets of equilibria in subjective games and Ellsberg
games relate to each other? We start by proving that every Ellsberg equilibrium contains
a subjective equilibrium.
Proposition 5.5. For every Ellsberg equilibrium (P∗1 , . . . ,P∗n) of a normal form game
145
5 A Third Player Can Cause Non-Nash Behavior
G = 〈N, (Si), ui〉, i ∈ N , there exists a subjective equilibrium (p∗1, . . . , p∗n) with beliefs
µi−i ∈ ∆S−i of G, such that
p∗i ∈ P∗i ,
and µi−i ∈ ∆P∗−i .
Proof. When a Nash equilibrium (q1, . . . , qn) is element of the Ellsberg equilibrium (P∗1 , . . . ,P∗n),
that is qi ∈ P∗i for all i ∈ N , then we define
p∗i := qi ,
and µi−i := q−i ,
and the proposition holds since every Nash equilibrium is a subjective equilibrium in which
the subjective probability distributions coincide.
Now let there not be a Nash equilibrium like above. Take p∗i ∈ P∗i to be any element of
P∗i and
µi−i ∈
{
P ′−i
∣∣∣P ′−i = arg min
P−i∈P∗−i
∫
Si
∫
S−i
ui(si, s−i) dP−i dp∗i
}
(5.1)
to be any minimizer given p∗i ∈ P∗i . We need to show that (p∗1, . . . , p∗n) with beliefs µi−i
is indeed a subjective equilibrium. But this is obvious, since (P∗1 , . . . ,P∗n) is an Ellsberg
equilibrium and
p∗i ∈ arg max
pi∈∆Si
∫
Si
∫
S−i
ui(si, s−i) dµi−i dpi for all i ∈ N .
Thus, (p∗1, . . . , p∗n) with the beliefs µi−i as in (5.1) for each i ∈ N is a subjective equilibrium.
Remarks 5.6. 1. To find a subjective equilibrium contained in an Ellsberg equilibrium,
not every candidate for the beliefs µi−i can be chosen within (P∗1 , . . . ,P∗n). To see
this, consider the Modified Matching Pennies example, Figure 3.8: if player 1 played
his Nash equilibrium strategy 1/2 and his belief about player 2’s strategy was not the
minimizer 1/4, he would not stay with his mixed strategy.
2. On the other hand, for the beliefs µi−i of every player i ∈ N , we need not necessarily
choose the minimizer as constructed in (5.1) in the proof. To see this, consider the
peace negotiation example in Figure 1.3: every belief of countries A and B about the
play of the superpower C that fulfills µAC(punishA) > 5/9 and µ
B
C(punishA) < 4/9
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is a candidate for a subjective equilibrium.
This result is of course not very surprising, because due to the inconsistency of beliefs one
can obtain a large set of outcomes with the subjective equilibrium notion.
The converse of the statement does not hold, that is, it is not possible to find for every
subjective equilibrium of a normal form game G an Ellsberg equilibrium that contains
the subjective equilibrium in the way prescribed by the proposition. We give an example
to show this. Consider the matching pennies game in Figure 5.3. We explained that the
pair (U,L) with beliefs µ12(D) = 1 and µ
2
1(L) = 1 is a subjective equilibrium of the game.
In contrast, the only Ellsberg equilibria are ((1/2, 1/2), [Q0, Q1]) with Q0 < 1/2 < Q1
and ([P0, P1] , (1/2, 1/2)) with P0 < 1/2 < P1, where P ∈ [P0, P1], Q ∈ [Q0, Q1] are the
probabilities of player 1 playing U and player 2 playing L, respectively. It is obvious that
the subjective equilibrium (U,L) cannot be contained in any Ellsberg equilibrium.
5.2.3 Subjective Equilibria Explain Non-Nash Behavior in
Three-Person Ellsberg Games
We now give an intuitive explanation for the observation of strategies with non-Nash
support in Ellsberg games with more than two players. To this end, we define one more
subjective equilibrium notion. The subjective beliefs equilibrium is a profile of possible
non-common beliefs about the opponents’ play, where the belief µji of player j about the
play of player i must be a best response of player i to his belief µi−i about the others’ play.
Definition 5.7. A subjective beliefs equilibrium is a profile (µ1−1, . . . , µn−n), where µi−i ∈
∆S−i, such that for all i ∈ N , for every j 6= i,
µji ∈ arg max
Pi∈∆Si
ui(Pi, µ
i
−i) .
This is what Lo (1996) calls a Bayesian Beliefs Equilibrium, with the difference that we do
not allow for correlated beliefs. The difference of subjective beliefs equilibrium to subjec-
tive equilibrium lies in the fact that players do no longer best respond to some subjective
belief, but the (possibly non-common) subjective beliefs of the other players must be a
best response to the subjective beliefs. One can see clearly now that Klibanoff (1996)’s
equilibrium under uncertainty is a generalization of subjective equilibrium, whereas Lo
(1996) generalizes the subjective beliefs equilibrium.
We show in Theorem 5.8 that every Ellsberg equilibrium contains a subjective beliefs
equilibrium. In two-player games, every subjective beliefs equilibrium is a Nash equilib-
rium. When there is only one opponent, there is no room for disagreeing beliefs. This
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changes when we allow for more players, as Lo (1996) points out, because now players j
and k may disagree about what player i will play. The consequence of this is immedi-
ate: we have an intuitive explanation, why in games with more than two players Ellsberg
equilibria arise that are not obtainable by a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 5.8. If (P∗1 , . . . ,P∗n) is an Ellsberg equilibrium, then there exist µi−i ∈ P∗−i such
that (µ1−1, . . . , µn−n) is a subjective beliefs equilibrium and
arg max
Pi∈∆Si
Ui(Pi,P∗−i) ⊆ arg max
Pi∈∆Si
ui(Pi, µ
i
−i) .
Proof. It is sufficient to show that there exists µi−i ∈ P∗−i such that
arg max
Pi∈∆Si
Ui(Pi,P∗−i) ⊆ arg max
Pi∈∆Si
ui(Pi, µ
i
−i) .
The latter inclusion means that the set of best responses to P∗−i is contained in the set of
best responses to µi−i. This and the assumption that (P∗1 , . . . ,P∗n) is an Ellsberg equilib-
rium imply
µji ∈ P∗i ⊆ arg max
Pi∈∆Si
Ui(Pi,P∗−i) ⊆ arg max
Pi∈∆Si
ui(Pi, µ
i
−i) ,
and therefore (µ1−1, . . . , µn−n) is a subjective beliefs equilibrium. We know from the Mini-
max Theorem 1 (Theorem 1.15) and the Principle of Indifference in Distributions (Theorem
1.14) that
max
Pi∈∆Si
min
P−i∈P∗−i
ui(Pi, P−i) = min
P−i∈P∗−i
max
Pi∈∆Si
ui(Pi, P−i) = c∗ .
Now, P ∗i ∈ arg maxPi∈∆Si Ui(Pi,P∗−i) if and only if (by the Principle of Indifference in
Distributions) minP−i∈P∗−i ui(P
∗
i , P−i) = c
∗. From this follows that
ui(P
∗
i , P−i) ≥ c∗ (5.2)
for all P−i ∈ P∗−i, for all P ∗i ∈ arg max
Pi∈∆Si
Ui(Pi,P−i)∗ .
Take µi−i ∈ arg minP−i∈P∗−i maxP ∗i ∈∆Si ui(P ∗i , P−i) . Then we have
ui(P
∗
i , µ
i
−i) ≤ c∗ = max
P ∗i ∈∆Si
ui(P
∗
i , µ
i
−i) for all P
∗
i ∈ ∆Si . (5.3)
When we combine equations (5.2) and (5.3), we have
ui(P
∗
i , µ
i
−i) = c
∗ for all P ∗i ∈ arg max
Pi∈∆Si
Ui(Pi,P∗−i) .
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That is,
arg max
Pi∈∆Si
Ui(Pi,P∗−i) ⊆ arg max
Pi∈∆Si
ui(Pi, µ
i
−i) .
Since subjective beliefs equilibria and Nash equilibria are equivalent in two-person games,
Theorem 5.8 has the following corollary. The reasoning of Theorem 5.8 and the corollary
are based on Lo (1996), Proposition 3. The corollary gives an intuitive explanation, why
in two-player games the Ellsberg equilibrium behavior cannot be “too far” from the Nash
equilibrium behavior. We discuss this in Remark 5.10.
Corollary 5.9. When G is a two-player game, then for every Ellsberg equilibrium (P∗,Q∗)
there exists P ∗ ∈ P∗ and Q∗ ∈ Q∗ such that (P ∗, Q∗) is a Nash equilibrium and
arg max
P∈∆Si
Ui(P,Q∗) ⊆ arg max
P∈∆Si
ui(P,Q
∗) .
Remark 5.10. Note that the statement of Corollary 5.9 has an interesting consequence
for the interpretation of Bade (2011b)’s theorem on observational indifference. When
we relax Bade’s assumption on strictly monotone payoff functions and allow for weakly
dominated strategies (like in the example on observational differences in two-player games,
Figure 4.1), we are likely to observe Ellsberg equilibria with a support greater than the Nash
equilibrium support. But, and this follows from Corollary 5.9 and the proof of Theorem
5.8, the minimizers used by the players to derive the utility in Ellsberg equilibrium remain
the Nash equilibrium strategies.
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6 Strategic Use of Ambiguity in Dynamic
Games
It is straightforward that Ellsberg urns can also be used as strategies in dynamic games.1 In
this chapter we develop the theoretical framework to analyze such extensive form Ellsberg
games. As in classic extensive form theory, players can use an urn to create ambiguity
over their set of pure strategies, or they can place an Ellsberg urn at every decision point
in the process of the game. In the first section of the chapter we thus extend the notions
of mixed strategy and behavioral strategy to extensive form Ellsberg games.
Considering dynamic games leads directly to the question of dynamic consistency of the
players’ preferences. We discuss this in Section 6.2 and develop a formalism to translate
rectangularity of Epstein and Schneider (2003b) to extensive form Ellsberg games. This
property of Ellsberg strategies is then used to prove a version of Kuhn’s Theorem (Kuhn
(1953)) for extensive form Ellsberg games. We present an example for intuition. Thereafter
we define Ellsberg equilibrium in extensive form Ellsberg games and finally, in Section 6.5,
we compare Ellsberg equilibria to other extensive form solution concepts.
6.1 Extensive Form Ellsberg Games
We focus on dynamic games that can be represented in finite game trees. This implies a
finite number n of players and a finite number of moves for each player. For simplicity,
we do not allow any chance moves. We use the model of Osborne and Rubinstein (1994)
for extensive form games with imperfect information, and extend it to allow for imprecise
probabilistic devices.
Definition 6.1. A finite extensive form game is a tuple (N,H,W, l, (Ii), (ui)) whose com-
ponents are defined by:
• A finite set N of players i;
• A finite set H of sequences of actions (ak)k=1,...,K with ∅ ∈ H, which represent the
histories;
1 This chapter was published as IMW working paper Sass (2013).
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• A set W ⊂ H of terminal histories; for each h ∈ H \W , A(h) := {a | (h, a) ∈ H}
defines the set of actions available after history h;
• A player function l : H \W → N ;
• For each player i ∈ N an information partition Ii of {h ∈ H | l(h) = i} with the
property that A(h) = A(h′) whenever h, h′ ∈ Ii ∈ Ii. For Ii ∈ Ii we denote by A(Ii)
the set A(h) and by l(Ii) the player l(h) for any h ∈ Ii.
• For each player i ∈ N the preferences on lotteries over W can be represented by a
Von Neumann and Morgenstern expected utility function ui.
The set of pure strategies of a player i is denoted Si. The utility of a pure strategy
profile s ∈ S1 × . . . × Sn is simply ui(w), where w is the terminal history that results
when the profile s is played. The set of mixed strategies Pi is denoted ∆Si. We assume a
product structure on ∆S := ∆S1 × . . . ×∆Sn and thus have stochastic independence of
mixed strategies. Thus, if P = (P1, . . . , Pn) ∈ ∆S and s ∈ S, then
P (s) = P (s1, . . . , sn) =
n∏
i=1
Pi(si) for all s ∈ S .
The expected utility u = (u1, . . . , un) : S → Rn of a mixed strategy profile P (we use
the same notation as for the utility of a pure strategy) is ui(P ) =
∑
s∈S P (s)ui(s) . A
behavioral strategy of player i is a function θi = (θi(Ii))Ii∈Ii with θi(Ii) ∈ ∆A(Ii) that
assigns to each information set Ii of player i a probability distribution over the set of
actions available at Ii. The set of behavioral strategies of player i is denoted Oi, the set
of profiles θ = (θ1, ..., θn) of behavioral strategies by O = O1 × . . .×On.
We assume that in addition to classic randomizing devices, players can use imprecise
probabilistic devices to choose among their pure strategies or among their available actions
at each information set. Therefore, in addition to classical pure, mixed and behavioral
strategies, we define Ellsberg strategies and Ellsberg behavioral strategies as convex and
compact sets of mixed and behavioral strategies.
Definition 6.2. An Ellsberg strategy of player i is a convex and compact set Pi of
probability distributions Pi : Si → R+, such that
∑
si∈Si Pi(si) = 1.
Definition 6.3. An Ellsberg behavior strategy Θi of player i is a function that assigns
to each information set Ii of player i a convex and compact set of probability distributions
θi over the set of actions available at Ii.
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A profile of Ellsberg behavior strategies is denoted Θ = (Θ1, . . . ,Θn), and Θ is consti-
tuted of profiles of behavior strategies θ = (θ1, . . . , θn). For any history h ∈ Ii ∈ Ii and
action a ∈ A(h) we denote by θi(h)(a) the probability θi(Ii)(a) assigned by θi(Ii) to the
action a.
For a profile P = (P1, ..., Pn) of mixed strategies, we define the outcome ΠP of P to
be the probability distribution over the terminal histories that results when each player
i follows the precepts of Pi. The probability that ΠP assigns to a terminal history w is∏
i∈N pii(w) where pii(w) is the sum of the probabilities according to Pi of all the pure
strategies of player i that are consistent (i.e. that result in the terminal history w) with
w. The same way we define Πθ for a profile of behavioral strategies. The probability that
Πθ assigns to w = (a
1, ..., aK) is
∏K−1
k=0 θl(a1,...,ak)(a
1, ..., ak)(ak+1), where for k = 0 the
history (a1, ..., ak) is the initial history.
For a profile of Ellsberg strategies P or Ellsberg behavior strategies Θ, the outcomes
ΠP and ΠΘ are sets of probabilities defined as
ΠP(w) :=
{
ΠP (w)
∣∣∣ P ∈ P} , (6.1)
ΠΘ(w) :=
{
Πθ(w)
∣∣∣ θ ∈ Θ} .
Finally we specify players’ preferences over the new strategic devices. We assume that
the players are ambiguity-averse according to Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud
(2008) in the special case φ = id. The utility of both an Ellsberg and Ellsberg behavior
strategy profile P, Θ is then evaluated with a maxmin rule using the worst case probability
distribution. We have stochastic independence of the Ellsberg strategies by assuming a
product structure for every mixed strategy profile P contained in P = (P1, . . . ,Pn).2
Thus, the utility of an Ellsberg strategy profile P for player i is
Ui(P) = min
P∈P
∑
w∈W
ΠP (w)ui(w) . (6.2)
2 In the definition of a normal form Ellsberg game we assume that the Ellsberg urns (Ωi,Fi,Pi) of all
players i ∈ N are stochastically independent. This is done by using product spaces as first suggested by
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) (instead of Ellsberg urns they speak of “non-unique probability spaces”
(Ω,F ,P), p. 150 therein). We define the product (Ω,F ,P) of n Ellsberg urns (Ωi,Fi,Pi), i = 1, . . . , n,
as follows: Ω := Ω1 × . . . × Ωn, F := F1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ Fn, and P is the closed convex hull of the set of
product measures, P := c¯o {P1 ⊗ . . .⊗ Pn | P1 ∈ P1, . . . , Pn ∈ Pn} . This way the Ellsberg urns are
stochastically independent. Different notions of stochastic independence in the context of ambiguity
aversion have been discussed in the literature, see for example Klibanoff (2001), Bade (2011b) and Bade
(2011a). In the present context of objective ambiguity in the form of Ellsberg urns the above notion
seems the most natural.
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The utility of an Ellsberg behavior strategy profile Θ for a player i is then
Ui(Θ) = min
θ∈Θ
∑
w∈W
Πθ(w)ui(w) . (6.3)
With the ambiguity-averse preference representation at hand, we can now give the defini-
tion of an extensive form Ellsberg game.
Definition 6.4. An n-player extensive form Ellsberg game is a tuple (N,H,W, l, (Ii)(Ui))
of which the components satisfy the conditions in Definition 6.1, and U = (U1, . . . , Un) is
the ambiguity-averse preference representation in (6.2) and (6.3).
By specifying in the definition how players evaluate Ellsberg strategies we allow players
to use Ellsberg urns as imprecise probabilistic devices. Of course, it is still possible to
play classic mixed and behavioral strategies. Then Ui reduces to the Von Neumann and
Morgenstern expected utility ui.
6.2 Rectangular Ellsberg Strategies and Dynamic
Consistency
Dynamic consistency requires that preferences over outcomes at some point in the game
will not be reversed or contradicted at a later point. A compelling feature of classic
extensive form games lies in the fact that for a rational player it does not matter whether
he plans his strategy in advance or executes it whenever one of his information sets is
reached; this means that additional information arriving at some point in the game is
irrelevant for the choice of the strategy. This equivalence is captured by Kuhn’s Theorem
which we discuss and extend to Ellsberg games in the next section. When players are
expected utility maximizers, Kuhn’s Theorem establishes a connection between conditional
preferences at different points in the game tree via Bayes’ updating rule: when players
update in that way, their choices following the expected utility model are dynamically
consistent.
Updating of ambiguity-averse preference representations and its relation to dynamic
consistency has been extensively analyzed. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) propose two
updating rules for multiple-prior expected utilities, full Bayesian updating and maximum
likelihood updating, which are in general not dynamically consistent. Epstein and Schnei-
der (2003b) characterize a particular set of priors which they call rectangular, for which full
Bayesian updating is dynamically consistent. They show, more precisely, that multiple-
prior utilities like those used in Ellsberg games are dynamically consistent if and only if
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each set of priors is rectangular and it is updated by Bayes’ Rule applied prior by prior.
Riedel (2004) uses rectangularity to prove dynamic consistency of dynamic coherent risk
measures. Later Hanany and Klibanoff (2007) use a weaker notion of dynamic consistency
to obtain a larger set of dynamically consistent updating rules for maxmin expected util-
ities.
We translate the property of rectangularity in Epstein and Schneider (2003b) to Ellsberg
games. First we describe the information structure of an extensive form Ellsberg game
(F,U) with a filtration {Wt}T0 on a state spaceW . This is only possible, when the extensive
form F satisfies perfect recall, otherwise for some t, Wt * Wt+1. Thus, we assume that
F satisfies perfect recall.3 Furthermore, we assume finite trees, T <∞, throughout. The
information structure of (F,U) is captured in the extensive form F in form of a rooted
tree T = (W,N). The root W corresponds to time 0, and the sequence of decisions taken
by the players defines the information available at time t. Let the set W of plays be the
state space. Then, staying with Epstein and Schneider (2003b), we assume that W0 is
trivial (that is, consists only of W and ∅) and that for each t,Wt is generated by the finite
information partition at time t. Then Wt(w) denotes the partition component containing
the play w. Wt(w) corresponds to some information set h, at which w is possible, along
with a number of other plays. At t + 1, the number of possible plays is narrowed down
again. At time T , WT (w) is the singleton set of play {w} that has materialized.
Epstein and Schneider (2003b) consider lotteries over adapted consumption processes,
and preferences over Wt-measurable acts from W into such lotteries. Then, for simplicity,
they assume full support (Axiom 5 therein): every non-empty event in WT is considered
possible at time 0. To apply the result by Epstein and Schneider (2003b) we assume the
same condition. For the game (F,U) this implies that we only consider strategies with full
support. This is without loss of generality. To allow for strategies without full support,
we apply the construction to a suitable subset of plays. It is up to further research to
determine whether this procedure has implications for the strategic analysis of an extensive
form Ellsberg game.
In the description of the information structure {Wt}T0 , it is irrelevant, who takes the
decision at some time t. The filtration only represents what is known to all players at
some time t, therefore it does not define a game, but only an event tree. When we define a
rectangular Ellsberg strategy profile P, we therefore only impose restrictions on the set of
induced distributions over plays: as long as the set of induced realization probabilities ΠP
(see (6.1)) is rectangular, any Ellsberg strategy profile P which induces ΠP is admissible.
3 For a precise definition of this notion in the notation introduced here see Ritzberger (2002), p. 124.
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We specify this in Definition 6.5. For the extension of Kuhn’s theorem to extensive form
Ellsberg games this leaves some degrees of freedom for the choice of an Ellsberg strategy
profile P given some set of realization probabilities ΠP .
We have already found a way to describe Ellsberg strategy profiles, that is, “the big
urn” over all pure strategies, in the setting of Epstein and Schneider (2003b): they are
represented by the set of realization probabilities ΠP . Now we see how Ellsberg behavior
strategies are described in this setting. Define the set ofWt-conditionals of measures pi on
(W,WT ) as
ΠtP(w)(·) =
{
pit(w)(·) := pi(·|Wt)(w)
∣∣ pi ∈ ΠP} ,
this is the set of Bayesian updates at a time t. The set of conditional one-step-ahead
measures is defined by
ΠtP,+1(w) =
{
pit+1(w)
∣∣ pi ∈ ΠP} ,
where pit+1 is the restriction of pi
t to Wt+1. The sets ΠtP and ΠtP,+1 can be viewed as
realizations of Wt-measurable correspondences into ∆(W,WT ) and ∆(W,Wt+1), respec-
tively. The name “conditional one-step-ahead measures” has the following intuition. Each
measure in ΠtP,+1(w) is a measure on Wt+1, thus one can think of ΠtP,+1(w) as the set of
measures describing beliefs about the “next step”: the belief at time t about what will
happen at time t + 1. Think of it as cutting the tree at time t and time t + 1, then one
is only left with distributions over the choices at the information sets at time t, and the
distributions are induced by ΠP . From this explanation it is clear that the conditional one-
step-ahead measures are the induced Ellsberg behavior strategies. Epstein and Schneider
(2003b) explain further that from any set of one-step-ahead conditionals, e.g. some set
Πt+1, a rectangular set Π can be constructed with backward construction via
Π = {pi ∈ ∆(W,Wt) | pit+1 ∈ Πt+1(w) for all t and w} .
We see that Π is the set of all measures pi whose one-step ahead conditionals conform with
the Πt+1.
When is an Ellsberg strategy dynamically consistent (rectangular)? The Bayesian the-
ory says, a probability distribution pi on (W,WT ) can be for every t decomposed into its
conditionals and marginals in the form
pit(w) =
∑
w′∈W
pit+1(w′) · pit+1(w) . (6.4)
156
6.3 Kuhn’s Theorem for Extensive Form Ellsberg Games
The set ΠP of probability distributions (and thus P) on (W,WT ) is rectangular if it admits
a corresponding decomposition. Details are explained in the proof of Theorem 6.7 and in
Epstein and Schneider (2003b). First, we define rectangularity precisely.
Definition 6.5. An Ellsberg strategy profile P in an extensive form Ellsberg game (F,U) is
rectangular, if the set of realization probabilities ΠP is rectangular in the following sense.
Let the information structure of the game (F,U) be described by the filtration {Wt}T0 .
Then ΠP is {Wt}-rectangular, if for all w and all t
ΠtP(w) =
{ ∑
w′∈W
pit+1(w′) · pit+1(w)
∣∣∣
pit+1(w′) ∈ Πt+1P (w′) for all w′ ∈W,pit+1(w) ∈ ΠtP,+1(w)
}
. (6.5)
An Ellsberg strategy Pi for player i is rectangular if it is part of a rectangular Ellsberg
strategy profile P. When necessary, we denote the restriction of a set X to its rectangular
subset with XR.
Remark 6.6. Definition 6.5 also applies to the set of realization probabilities ΠΘ. ΠΘ is
rectangular, if it has an analog decomposition as in (6.5). In difference to Definition 6.5
this is not a property of the Ellsberg behavior strategy profile Θ.
Observe that the inclusion ⊂ is always satisfied by applying (6.4) for every pi ∈ ΠP . In
order to assure the inclusion in the other direction, ΠP is required to have the special
“rectangular” form. Combinations of conditionals and marginals that arise from different
pi, pi′ ∈ ΠP have to lie in ΠtP . In Example 6.9 in the following section, we explain the
geometric representation of a rectangular Ellsberg strategy. Epstein and Schneider (2003b)
point out some features of rectangularity. One of these is particularly important in the
setting of extensive form Ellsberg games: rectangularity imposes no restrictions on one-
step-ahead conditionals. This means that players can use any Ellsberg behavior strategy
they wish. Only when they want to represent this Ellsberg behavior strategy by an
outcome-equivalent Ellsberg strategy they have to use the induced rectangular Ellsberg
strategy. We show this in detail in the following section.
6.3 Kuhn’s Theorem for Extensive Form Ellsberg Games
Kuhn (1953) proved that an extensive form satisfies perfect recall if and only if, for every
probability distribution on plays that is induced by some mixed strategy profile, there is
a behavior strategy profile that induces the same distribution, and for every probability
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distribution on plays that is induced by some behavior strategy profile, there is a mixed
strategy profile that induces the same distribution. Under expected utility this implies
that the strategies yield the same utility.
In this section we assume, as it is assumed in most applications, that the extensive form
F = (T , C) satisfies perfect recall. We then show that under this assumption and the
condition that the Ellsberg strategies are rectangular we get an equivalent result of Kuhn’s
theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games, namely:
Theorem 6.7. In an extensive form Ellsberg game (F,U) with F = (T , C) satisfying
perfect recall, every rectangular Ellsberg strategy profile P induces an Ellsberg behavior
strategy profile ΘP via prior-by-prior updating; every Ellsberg behavior strategy profile Θ
induces a rectangular Ellsberg strategy profile PΘ such that prior-by-prior updating of PΘ
yields Θ. The induced strategy profiles are payoff-equivalent, i.e.,
Ui(P) = Ui(ΘP) and Ui(Θ) = Ui(PΘ) .
Proof. We construct the induced strategies as follows. Note that we only consider strate-
gies with full support according to Axiom 5 in Epstein and Schneider (2003b). This is
without loss of generality. To allow for strategies without full support, we apply the
construction to a suitable subset of plays.
A rectangular Ellsberg strategy profile P has by definition a rectangular set of real-
ization probabilities ΠP . Due to rectangularity, ΠP possesses at any point in time t a
decomposition into marginals and one-step-ahead conditionals according to (6.5). The set
of conditional one-step-ahead measures at t, ΠtP,+1, defines the induced Ellsberg behavior
strategy profile ΘP by setting
ΘP,αi := Π
t
P,+1 , (6.6)
when player i is at information set α at time t. The construction is graphically captured
in the diagram in Figure 6.1.
The construction of an induced rectangular Ellsberg strategy profile PΘ is similar. Any
Ellsberg behavior strategy profile Θ has a set of realization probabilities ΠΘ. This set can
be restricted to its rectangular subset ΠRΘ by requiring that the conditional one-step-ahead
measures are again the Ellsberg behavior strategy profile Θ in the sense that
ΠR,tΘ,+1 = Θ
α
i (6.7)
when player i is at information set α at time t (dashed line in Figure 6.2). Then we
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P ΘP
ΠP ΠtP,+1
realization
probabilities
induces
rectangular set
decomposition of
conditional
one-step-
ahead
measures
correspond to
Figure 6.1: Rectangular P induces Ellsberg behavior strategy ΘP .
define ΠRP := Π
R
Θ. Π
R
P is uniquely determined by the process of conditional one-step-ahead
correspondences ΠR,tΘ,+1. The rectangular set is the set of realization probabilities of the
induced rectangular Ellsberg strategy profile PΘ. The construction is graphically captured
in the diagram in Figure 6.2.
Θ PΘ
ΠΘ Π
R
Θ =: Π
R
P
realization
probabilities
induces
rectangular set
restriction to
realization
probabilities
(backwards
construction)
ΠR,tΘ,+1 = Θ
α
i
Figure 6.2: Θ induces rectangular Ellsberg strategy PΘ.
It remains to show that P and ΘP , as well as Θ and PΘ, yield the same minimal expected
utility.
Recall that
Ui(P) = min
P∈P
P (s)ui(s) .
159
6 Strategic Use of Ambiguity in Dynamic Games
This is equal to the minimal expected utility of the realization probabilities of P,
Ui(P) = Ui(ΠP) = min
piP∈ΠP
∑
w∈W
piP (w)ui(w) ,
where piP (w) =
∑
s∈S,w∈s P (s). Now consider the minimal expected utility of Θ
P , with
piθ(w) =
∏n
i=1 θi(ci), where (ci)
n
i=1 is the unique sequence of choices that yield w.
Ui(Θ
P) = Ui(ΠΘP ) = min
piθ∈ΠΘP
∑
w∈W
piθ(w)ui(w)
= min
θ∈ΘP
∑
w∈W
(
n∏
i=1
θi(ci)
)
ui(w) (6.8)
= min
pit+1∈ΠtP,+1
∑
w∈W
(
T∏
t=0
pit+1(w)
)
ui(w) (6.9)
= min
piP∈ΠP
∑
w∈W
piP (w)ui(w) (6.10)
= Ui(ΠP) = Ui(P) .
From (6.8) to (6.9) we get by definition of θi in the construction of the proof, see (6.6). We
can replace
∏n
i=1 θi(ci) by
∏T
t=0 pi
t
+1(w), where (ci)
n
i=1 is the unique sequence of choices
which yields w. The equality of (6.9) and (6.10) results from the rectangularity of P.
Because of rectangularity,
∏T
t=1 pi
t
+1(w) is an element of ΠP , that is,
∏T
t=0 pi
t
+1(w) = piP (w).
Likewise, we show the equality of Ui(Θ) and Ui(PΘ). We use (6.7) for the equality of
(6.11) and (6.12), and rectangularity in the equality of (6.12) and (6.13).
Ui(Θ) = Ui(ΠΘ) = min
piθ∈ΠΘ
∑
w∈W
piθ(w)ui(w)
= min
θ∈Θ
∑
w∈W
(
n∏
i=1
θi(ci)
)
ui(w) (6.11)
= min
pit+1∈piR,tΘ,+1
∑
w∈W
(
T∏
t=0
pit+1(w)
)
ui(w) (6.12)
= min
piP∈ΠPΘ
∑
w∈W
piP (w)ui(w) (6.13)
= Ui(ΠPΘ) = Ui(PΘ) .
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Remark 6.8. Note that the induced Ellsberg behavior strategy profile ΘP is unique, but
the induced Ellsberg strategy profile PΘ is not. This is because the construction of PΘ
from the set of realization probabilities ΠRP is in general not unique.
Theorem 6.7 has the following interpretation. For every Ellsberg behavior strategy profile
there exists an Ellsberg strategy profile that yields the same utility for all players. This
induced Ellsberg strategy profile has to be chosen rectangular if we want it to be dynam-
ically consistent and equivalent to the original Ellsberg behavior strategy. Note that this
does not impose any restriction on the choice of the Ellsberg behavior strategy profile (this
is also pointed out in Epstein and Schneider (2003b), p. 10), but only allows a restricted
set of Ellsberg strategy profiles. Conversely, for every rectangular Ellsberg strategy, there
exists an equivalent Ellsberg behavior strategy.
To gain some intuition about the nature of rectangular Ellsberg strategies and the
inductions explained in the proof of Theorem 6.7, we now discuss a most simple example.
Example 6.9. Consider the following example taken from Osborne and Rubinstein (1994),
p. 93. We believe this to be the simplest two-player information structure with which we can
illustrate the equivalence of rectangular Ellsberg strategies and Ellsberg behavior strategies.
The game is presented in Figure 6.3.
B
d
A
1
D
c
C
2
F
b
E
a
1
1
Figure 6.3: Game where player 1 moves before and after player 2.
We assume that a, b, c, d ∈ R are payoffs for player 1 with d < a = b. To keep things
as simple as possible, we let player 2 choose C at all times, thus c will never be reached.
Player 1 has four pure strategies: (A,E), (A,F ), (B,E) and (B,F ), we denote the set of
pure strategies of player 1 by S1. Player 2 only has C and D as pure strategies.
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First, we start with Ellsberg behavior strategies Θ1 = (Θ
0
1,Θ
1
1) and Θ2 that specify a
set of probability distributions at every information set of player 1 and 2, respectively.
Suppose player 1 plays
Θ01 =
{
(θ01, 1− θ01) | θ01 ∈ [0, 1], 1/4 ≤ θ01 ≤ 3/4
}
,
Θ11 =
{
(θ11, 1− θ11) | θ11 ∈ [0, 1], 1/2 ≤ θ11 ≤ 2/3
}
,
with Θ01 the set of distributions over A and B, and Θ
1
1 the set of distributions over E and
F . For the purpose of the example, let player 2 have an Ellsberg behavior strategy Θ2 that
chooses C with probability 1, without creating any ambiguity.
The set of plays W is then given by W = {E,F,B} with respect to the outcomes a, b and
d. We derive the set of realization probabilities ΠΘ corresponding to the Ellsberg behavior
strategy Θ,
ΠΘ(E) = {θ01 · θ11 | θ01 ∈ Θ01, θ11 ∈ Θ11} ,
ΠΘ(F ) = {θ01 · (1− θ11) | θ01 ∈ Θ01, θ11 ∈ Θ11} ,
ΠΘ(B) = {1− θ01 | θ01 ∈ Θ01} .
Now we can calculate the maxmin expected utility for player 1 of the Ellsberg behavior
strategy Θ.
U1(Θ) = U1(ΠΘ) = min
piθ∈ΠΘ
∑
w∈W
piθ(w)ui(w)
= min
piθ∈ΠΘ
piθ(E) · a+ piθ(F ) · b+ piθ(B) · d
= min
θ∈Θ
θ01 · θ11 · a+ θ01 · (1− θ11) · b+ (1− θ01) · d
= 1/4 · 1/2 · a+ 1/4 · 1/2 · b+ 3/4 · d
= 1/8 · a+ 1/8 · b+ 3/4 · d . (6.14)
What is the rectangular Ellsberg strategy profile PΘ induced by the Ellsberg behavior
strategy profile Θ? We follow the construction in Figure 6.2.
The set of induced realization probabilities ΠΘ is a hexagon (colored green in Figure 6.4),
given by the surface that lies in the intersection of ΠΘ(E) = [1/8, 1/2], ΠΘ(F ) = [1/12, 3/8]
and ΠΘ(B) = [1/4, 3/4]. It can be easily seen that ΠΘ is too large in the sense that it
induces conditional probabilities over E and F which lie outside the set Θ11 of original
Ellsberg behavior strategies. Take for example the distribution (1/8, 3/8, 1/2) (probability
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distribution over E,F,B) at the lower right corner of the green hexagon. This distribution
yields a conditional one-step-ahead probability for E which is equal to 1/81/2 = 1/4, and 1/4
does not lie in the set Θ11(E). Hence we have to restrict ΠΘ to its rectangular subset Π
R
Θ,
this is exactly the set that yields the correct conditionals.
To apply the construction of Epstein and Schneider (2003b) we represent the game in
Figure 6.9 by a state space W = {E,F,B} (the set of plays) and a filtration {Wt}20 where
W0 = {{E,F,B}} ,
W1 = {{E,F}, {B}} ,
W2 = {{E}, {F}, {B}} .
ΠRΘ ⊂ ΠΘ is the set of distributions on (W,W2) that for all t ∈ {0, 1, 2} and all w ∈ W
admits a decomposition
ΠR,tΘ (w) =
{ ∑
w′∈W
pit+1(w′) · pit+1(w)
∣∣∣
pit+1(w′) ∈ Πt+1Θ (w′) for all w′ ∈W,pit+1(w) ∈ ΠtΘ,+1(w)
}
. (6.15)
The set ΠRΘ excludes exactly all those distributions in ΠΘ that yield conditionals outside
Θ11. The rectangular set Π
R
Θ is depicted as the blue rectangle in Figure 6.4.
From the construction of ΠR,tΘ , it follows that
ΠR,0Θ,+1 = Θ
0
1 ,
ΠR,1Θ,+1 = Θ
1
1 ,
that is, the induced conditional one-step-ahead measures are exactly the components of
the Ellsberg behavior strategy which we started with. The set ΠRΘ can also be constructed
recursively as the set of all distributions pi ∈ ∆(W,WT ) for which pit+1 ∈ ΠR,tΘ,+1(w) for all
t and all w, see Epstein and Schneider (2003b) p. 8 for details. Hence, to find the induced
Ellsberg strategy PΘ we first define
ΠRP := Π
R
Θ
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2/3
1/2
1/43/4B F
E
Figure 6.4: Set of realization probabilities ΠΘ (green hexagon), rectangular set of proba-
bilities ΠRΘ (blue rectangle). The grey numbers indicate the set of probabilities
for B, the blue numbers the set of conditional one-step-ahead probabilities for
E.
as in Figure 6.2. Then the rectangular set of realization probabilities ΠRP is
ΠRP =
{
pi = (pi1, pi2, pi3) ∈ ∆(W,WT )
∣∣ pi1/(1− pi3) ∈ [1/2, 2/3] = ΠR,1P,+1(E) ,
pi2/(1− pi3) ∈ [1/3, 1/2] = ΠR,1P,+1(F ), pi3 ∈ [1/4, 3/4] = ΠR,0P,+1(B)
}
=
{
pi ∈ ∆(W,WT )
∣∣ pi3 ∈ [1/4, 3/4], pi1 ∈ [−pi3/2 + 1/2,−2pi3/3 + 2/3]} . (6.16)
The notation in (6.16) is derived as follows. Every point in the simplex is fully described
by probabilities for B and E. The two lines passing through B = 1 and E = 2/3, B = 1
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and E = 1/2 are functions of B and E with equations
pi1 = pi3/2 + 1/2 ,
pi1 = 2pi3/3 + 2/3 .
Now, finally, we construct PΘ from the rectangular set of realization probabilities ΠRP . We
find
PΘ1 =
{
P ∈ ∆S1
∣∣ P (A,E) = pi1, P (A,F ) = pi2, P (B,E) = pi1
pi1 + pi2
pi3,
P (B,F ) =
pi2
pi1 + pi2
pi3, for all (pi1, pi2, pi3) ∈ ΠRP
}
.
We calculate the maxmin expected utility of player 1 of the Ellsberg strategy profile PΘ.
U1(PΘ) = min
P∈P
∑
s∈S
P (s)ui(s)
= min
P∈P
P (A,E) · a+ P (A,F ) · b+ (P (B,E) + P (B,F )) · d
= 1/8 · a+ 1/8 · b+ (3/8 + 3/8) · d
= 1/8 · a+ 1/8 · b+ 3/4 · d . (6.17)
Player 1 uses P = (1/8, 1/8, 3/8, 3/8) as his worst case probability distribution, because
it puts the greatest available probability to the worst outcome d. We thus find that the
Ellsberg strategy profile PΘ induced by Θ yields the same maxmin expected utility as Θ:
U1(PΘ) (6.17)= 1/8 · a+ 1/8 · b+ 3/4 · d (6.14)= U1(Θ) .
Furthermore, doing the reasoning backwards, one sees directly that with the rectangular
construction of ΠRP = Π
R
Θ in (6.15), the Ellsberg strategy yields the correct one-step-ahead
conditionals for A,B and E,F .
Now, we start out from the rectangular Ellsberg strategy profile P (the blue rectangle in
Figure 6.4) and construct the induced Ellsberg behavior strategy profile ΘP . We proceed as
sketched in the diagram in Figure 6.1. The Ellsberg strategy profile has a set of realization
probabilities ΠP which are by definition also rectangular. Then from Definition 6.5, ΠP
possesses a decomposition of ΠtP for all t into marginals and one-step-ahead conditionals.
The rectangular set ΠP is constructed in the way to get exactly Π0P,+1 = Θ
P,0
1 and Π
1
P,+1 =
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ΘP,11 as one-step-ahead conditionals, and hence
ΘP,01 =
{
(θ01, 1− θ01)
∣∣ θ01 ∈ [0, 1], 1/4 ≤ θ01 ≤ 3/4} ,
ΘP,11 =
{
(θ11, 1− θ11)
∣∣ θ11 ∈ [0, 1], 1/2 ≤ θ11 ≤ 2/3} .
Obviously we have
U1(P) = U1(PΘ) (6.17)= 1/8 · a+ 1/8 · b+ 3/4 · d (6.14)= U1(Θ) = U1(ΘP) .
6.4 Ellsberg Equilibrium in Extensive Form Ellsberg Games
An Ellsberg equilibrium in an extensive form Ellsberg game is defined straightforwardly
as in the static case. A profile of Ellsberg strategies is an Ellsberg equilibrium profile, if
no player finds it profitable to deviate unilaterally.
Definition 6.10. An Ellsberg equilibrium of an extensive form Ellsberg game (F,U) is a
profile (P∗1 , . . . ,P∗n) of Ellsberg strategies such that for all i = 1, . . . , n and every Pi ⊆ ∆Si
Ui(P∗i ,P∗−i) ≥ Ui(Pi,P∗−i) .
An Ellsberg equilibrium in Ellsberg behavior strategies is defined analogously. Given Theo-
rem 6.7, the two definitions are equivalent for extensive form Ellsberg games with perfect
recall.
Corollary 6.11 (of Theorem 6.7). If a rectangular Ellsberg strategy profile P is an Ells-
berg equilibrium of an extensive form Ellsberg game (F , U), then the Ellsberg behavior
strategy profile ΘP is an Ellsberg equilibrium in Ellsberg behavior strategies. If an Ellsberg
behavior strategy profile Θ is an Ellsberg equilibrium in Ellsberg behavior strategies, then
the rectangular Ellsberg strategy profile ΘP is an Ellsberg equilibrium.
Every Nash equilibrium is an Ellsberg equilibrium. Conversely, every Ellsberg equilibrium
in which P is a single probability distribution is a Nash equilibrium.
6.5 Relation to Other Extensive Form Solution Concepts
We discuss the relation of Ellsberg equilibrium to other extensive form solution concepts
with an example which Fudenberg and Kreps (1988) used to show that mistakes about
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play off the equilibrium path can lead to non-Nash outcomes. Subsequently this “horse”-
like game4 has been used as an example in a number of papers (Battigalli, Gilli, and
Molinari (1992), Fudenberg and Levine (1993), Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1994), Groes,
Jacobsen, Sloth, and Tranaes (1998), Lo (1999)). The information structure is the same as
in Greenberg (2000)’s peace negotiation example, and also the incentive structure is very
similar. We are in a situation, where ambiguity can be used as a threat against deviation.5
D1A1
1
R
0, 3, 0
L
3, 0, 0 R
0, 3, 0
L
3, 0, 0
D2
1, 1, 1
A2
2
3
1
Figure 6.5: Fudenberg and Kreps’ three-player game.
Proposition 6.12. The proper Ellsberg equilibria of Fudenberg and Kreps’ Three-Player
game are of the form (A1, A2, [R0, R1]) where R ∈ [R0, R1] is the probability that player 3
plays L, and R0 < 1/3 and R1 > 2/3.
Proof. Let P,Q denote the probability that player 1 plays A1, player 2 plays A2, respec-
tively. Then we can calculate the minimal expected utility for each player.
U1(P,Q, [R0, R1])
= min
R0≤R≤R1
PQR+ 3P (1−Q)R+ 3(1− P )QR+ 3(1− P )(1−Q)R+ PQ(1−R)
= min
R0≤R≤R1
R(−3PQ+ 3) + PQ
= R0(−3PQ+ 3) + PQ for all P,Q ∈ [0, 1] .
4 Selten (1975) is first to analyze this “horse”-like information structure. In his numerical example,
however, the possibility to use Ellsberg strategies does not lead to Ellsberg equilibria outside the Nash
equilibrium support, because the incentive structure is such that players 1 and 2 are not in opposition
to each other.
5 Kelsey and Spanjers (2004) observe that “Ambiguity can make threats more effective.” In the incentive
structure of the games considered here, this observation is confirmed.
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U2(P,Q, [R0, R1]) = min
R0≤R≤R1
R(3PQ− 3)− 2PQ+ 3
= R1(3PQ− 3)− 2PQ+ 3 for all P,Q ∈ [0, 1] .
U3(P,Q, [R0, R1]) = max
R0≤R≤R1
PQR+ PQ(1−R)
= PQ .
Player 1 gets a payoff less than 1 if player 1 or 2 defect, when
R0(−3PQ+ 3) + PQ < 1
⇔ R0 < 1/3 .
Player 2 gets a payoff less than 1 if player 1 or 2 defect, when
R1(3PQ− 3)− 2PQ+ 3 < 1
⇔ R1 > 2/3 .
This yields the equilibrium (A1, A2, [R0, R1]) where R0 < 1/3 and R1 > 2/3.
The information structure of the game has been characterized by Fudenberg and Levine
(1993) in the analysis of their concept of Self-confirming equilibrium. They define a prop-
erty of unobserved deviators which captures the fact that a player does not observe who of
his opponents leaves the equilibrium path at some point in the game. These games have
a natural property to allow for “wrong” beliefs on plays off the equilibrium path. There-
fore games with unobserved deviators can have Self-confirming or Conjectural (Battigalli
(1987), Battigalli and Guaitoli (1988), Battigalli and Guaitoli (1997)) equilibria which
are not Nash equilibria. Fudenberg and Levine (1993) show that games that have only
observed deviators do not have non-Nash equilibria. We suppose that a similar charac-
terization holds for Ellsberg equilibria as well. This is an interesting question for further
research.
We briefly present other extensive form solution concepts with Knightian uncertainty.
Battigalli, Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2012) define Self-confirming equi-
librium with model uncertainty. Their concept also incorporates Knightian uncertainty
into extensive form games, but is quite different from our extensive form Ellsberg games.
The differences lie especially in the fact that players may only play pure strategies in
Self-confirming equilibrium with model uncertainty, and that uncertainty is present in the
environment and not in the strategies. In Aryal and Stauber (2013) players, anticipating
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6.5 Relation to Other Extensive Form Solution Concepts
possible small mistakes (trembles), can have ambiguous beliefs about their opponents’
strategies. A further extensive form solution concept with Knightian uncertainty is Multi-
ple Priors Nash equilibrium by Lo (1999). Lo allows beliefs to be represented by multiple
priors and demands every distribution in the sets of beliefs to be a best response to the
beliefs on the other players. Players only have pure strategies at their disposition. Lo
(1999) also looks at the example in Figure 6.5 and shows that the path (D1, D2) can be
supported by a Multiple Priors Nash equilibrium, that is, that there exist sets of beliefs
such that playing (D1, D2) is optimal. However, this equilibrium in beliefs is entirely sub-
jective and in that aspect differs fundamentally from Ellsberg equilibrium. In the same
way, Nash equilibrium with lower probabilities in Groes, Jacobsen, Sloth, and Tranaes
(1998) is distinguished from Ellsberg equilibrium. The Ellsberg equilibrium outcomes in
Fudenberg and Kreps’ game can also be achieved with subjective equilibrium by Kalai
and Lehrer (1995), but, again, the fundamentals of the two concepts differ.
σ∗- equilibrium by Ma (2000) is closest to our approach. In his model, players use
ambiguous plans modeled by sets of probability distributions over acts. The author also
mentions the possibility to create Knightian uncertainty. In difference to our approach he
relies entirely on subjective preference representations and focuses on belief systems and
thus on equilibrium in beliefs. An interesting aspect of his paper is that it models the
possibility to create ambiguity with pre-play communication.
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Summary
In this thesis I propose a framework for normal and extensive form games where players
can use Knightian uncertainty strategically. In such Ellsberg games, ambiguity-averse
players may render their actions objectively ambiguous by using devices such as Ellsberg
urns, in addition to the standard mixed strategies. This simple change in the foundations
leads to a number of interesting phenomena.
While Nash equilibria remain equilibria in the extended game, there arise new Ellsberg
equilibria with distinct outcomes. This happens especially in games with an information
structure in which a player has the possibility to threaten his opponents. I illustrate
this with the example of a negotiation game with three players. This mediated peace
negotiation does not have a Nash equilibrium with peace outcome, but does have a peace
equilibrium when ambiguity is a possible strategy. That a game with more than two players
can have interesting non-Nash Ellsberg equilibria is traced back to results on subjective
equilibria.
Ellsberg equilibria are mathematically characterized by the Principle of Indifference
in Distributions. In an Ellsberg equilibrium, players are indifferent between all mixed
strategies contained in the Ellsberg equilibrium strategy. Furthermore, I observe that
in two-player games players can immunize against strategic ambiguity by playing their
maximin strategy (if a completely mixed Nash equilibrium exists).
I analyze Ellsberg equilibria in two-person games with common and conflicting interests.
I provide a number of examples and general results how to determine the Ellsberg equilibria
of these games. The equilibria of conflicting interest games (modified Matching Pennies)
turn out to be consistent with experimental deviations from Nash equilibrium play.
Finally, I define extensive form Ellsberg games. Under the assumption of dynamically
consistent (rectangular) Ellsberg strategies, I prove a result analog to Kuhn’s theorem:
rectangular Ellsberg strategies and Ellsberg behavior strategies are equivalent.
Keywords Knightian Uncertainty in Games, Strategic Ambiguity, Ellsberg Games, Ex-
tensive Form Ellsberg Games, Kuhn’s Theorem
Re´sume´
Dans cette the`se, je propose un cadre d’analyse permettant d’e´tudier les jeux sous forme
normale et les jeux sous forme extensive dans lesquels les joueurs peuvent utiliser l’incerti-
tude Knightienne de manie`re strate´gique. Dans ces jeux, appele´s jeux d’Ellsberg, les
joueurs adverses a` l’ambigu¨ıte´ ont la possibilite´ de rendre leurs actions objectivement
ambigue¨s en utilisant comme instrument strate´gique des urnes d’Ellsberg, en plus des
strate´gies mixtes usuelles. Ce changement simple me`ne a` de nombreux phe´nome`nes
inte´ressants.
Bien que les e´quilibres de Nash restent des e´quilibres dans le jeu e´tendu, il peut exister
de nouveaux e´quilibres d’Ellsberg avec des re´sultats distincts des re´sultats d’e´quilibre de
Nash. Ceci se produit notamment dans des jeux dont la structure d’information permet
a` un joueur de menacer ses adversaires. J’illustre ce phe´nome`ne a` l’aide d’un exemple de
ne´gociation de paix a` trois joueurs. Dans ce jeu, la paix n’est jamais une issue d’e´quilibre
de Nash, mais le jeu posse`de un e´quilibre d’Ellsberg menant a` la paix lorsque les joueurs
peuvent utiliser des strate´gies ambigue¨s. Dans les jeux a` plus de deux joueurs, l’existence
d’e´quilibres d’Ellsberg qui ne sont pas des e´quilibres de Nash est explique´e a` l’aide de
re´sultats sur les e´quilibres subjectifs.
Les e´quilibres d’Ellsberg se caracte´risent mathe´matiquement par le Principe d’Indiffe´-
rence dans les Distributions. Les joueurs sont indiffe´rents entre toutes les strate´gies mixtes
contenues dans la strate´gie d’e´quilibre d’Ellsberg. De plus, on observe que dans les jeux
a` deux joueurs, les joueurs peuvent s’immuniser contre l’ambigu¨ıte´ strate´gique en jouant
leurs strate´gies maximin (lorsqu’il existe un e´quilibre de Nash comple`tement mixte).
J’analyse des e´quilibres d’Ellsberg dans des jeux a` deux joueurs a` inte´reˆts communs et
oppose´s. Je pre´sente des exemples et des re´sultats ge´ne´raux permettant de de´terminer les
e´quilibres d’Ellsberg dans ces jeux. Les e´quilibres d’Ellsberg des jeux a` inte´reˆts oppose´s
(des jeux “cache bouton” modifie´s) sont en ade´quation avec les comportements observe´s
dans des e´tudes expe´rimentales.
Finalement, je de´finis les jeux d’Ellsberg sous forme extensive. Sous l’hypothe`se de
cohe´rence dynamique (rectangularite´) des strate´gies d’Ellsberg, je de´montre un re´sultat
analogue au the´ore`me de Kuhn: des strate´gies d’Ellsberg rectangulaires sont e´quivalentes
a` des strate´gies d’Ellsberg comportementales.
Mots cle´s Incertitude Knightienne dans les jeux, ambigu¨ıte´ strate´gique, jeux d’Ellsberg,
jeux d’Ellsberg sous forme extensive, The´ore`me de Kuhn
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